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Zusammenfassung
Die hier vorgestellte Studie befasst sich mit einer der Grundannahmen der psychoanalytischen
Theorie: der Existenz zweier verschiedener Arten mentaler Prozesse, genannt Prima¨r - und
Sekunda¨rprozess. Gema¨ß Freud ﬁndet sich der Sekunda¨rprozess in unserem wachen bewussten
Denken und Erleben wieder, welches vorwiegend rational und logisch ausgerichtet ist. Demge-
genu¨ber beschreibt der Prima¨rprozess eine eher irrationale Form des Denkens. Er umfasst
Mechanismen wie Verdichtung, Verschiebung und Symbolisierung, die sich vor allem in unbe-
wussten Prozessen wiederﬁnden, wie sie beispielsweise Tra¨umen, Fehlleistungen oder Phan-
tasien zugrunde liegen.
Im Jahre 1917 machte Po¨tzl erstmals die Entdeckung, dass nicht registrierte Teile eines un-
terhalb der Wahrnehmungsschwelle pra¨sentierten Reizes in den nachfolgenden Tra¨umen auf-
tauchen. Allerdings stellte er dabei fest, dass diese Teile vor ihrem Wiederauftreten bedeut-
same Transformationen und Entstellungen durchgemacht haben. Interessanterweise erinnern
diese Transformationen stark an die Mechanismen des Prima¨rprozesses (z.B. Verdichtung,
Verschiebung und Symbolisierung). Somit scheint diese Entdeckung Freud’s Hypothese, dass
Tra¨ume nach den Prinzipien des Prima¨rprozesses organisiert sind, zu besta¨tigen.
In der vorliegenden Studie wenden wir die Methode der subliminalen Stimulation auf den
Schlafzyklus an, um unbewusste Prozesse wa¨hrend des Schlafes zu untersuchen. Ziel dieser
Studie ist es heraus zu ﬁnden, ob sich diese Prozesse im REM- und non-REM-Schlaf unter-
scheiden und ob sich diese Unterschiede dem Freudschen Konzept vom Prima¨r- und Sekunda¨r-
prozess zuordnen lassen. Bislang gibt es nur eine einzige Studie, die die Eﬀekte eines im
Wachzustand subliminal pra¨sentierten Stimulus auf die gedanklichen Abla¨ufe im REM- und
non-REM-Schlaf untersucht (Shevrin and Fisher, 1967). Wir mo¨chten diese fru¨hen Ergeb-
nisse replizieren und erweitern, indem wir zusa¨tzliche Stimuli verwenden und daru¨ber hinaus
neurophysiologische Daten erheben und analysieren. Unsere Haupthypothese lautet, dass
im REM-Schlaf, in dem meist bizarre, phantasievolle und irreale Tra¨ume erlebt werden, der
Prima¨rprozess der vorherrschende Denkmodus ist. Der non-REM-Schlaf auf der anderen Seite,
der eher ku¨rzere, weniger bizarre, sondern vermehrt gedankenartige Tra¨ume hervorbringt, ist
vermutlich vermehrt durch sekunda¨rprozesshafte Abla¨ufe charakterisiert.
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Um diese Hypothese zu untersuchen, wurde 20 Probanden vor dem Schlafengehen ein vi-
sueller Stimulus subliminal dargeboten. Dabei handelte es sich um einen speziellen Rebus-
Stimulus, der es aufgrund seiner Doppeldeutigkeit mo¨glich macht, sowohl prima¨r- als auch
sekunda¨rprozesshafte Abla¨ufe zu untersuchen. Die Probanden wurden im Verlauf der Nacht
insgesamt sechsmal geweckt (dreimal aus dem REM-Schlaf und dreimal aus dem non-REM-
Schlaf Stadium 2) und nach jeder Weckung aufgefordert, verschiedene Aufgaben zu erfu¨llen
(einen Traumbericht abliefern, vier Minuten frei assoziieren, sowie das erste in den Sinn kom-
mende Bild aufmalen). Vor allem die Analyse der freien Assoziationen zeigte, dass die men-
talen Abla¨ufe im non-REM-Schlaf wie erwartet durch den Sekunda¨rprozess charakterisiert
sind. Assoziationen nach REM-Schlaf Weckungen hingegen ließen starke prima¨rprozesshafte
Einﬂu¨sse erkennen. Diese Ergebnisse zeigen eine deutliche U¨bereinstimmung mit denen der
Originalstudie (Shevrin and Fisher, 1967).
Um diese Ergebnisse zu erweitern, verwendeten wir außerdem die geometrischen GeoCat-
Stimuli von Brakel et al. (Brakel et al., 2000, 2002; Brakel and Shevrin, 2005). Diese geo-
metrischen Figuren bestehen aus verschiedenen Items, die hinsichtlich speziﬁscher Gemein-
samkeiten untereinander beurteilt werden mu¨ssen und auf diese Weise ebenfalls prima¨r- und
sekunda¨rprozesshaftes Denken untersuchen. Wie erwartet, zeigte sich nach Weckungen aus
dem non-REM-Schlaf die erwartete Dominanz von Entscheidungen auf Basis des Sekunda¨r-
prozesses. Die erwartete Dominanz von prima¨rprozesshaften Entscheidungen nach REM-
Schlaf Weckungen konnte hingegen nicht gezeigt werden.
Daru¨ber hinaus wurden die elektrophysiologischen Daten der REM- und non-REM-Schlaf-
phasen analysiert, die den jeweiligen Weckungen voraus gingen. Auf diese Weise sollte un-
tersucht werden, ob Vera¨nderungen innerhalb der Power im Alpha- und Theta-Frequenzband
mit Vera¨nderungen im prima¨r- und sekunda¨rprozesshaften Denken assoziiert sind. Obwohl
vorherige Studien gezeigt haben, dass erho¨hte Alpha-Aktivita¨t mit Kreativita¨t und Original-
ita¨t assoziiert ist, konnte die erwartete Beziehung zwischen Alpha Power und dem Prima¨r-
prozess nicht besta¨tigt werden. Erho¨hte Theta-Aktivita¨t auf der anderen Seite, welche mit
ho¨heren kognitiven Funktionen assoziiert ist, korrelierte gema¨ß der Hypothese mit sekunda¨r-
prozesshaften Antworten. Allerdings handelt es sich hierbei um sehr vorla¨uﬁge und ex-
ploratorische Ergebnisse.
Zusammenfassend liefert die Studie vor allem anhand des subliminal pra¨sentieren Rebus-
Stimulus wichtige empirische Belege fu¨r die These, dass die gedanklichen Abla¨ufe im REM-
Schlaf prima¨rprozesshaft organisiert sind, wa¨hrend im non-REM-Schlaf sekunda¨rprozesshafte
Abla¨ufe vorherrschen. Mo¨gliche Gru¨nde dafu¨r, dass dieser Eﬀekt nicht auch unter Verwen-
dung der GeoCat-Items demonstriert werden konnte, sowie eine mo¨gliche Beziehung zwischen
elektrophysiologischen Markern und prima¨r- bzw. sekunda¨rprozesshaften Denkprozessen wer-
den diskutiert.
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Die Bedeutung dieser Studie liegt darin, dass sie einen wichtigen Beitrag zur empirischen
Validierung eines der psychoanalytischen Kernkonzepte liefert. Dies ist vor allem aktuell be-
deutsam, da die Psychoanalyse heute mehr denn je gefordert ist, empirische Belege fu¨r ihre
theoretischen Konstrukte zu liefern, um ihre Glaubwu¨rdigkeit weiterhin aufrecht erhalten zu
ko¨nnen.
Summary
The presented study deals with one of the fundamental psychoanalytic assumptions: the ex-
istence of two diﬀerent ways of mental functioning called primary and secondary process. In
Freudian theory, the secondary process dominates our conscious, awake, and alert way of
thinking and functioning which is mostly rational and logical. The primary process, however,
describes a more irrational way of thinking and comprises mechanisms like condensation,
displacement, and symbolization. These mechanisms can mainly be found in unconscious
processes underlying dreams, slips of the tongue, fantasies, and symptoms.
In 1917, Po¨tzl discovered that unnoticed parts of a visual stimulus presented below the per-
ception threshold appeared in the subject’s following dreams. However, these parts had un-
dergone signiﬁcant transformations and distortions before their reoccurrence. Interestingly,
these transformations closely resemble the mechanisms of the primary process (e.g. conden-
sation, displacement, symbolization). This ﬁnding seemed to support Freud’s hypothesis that
dreams are organized along primary process lines.
In our study, we apply the subliminal method to the sleep-dream cycle to study unconscious
thought processes during sleep. We aim at ﬁnding out whether these processes diﬀerentiate
REM- and non-REM-sleep and match the Freudian idea of primary and secondary process
thinking. So far, only one single study has investigated the eﬀects of a waking subliminal
stimulus on REM- and non-REM-sleep mentation (Shevrin and Fisher, 1967). We wish to
replicate these early ﬁndings and extend them by using additional stimuli and by record-
ing neurophysiological measurements. Our main hypothesis is that during REM-sleep, when
most bizarre, fanciful, and irrational dreams occur, the primary process is the dominant mode
of mental functioning. Non-REM-sleep, however, when dreams are mainly characterized as
thought-like, is supposed to be characterized by secondary process mechanisms.
To investigate our main hypothesis, 20 subjects were presented a visual stimulus subliminally
before retiring to bed. A special rebus stimulus able to elicit diﬀerent levels of associations was
applied to allow for tracking primary and secondary process inﬂuences. Being awakened three
times from REM-sleep and three times from non-REM-sleep (stage 2), subjects were asked to
perform several tasks (give a dream report, have four minutes of free association, and draw
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the ﬁrst image coming to mind). As revealed by the free associations (which are supposed
to be most capable of catching the ongoing process underlying the preceding sleep stage),
non-REM-sleep mentation is indeed marked by secondary process mechanisms. Associations
following REM-sleep awakenings, on the other side, revealed strong primary process inﬂu-
ences. These ﬁndings are in great accordance with the results of the original study (Shevrin
and Fisher, 1967).
To extend these ﬁndings, we used the geometrical GeoCat stimuli of Brakel et al. (Brakel
et al., 2000, 2002; Brakel and Shevrin, 2005). These geometrical items ask for two diﬀerent
kinds of similarity choices which index either primary or secondary process thinking. Again,
awakenings from non-REM-sleep showed the expected predominance of secondary process
choices. The hypothesized predominance for primary process choices after REM-sleep awak-
enings, however, could not be demonstrated.
Finally, the electrophysiological data preceding the respective awakenings from REM- and
non-REM-sleep was analyzed to investigate whether power changes in the alpha and theta
frequency band are related to changes in primary and secondary process thinking. Although
previous studies have shown that increased alpha power is associated with creativity and
originality, the hypothesized relationship between alpha power and primary process thinking
could not be observed. Increased theta power, on the other hand, as an index for higher cog-
nitive functioning, seems indeed to be correlated with secondary process answers, although
these ﬁndings are preliminary.
Summarizing, the current study demonstrates that the same subliminal stimulus can be pro-
cessed during sleep in signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways. It was thus possible to provide experimental
evidence that mentation during non-REM-sleep is organized along secondary process lines,
while REM-sleep mentation is characterized by primary process mechanisms. Reasons for the
failure to demonstrate the same eﬀect using the GeoCat items, as well as a possible relation-
ship between electrophysiological markers and primary and secondary thinking, are discussed.
The importance of this study lies within the fact that it contributes to the experimental val-
idation of one of the psychoanalytical core concepts. This is especially important because
psychoanalysis is now being challenged more than ever to provide empirical evidence for its
theoretical constructs to maintain and to increase its credibility.
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1. Introduction
1.1 Psychoanalysis - empirical science or hermeneutic disci-
pline?
According to Freud, the term “psychoanalysis” comprises three aspects: a scientiﬁc theoretic
construct (psychoanalytic theory), a method for the investigation of unconscious processes
(psychoanalytic method), and a technique for the therapeutic treatment of psychic disorders
(psychoanalytic therapy). However, especially the question as to whether psychoanalysis can
be regarded as empirical science has never been as hotly debated as it is today, “at a time
when so many voices are calling more loudly than ever for the total rejection of psychoanalysis
- as a therapy, as a science, and as a movement” (Holt, 2009, p.86). Although psychoanalysis
has always had to face strong objections and manifold criticism since its emergence at the
beginning of the 20th century, its scientiﬁc status has been especially under attack since the
actual “decade of the brain” produced such a ﬂood of experimental ﬁndings. Confronted with
this ﬂood of putative hard facts produced within the ﬁeld of neurosciences, psychoanalysts
are being explicitly challenged to underpin the state of psychoanalysis as an empirical science.
Indeed, psychoanalysis is, above all, a clinical method for the treatment of patients suﬀering
from psychological disorders and clearly derives from a clinical and not an experimental tradi-
tion. Nevertheless, it comprises a wide range of expansive theories embracing elements of the
human being like mental disorders, symptom formation, hallucinosis, development, dreams,
slips of the tongue, emotions, motivation, aﬀect, humor, religion, culture, and much more.
But despite its large, all-engulﬁng and far-reaching impact on all these diﬀerent aspects of
human life, the few clinical case studies psychoanalytic theory is mainly based upon are highly
anecdotal in nature. Psychoanalysis, it seems, is and always has been far better at generating
hypotheses than at systematically validating them. Experimental setups, clearly formulated
hypotheses, controlled observations, and statistically signiﬁcant ﬁndings are largely missing.
Hence, psychoanalysis has undoubtedly missed the opportunity to “develop a systematic, in-
vestigative, research-oriented dimension to its science” (Shevrin, 2000, p.34). Shevrin goes on
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and summarizes the dilemma of psychoanalysis:
[I]t has remained with a few signiﬁcant exceptions a clinical science, its major interest and
investment devoted to the treatment of patients and the training of clinicians. If it has
a research interest, it is in research aimed at proving the eﬀectiveness of psychoanalytic
treatment and in studying the nature of the analytic process. (Shevrin, 2000, p.34-35)
The apparent distrust of empirical research might be explained by the fear of many psycho-
analysts that experimental testing leads to an oversimpliﬁcation and reductionism of psy-
choanalytic theory. An empirical approach is assumed not to take the complexity of clinical
phenomena into account, and to disregard the dynamic processes taking place unconsciously
between analyst and patient. Furthermore, experimental psychoanalytic research is supposed
to miss “the deeper aspects of oedipal and pre-oedipal, sexual and aggressive fantasy life and
conﬂicts” (Kernberg, 2006, p.902). Another reason for the apparent failure to put psychoana-
lytic assumptions to testable experimentation is the lack of an immediate use for the analytic
practice. On the other hand, clinical evidence and anecdotal case studies do not satisfactorily
fulﬁll contemporary scientiﬁc standards or, as Westen puts it, the “recognition that “I had a
patient once” is not the ﬁrmest of epistemological foundations” (Westen, 1998, p.334). This,
however, has led to the “insularity and anti-intellectualism” (Kandel, 1998, p.467-468) char-
acteristic especially of psychoanalysis in the past 50 years.
Accordingly, critics like Gru¨nbaum (1984; 2001; 2006), Crews (1986; 1996), or Macmillan
(1991) claim that Freudian theories clearly lack “any observational basis, being drawn en-
tirely from nonempirical sources” (Holt, 2009, p.86). Very harshly, Crews downgrades psy-
choanalysis to “a faith like any other” and states that “Freudianism has become (. . . ) the
paradigmatic example of doctrine that compels irrational loyalty” (Crews, 1986, p.12). Sim-
ilarly, Gru¨nbaum speaks about the “biblical deference” (Gru¨nbaum, 2001, p.106) of most
psychoanalysts. Westen made a similar observation and states that for years “many in the
psychoanalytic community have treated psychoanalysis as a religion and have been more in-
terested in protecting than testing psychoanalytic dogma” (Westen, 1998, p.334). It is widely
criticized that the central presuppositions of psychoanalysis are largely taken for granted, and
emphasized that it is indispensable that these assumptions are put to the test. By doing so,
the famous critique by Popper (1963) that Freud’s psychoanalytic theory is a non-falsiﬁable
pseudoscience could be answered. Hence, empirical research investigating the basic princi-
ples underlying psychoanalytic theory is very much needed, so that the theory itself can be
exposed to falsiﬁcation. These basic principles of psychoanalysis are:
1. The existence of a psychological unconscious: Unconscious processes exist; thoughts, feel-
ings, and motives can occur entirely unconsciously. Furthermore, these unconscious pro-
cesses have a strong inﬂuence on conscious processes.
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2. The role of free associations: By applying the method of free association, which is one
of the most important techniques in psychoanalytic treatment, unconscious elements are
supposed to be revealed.
3. The existence of two diﬀerent modes of mental functioning - primary and secondary pro-
cess: Conscious and unconscious processes diﬀer with regard to their prevailing mental
organization. While unconscious processes are dominated by primary process thinking,
conscious processes are largely organized along secondary process lines.
However, designing experiments based on the theory which is put to test, runs the risk of
circularity. Brakel accordingly claims:
The ﬁndings of a method cannot provide evidence for its own assumptions. (. . . ) Thus,
postulates or assumptions must gain support from ﬁndings outside the methods that
presuppose those same assumptions. (Brakel, 1994, p.41)
Hence, the challenge psychoanalysis has to answer is to search for independent evidence-
based support for its fundamental propositions (Popper, 1963; Gru¨nbaum, 1984; Edelson,
1990; Shevrin, 1995; Shevrin et al., 1996). Following this challenge, more and more contem-
porary psychoanalysts plead for more scientiﬁc research within the ﬁeld of psychoanalysis
(e.g. Schachter, 2005; Meissner, 2006; Jime´nez, 2007; Wallerstein, 2009; Chiesa, 2010).1 Fur-
thermore, the call for an interchange between psychoanalysis and neighbouring disciplines,
such as cognitive psychology, social psychology, or neuropsychology, gets louder. Especially
the connection between psychoanalysis and neuroscience has become very popular recently
- with good reason. Despite its wealth of signiﬁcant and meaningful ﬁndings, neuroscience
(as well as cognitive psychology) lacks a global and comprehensive theory which “explains
more than the immediate set of ﬁndings at hand, and one that can generate an explanation
of ﬁndings at a conceptual and phenomenological distance from the original ground on which
the theory was based” (Shevrin, 2000, p.34). What is handled as theory within neuroscience
or cognitive psychology is often not much more than an empirical generalization of several
ﬁndings, rather than a true theory. As described above, psychoanalysis faces the opposite
dilemma. However, according to the often-cited statement of Nobel-prize winner Kandel,
“psychoanalysis still represents the most coherent and intellectually satisfying view of the
mind” (Kandel, 1999, p.505), but - one might wish to add - a view without empirical support
or scientiﬁc foundation. Hence, the convergence of both disciplines promises to be a very
fruitful endeavour and has been pursued by leading specialists in both ﬁelds, such as Kandel
(1998; 1999), Panksepp (1998), Shevrin (Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968a; Shevrin et al., 1971,
1It is important to note, however, that mainly during the 50s a lot of psychoanalytically oriented research was
conducted especially in the United States (see chapter 1.2.3 and 1.3).
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1996), Solms (Solms and Saling, 1986; Solms, 1997, 1998), Kernberg (2006), and many more.
It is important not to lose sight of the fact that this was exactly what Freud, being originally
trained as a neurologist, had in mind. At the time he started to immerse himself into the
implication of unconscious mental processes, he intended to sketch a neural model of behavior
as a basis for a scientiﬁc psychology. However, since brain sciences at that time were still very
immature, he abandoned his idea of a neural model and turned towards a purely psycholog-
ical, mentalistic conceptualization of the mind and the psyche. Still, he never doubted that
one day the neural basis for his concepts would be found:
Das Lehrgeba¨ude der Psychoanalyse, das wir geschaﬀen haben, ist in Wirklichkeit ein
U¨berbau, der irgendeinmal auf sein organisches Fundament aufgesetzt werden soll.2 (Freud,
1917, p.377)
Summarizing, psychoanalysis is very much in need of opening itself to an empirical approach
and to other disciplines if it wants to “regain its intellectual energy” (Kandel, 1999, p.506)
and strengthen its scientiﬁc status. With our work, we wish to contribute to the independent
experimental validation of one of the fundamental psychoanalytic presuppositions, namely
the existence of two diﬀerent modes of thinking: primary and secondary process thinking.
1.2 The Freudian concept of primary and secondary process
thinking
As early as in his Entwurf einer Psychologie (1895), Freud described what has been ap-
praised as “epoch-making distinction” (Klein, 1967, p.130) and Freud’s “most fundamental
contribution to psychology” (Jones, 1953, p.389): the distinction between the two principles
of mental functioning - the primary and the secondary process.
As Freud hypothesized, the so-called primary process is developmentally earlier in both, on-
togeny and phylogeny (Freud, 1900). This “more primitive form” of thinking (Holt, 2009,
p.3) is ruled by the pleasure principle. Excitation seeks immediate discharge to establish an
“identity of perception”3, i.e. something that is perceived as being identical with the experi-
ence of satisfaction. It strives for wish fulﬁllment and the gratiﬁcation of drives and needs by
the shortest path - either motorical or hallucinatory. The primary process is further marked
by freely displaceable cathexes and free transferences of intensities from one idea to another.
Repeated transformations and displacements of this kind lead to condensations of intensities.
2(Engl.: The theoretical structure of psychoanalysis that we have created is in truth a superstructure, which
will one day have to be set upon its organic foundation.)
3(“Wahrnehmungsidentita¨t” (Freud, 1900, p.571))
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Thus, the “intensity of an entire train of thought may ultimately be concentrated in a single
conceptual unit”4. These mechanisms of condensation (i.e. two or more diﬀerent elements
are combined to form a new one) and displacement (i.e. intensity attached to one speciﬁc
idea is displaced onto another, less frightening one), as well as symbolization, substitution,
compromise-formation, “omnipotence of thought, pars pro toto” (Rapaport, 1951, p.694), and
“superﬁcial associations”5 characterize primary process thinking. It is hallucinatory, unreal-
istic, not time-bound, and irrational. The primary process prevails in the unconscious (see
below). Therefore, not only the mental activity of young children (until the age of about
seven; see Burstein, 1959; Brakel et al., 2002) operates under primary process principles. It
also prevails in all diﬀerent kinds of phenomena which reveal close relationships to unconscious
processes such as neurotic and psychotic symptoms, slips of the tongue and other parapraxes,
jokes, transference manifestation, fantasies and free associations, as well as altered states of
consciousness (e.g. sleep, dreams, hypnosis).
The“more sophisticated” (Holt, 2009, p.3) secondary process develops in the course of life and
functions to inhibit and control the primary process. It comprises the more mature mode of
mental functioning and can be found in our awake and conscious thinking and in experiences
which are ruled by the reality principle. It aims at establishing an “identity of thought”6.
Impulses and instinctual urges do not need to be satisﬁed immediately, since the secondary
process is “attuned to the eﬃcient attainment of goals in reality with the delayed gratiﬁcation
of impulses that is necessary” (Holt, 2009, p.3). It is an ordered and goal-directed thought-
process - mostly logical, rational, non-hallucinatory, self-correcting, and realistic. However,
it is important to note, as Gill points out, that “there is no such thing as “pure” primary
process. Even a product involving condensation and displacement must be a compromise-
formation expressing the functioning of both primary and secondary processes” (Gill, 1967,
p.288). Similarly, Rapaport claims that there is no “sharp dichotomy” between these two
modes of mental functioning, but rather a “continuous transition” (Rapaport, 1951, p.709).
He also refers to the diﬀerent states of consciousness from the most vigilant waking state to
the deepest sleep stage, as well as those special states of consciousness induced by medica-
tion, drugs, hypnosis or meditation and claims that “as one descends levels of consciousness,
thinking is increasingly taken over by symbolic, transformative, dreamlike ways of processing
information” (Holt, 2009, p.33), that is by primary process thinking.
Table 1.1 summarizes Freud’s major propositions about his theory of primary and secondary
process thinking taken from Die Traumdeutung (1900) and the Formulierungen u¨ber
die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschens (1911).
4(“[Die] Intensita¨t eines ganzen Gedankenzugs [kann] schließlich in einem einzigen Vorstellungselement gesam-
melt sein.” (Freud, 1900, p.565))
5(“oberﬂa¨chliche Assoziationen”(Freud, 1900, p.567))
6(“Denkidentita¨t” (Freud, 1900, p.571))
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Primary Process Secondary Process
- genetically older, present from the ﬁrst
- residue of an early developmental stage
when it was the only kind of mental process
- regressive
- later, more adult
- unfolds during the course of life and in-
hibits and overlays primary process only
quite late
- the only process admitted in the uncon-
scious
- the process resulting from inhibitions im-
posed by the (pre)conscious
- ruled by the pleasure principle
- entirely disregards reality testing
- wards oﬀ displeasure by repression
- ruled by the reality principle
- uses and respects reality testing
- impartial passing of judgment (true/false)
- aims at identity of perception (hallucina-
tory ideation, phantasizing)
- wish fulﬁllment by the shortest path
- seeks immediate gratiﬁcation by any avail-
able means
- aims at identity of thought (more abstract,
non-hallucinatory thinking)
- detouring to gratiﬁcation through reality
- seeks ultimate gratiﬁcation by roundabout
route through reality
- mostly unconscious and non-verbal
- occurs only if an unconscious wish, derived
from infancy and in a state of repression,
is transferred to it
- mostly conscious and verbal
- cathecting (drive-)energy is free and easily
capable of discharge, by condensation and
displacement
- cathecting energy is bound, most of it kept
in a state of quiescence
- discharge inhibited by means of hyper-
cathexes
Table 1.1: Freud’s major propositions about primary and secondary process thinking (adapted and
modiﬁed from Holt, 2009)
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1.2.1 The primary process and the unconscious
The demonstration of the existence of the unconscious and of its huge impact on our mental
life is without doubt one of Freud’s major contributions. Although he might not have been
the one to discover the unconscious (see James, 1890), he was surely the one to stress its
importance and to investigate it in more detail.
Following his earlier topographic model, “the mental apparatus”7 consists of a system called
preconscious (Pcs.) and a system named unconscious (Ucs.). Preconscious contents are not
conscious yet, but principally capable of consciousness, e.g. when they achieve a certain in-
tensity or are considered with suﬃcient attention (Freud, 1912, 1915). Unconscious contents,
however, although they strongly inﬂuence ourselves, our actions, aﬀect, and thoughts, do not
have access to consciousness. They need to pass the system Pcs. ﬁrst, but a censorship is
interconnected between Ucs. and Pcs. If access to consciousness is refused by the censorship,
those unconscious contents are repressed and stay unconscious (Freud, 1900).8 Thus, the cen-
sorship functions to protect ourselves from a breakthrough of unconscious wishes and drives.
It helps to control our waking life and our voluntary conscious actions and can, therefore, be
seen as the “guardian of our mental health”9. If unconscious contents do get access to con-
sciousness through the preconscious, they have to undergo various changes and modiﬁcations
like condensation, displacement, and symbolization until they cannot be recognized anymore
as such. This happens in dreams for example (see chapter 1.2.2), or in psychotic patients
whose censorship is overwhelmed by the unconscious excitation which may result in halluci-
natory regression. Following Freud, the third system consciousness (Cs.) holds the function
of the sense organ or perception-system. He assumed that the transition from Pcs. to Cs. is
also guarded by a censorship (Freud, 1900, 1915). Instead of the “once so all-powerful and
over-shadowing all else”10 consciousness, he declared the unconscious as the “general basis of
psychic life”11 and the true psychic reality. According to his hypothesis, the unconscious is the
large circle which includes the smaller circle of the conscious. Everything has a preliminary
unconscious stage as Freud claims repeatedly:
[A]lles Bewußte hat eine unbewußte Vorstufe.12 (Freud, 1900, p.580)
and later
7(“der seelische Apparat” (Freud, 1900, p.513))
8According to Freud the unconscious thought is barred from consciousness by active forces, such as defence
and resistance (Freud, 1912).
9(“Wa¨chter unser geistigen Gesundheit” (Freud, 1900, p.540))
10(“einst allma¨chtigen, alles andere verdeckende” (Freud, 1900, p.583))
11(“allgemeine Basis des psychischen Lebens” (Freud, 1900, p.580))
12(Engl.: Everything conscious has a preliminary unconscious stage.)
1.2. The Freudian concept of primary and secondary process thinking 8
Das Unbewußte ist eine regelma¨ßige und unvermeidliche Phase in den Vorga¨ngen, die
unsere psychische Ta¨tigkeit begru¨nden; jeder psychische Akt beginnt als unbewußter und
kann entweder so bleiben oder sich weiterentwickelnd zum Bewußtsein fortschreiten, je
nachdem, ob er auf Widerstand triﬀt oder nicht.13 (Freud, 1915, p.33-34; see also chapter
1.2.3)
In his metapsychological writing Das Unbewußte (1915), Freud described the nature of
the systems Ucs. and Pcs. in more detail. According to this, the unconscious consists of
drive representations which seek discharge of their cathexis. It is organized along primary
process lines (see above) and encompasses the respective mechanisms (condensation, displace-
ment, etc.). In this system, there is no doubt, no negation, no temporal order, no regards
for reality; everything is subject to the pleasure principle. Repressed contents are part of
the unconscious, and this repressed unconscious is named the dynamic unconscious which
cannot become conscious - no matter how intense or eﬀective it is. As stated by Shevrin,
this dynamic unconscious “refers to the motivated inhibition of experience and to such de-
fenses as repression, isolation, and so forth” (Shevrin, 1992, p.136). Preconscious contents, on
the contrary, follow the laws of the secondary process and are subject to the reality principle.
Discharge of chathexed ideas is inhibited and displacement and condensation hardly appear.14
One has to keep in mind, however, that the assumption of the existence of an unconscious had
been strongly refuted over and over again. In 1890, even before Freud’s detailed description
of unconscious processes, William James found ten arguments against the mere existence of
an unconscious (James, 1890). Freud himself answered objections of this kind and stated in
Das Unbewußte (1915): “Our right to assume the existence of something mental that is
unconscious, and to employ that assumption for the purpose of scientiﬁc work, is disputed in
many quarters. To this we can apply that our assumption of the unconscious is necessary and
legitimate.”15 But the objections did not stop. Especially in the 1950s, the scientiﬁc ﬁeld was
strongly dominated by advocates of behaviorism who believed only in observable and mea-
surable behavior, which can be fragmented into stimulus and response. All intrapsychic and
cognitive processes, which could not be measured objectively, had been refused and declared
13(Engl.: The unconscious is a regular and inevitable phase in the processes constituting our psychic activity;
every psychic act begins as an unconscious one, and it may either remain so or go on developing into
consciousness, depending on whether it encounters resistance or not.)
14In 1923 Freud replaced the former topographic model by the new structural model in which he divided
the psychic apparatus into the three subsystems id, ego, and super ego. The substantives unconscious,
preconscious, and consciousness were changed into adjectives. Later, in his Abriß der Psychoanalyse
(1940), he clearly assigned the unconscious and the primary process to the id.
15(“Die Berechtigung, ein unbewußtes Seelisches anzunehmen und mit dieser Annahme wissenschaftlich zu
arbeiten, wird uns von vielen Seiten bestritten. Wir ko¨nnen dagegen anfu¨hren, daß die Annahme des Unbe-
wußten notwendig und legitim ist.” (Freud, 1915, p.125))
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esoteric and unscientiﬁc. Consequently, the unconscious was considered only as a psychoan-
alytic myth and even consciousness itself was rejected as being a proper subject for scientiﬁc
investigation. Nevertheless, in the 1970s, with the turn of behaviorism towards cognition,
more and more studies of cognitive psychologist - starting with Marcel (1975; 1983a; 1983b)
- actually supported the idea of unconscious processes.16 Subsequently, it is nowadays widely
accepted - even within cognitive psychology and neuroscience - that unconscious processes
do exist. Learning and memory can be implicit, perception can be subliminal, aﬀect can
be non-conscious. However, we are dealing with two diﬀerent concepts: the psychoanalytic
dynamic unconscious and the so-called cognitive unconscious (Kihlstrom, 1987) which rather
corresponds to the psychoanalytic preconscious. More speciﬁcally, “the dynamic unconscious
is a mental structure that is the seat of instincts, drives, and motivations and is subject
to irrational mentation; whereas the cognitive unconscious refers to a type of indispensable,
but rational, mental processing that occurs out of awareness, is automatic, and is not under
conscious control” (Klein Villa, 2006, p.156). Or as Eagle points out:
[I]n Freudian theory, unconscious mental processes always reveal their links to drive grat-
iﬁcation and are characterized by such primary process features as irrationality, illogical-
ity, symbolization, condensation, displacement, and so on. By contrast, the unconscious
mental processes of cognitive psychology are anything but irrational and illogical. (. . . )
[T]hese processes are intelligent, logical, and problem-solving. (Eagle, 1987, p.159)
1.2.2 The primary process and dreams
In Die Traumdeutung (1900), Freud presented his extensive and ingenious theory of dream-
ing. According to this, every dream is “the (disguised) fulﬁllment of a (suppressed, repressed)
wish”17. Hence, the incitement of each dream is a day residue - mostly indiﬀerent, quickly
perceived registrations - which conjoins with an unconscious infantile wish. The excitation
strives to become conscious by passing the preconscious. As described above, this way is
blocked during the day by the censorship. At night, however, this censorship is weakened and
the unconscious drive is able to gain access to consciousness. Since the gate to motility is
blocked during the night (see chapter 1.5), excitation cannot result in motor action. It needs
to take a regressive path and ends up in hallucinatory wish fulﬁllment.18 However, the uncon-
scious wish undergoes various changes and modiﬁcations on its way before it appears in the
dream. It is disguised and distorted by defensive necessities by means of the so-called dream
16Most of these studies used the method of subliminal stimulation which will be described in more detail in
chapter 1.3.
17(“die (verkleidete) Erfu¨llung eines (unterdru¨ckten, verdra¨ngten) Wunsches” (Freud, 1900, p.175))
18Patients with so-called REM-sleep behavioral disorder show a lack of the characteristic muscle atonia during
REM-sleep and, therefore, act out their dreams (e.g. Schenck and Mahowald, 2002; Mahowald and Schenck,
2005; Eiser, 2005).
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work. In chapter VII of Die Traumdeutung (1900), Freud introduced the mechanisms of
condensation, displacement, symbolization, and compromise-formation as essential tools of
the dream work to achieve distortion. At the end of chapter VII, these mechanisms are sum-
marized under the term primary process. Interestingly enough for the purpose of the study
described here, condensation in dreams is most obvious when it concerns words or names.
According to Freud’s theory, names are treatened as objects and are combined, condensed
and concentrated in new, often bizarre and funny word creations (Freud, 1900). These verbal
transformations can also be found in the language of schizophrenics (see Robbins, 2002, 2004),
as well as in little children who also treat words as objects and invent artiﬁcial languages.
This special feature of dream work will be used to trace back primary process mechanisms in
dream mentation in this study, as described below.
Thus, as Freud hypothesized, we can assume “two psychic forces (tendencies, systems)”19 in
dream formation: one of which is the unconscious wish underlying the dream, and the other
the censorship which enforces disguise. Hence, he distinguished the latent dream thoughts
from the manifest dream content - the former describing the unconscious repressed wish in-
stigating the dream, and the latter resulting from the defensive distortions of the former. As
Freud put it: “Traumgedanken und Trauminhalt liegen vor uns wie zwei Darstellungen dessel-
ben Inhaltes in zwei verschiedenen Sprachen”20 (Freud, 1900, p.280). Dream work functions
to convert the reasonable, latent dream thoughts into the often bizarre and incomprehensible
pictorial language of the manifest dream content. Freud warns that the symbols of this lan-
guage must not be read according to their values as pictures, but according to their meaning
as symbols. The dream is a picture-puzzle, a rebus and must be read this way. Free asso-
ciations, which are thought to provide linkages to underlying unconscious causes, are used
to trace the way back from the manifest dream content to the latent dream thoughts. The
dreamer is supposed to say whatever comes to mind about the manifest content, without con-
straints or censorship, to advance to the underlying unconscious thoughts and causes (Freud,
1900). This method has proved to be a helpful tool in the detection of unconscious ideas and
processes (see chapter 1.2.3).
Summarizing, dreams are determined by unconscious and repressed wishes which need to
connect with day residues to result in the manifest dream. Therefore, Freud declared the
dream as being the “Via regia” (Freud, 1900, p.577) to the unconscious. Dreams result from
the disguising mechanisms of dream work and represent the regression to a former, more
primitive, infantile way of thinking - the primary process. According to Freud (1911), dreams
are therefore particularly suitable for investigating the nature of primary process thinking in
more detail, since they are the remains of the supremacy of this principle and evidence of its
19(“zwei psychische Ma¨chte (Stro¨mungen, Systeme)” (Freud, 1900, p.160))
20(Engl.: Dream thoughts and dream content present themselves as two descriptions of the same content in
two diﬀerent languages.)
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power.
1.2.3 The experimental investigation of the primary process
The experimental investigation of the primary process and dreaming started more or less
accidentally in 1917 with the Viennese sensory physiologist Po¨tzl. Using the method of sub-
liminal stimulation (for a more detailed review of this method see chapter 1.3), he found
that parts of a stimulus presented below the perception threshold appeared in the manifest
content of the subsequent dreams. Since this was only the case for those parts formerly un-
registered, he postulated the law of exclusion, describing the“relationship of mutual exclusion
(. . . ) between the consciously experienced percepts and the unconsciously experienced ones
which emerged in dreams” (Po¨tzl, 1917, p.50). He further observed that those parts of the
stimulus appearing in the dream had undergone signiﬁcant transformations and distortions
before their reoccurrence. Most interestingly, those transforming and disguising mechanisms
closely resembled the mechanisms Freud had described as manifestation of the primary pro-
cess and dream work, i.e. condensation, displacement, symbolic transformation, etc. (see
chapter 1.2).21 Even earlier in 1907, Urbantschitsch had demonstrated that unnoticed regis-
trations appear in subsequent eidetic images but undergo various changes beforehand, such
as fragmentation, rotations, displacements and condensations. However, the implications of
these observations for psychoanalysis were largely ignored for a long time and a replication
of Po¨tzl’s original ﬁndings was not attempted, although later investigators made use of his
method of subliminal stimulation (e.g. Allers and Teler, 1924; Malamud and Linder, 1931).
It was not until the beginning of the 1950s when Fisher, a psychoanalyst himself, built on
these previous ﬁndings by trying to replicate and integrate them into psychoanalysis. In his
remarkable studies, he could indeed conﬁrm Po¨tzl’s results by showing that unregistered parts
of a subliminally presented stimulus did appear in the following dreams (e.g.Fisher, 1954, 1957;
Fisher and Paul, 1959; Paul and Fisher, 1959). Remarkably, the delayed appearance of these
preconscious percepts was as long as ﬁve to six days (Fisher, 1956). Furthermore, he demon-
strated that“these unnoticed elements were inﬂuenced by unconscious wishes and subjected to
primary-process transformations” (Fisher, 1960a, p.21), such as displacement, fragmentation,
condensation, symbolic transformation, composite formation, as well as to spatial dislocation,
reversals, and rotations. Luborsky and Shevrin conﬁrmed Po¨tzl’s ﬁndings, as well (Luborsky
and Shevrin, 1956; Shevrin and Luborsky, 1958). They also made the important observa-
tion, as did Fisher (Fisher, 1954, 1959, 1960b), that also consciously registered parts of the
21As Po¨tzl was originally interested in visual perception in pathological brain conditions it was in fact not
his aim to provide experimental evidence of the Freudian dream theory in the ﬁrst place. Nevertheless, his
observations were praised by Freud in a footnote of the 1919 edition of Die Traumdeutung.
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subliminally presented stimulus were incorporated into subsequent dreams. Therefore, they
suggested a modiﬁcation of Po¨tzl’s law of exclusion to the eﬀect that the dream is a better
- but not the exclusive - vehicle for the unintentional occurrence of subliminal registrations,
while intentional recall in the waking state is more eﬃcient in recovering consciously registered
parts of the stimulus. However, in contrast to these consciously registered parts, the sublimi-
nally registered percepts seem to be related to“more deeply repressed material” (Fisher, 1954,
p.78). Investigating more carefully the diﬀerent fates a stimulus undergoes after subliminal
and supraliminal exposure, Fisher summarized:
It was shown that the subliminal stimulus is drawn into the drive organization of mem-
ories, subjected to primary-process transformations, and appears in the manifest con-
tent of the dream in image form. These manifest images are related to the repressed,
drive-oriented, wish-fulﬁlling aspect of the dreams. The supraliminal stimulus, on the
other hand, appears to activate preconscious trains of secondary-process thought, direct
derivates of the stimulus emerging in the dream in verbal, conceptual form. (Fisher,
1960a, p.23)
Because unnoticed parts of a subliminal stimulus also appear in distorted ways within free
imagery and associations immediately following stimulus presentation (which was already de-
scribed by Allers and Teler (1924), Luborsky and Shevrin (1956), and Shevrin and Luborsky
(1958)), Fisher assumed that primary process transformation and distortion of subliminal
percepts begin right after exposure (Fisher, 1954, 1956, 1957).22 Hence, he suggested a modi-
ﬁcation of Freud’s dream theory since something like dream work is apparently already active
during the day. It begins at the moment the stimulus is ﬂashed and is continued during the
night. Furthermore, the concept of day residues needed to be extended to include not only
conscious percepts, but also preconscious subliminal registrations. One could thus assume
that many of the manifest dream images in fact derive from subliminal daytime percepts
which have already made contact with repressed wishes. Consequently, Fisher proposed a
model of perception in which every stimulus - subliminal or supraliminal - ﬁrst registers pre-
consciously. In a second step this preconscious percept connects with pre-existing memory
traces and results in recognition. Afterwards, it can undergo three diﬀerent fates: (1) it en-
ters consciousness immediately showing no or little primary process transformations which is
usually the case for all non-conﬂictual supraliminal stimuli; (2) it remains in the preconscious
ready to become conscious as soon as provided with suﬃcient attention, as is the case for neu-
tral subliminal stimuli; (3) it is drawn from the initial preconscious phase into the dynamic
unconscious, as is the case for stimuli which have made contact with repressed memories, like
22At the same time, this was empirical evidence for the often doubted retrieval capacity of free associations.
This is an important aspect, since free associations are still one of he main tools in investigating the uncon-
scious in psychoanalytic practice (see chapter 4.1.1).
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all conﬂictual sub- and supraliminal stimuli. These preconscious percepts connected with un-
conscious repressed wishes provide the day residues underlying dream formation, and appear
indirectly in distorted and disguised ways within the dream. Hence, “[t]he raw material of
dreaming (. . . ) is already present during the day and the dream itself arises when there is a
second activation of the unconscious wish during sleep” (Shevrin, 1986, p.387).
In this model, the preconscious plays an important role and is seen as “port of entry for
external stimuli where they can be immediately shunted into consciousness or be drawn into
repression of the dynamic unconscious” (Shevrin, 2003, p.4). Thus, consciousness is regarded
as a later optional stage which only occurs for a small part of the percepts and depends
on stimulus factors (brightness, loudness, etc.), state factors (level of activation, sleep stage,
etc.), and motivational factors (emotional content, avoidance of anxiety, conﬂict, etc.; see
Shevrin and Dickman, 1980).23 Similar to Freud’s hypothesis about the development of pri-
mary and secondary process thinking, Fisher further declares this preconscious perception as
being an ontogenetically earlier, more primitive stage of perception which is controlled by
drives, wishes, and primary process mechanisms. It is inhibited by maturation of the ego and
replaced by a more reality-oriented secondary process mode of perception (Fisher, 1954).
For a closer investigation of the primary process mechanisms of condensation and displace-
ment in responses to subliminal stimulation, Shevrin and Luborsky (1961) designed a special
stimulus - a rebus stimulus composed of the pictures of a tie and a knee. This stimulus can
be read on a semantic, conceptual secondary process level and lead to associations and ideas
related meaningfully to the pictured objects tie and knee (conceptual eﬀect). A more primary
process way of reading this stimulus, however, would result in words incorporating the clangs
of the pictured objects, such as title or penny which are related to the objects by sound, but
not by meaning (clang eﬀect). Finally, another primary process way of reading this picture-
puzzle would lead to the phonic condensation of the sounds and, therefore, to the totally new
rebus word tiny, or related associations and ideas (rebus eﬀect). Such a rebus stimulus is
based on Freud’s assumption expressed in Die Traumdeutung (1900) that the pictographic
symbols of the manifest dream, which result from the distorting mechanisms of condensation
and displacement, and the unconscious processes underlying dream formation, are rebus-like
(see chapter 1.2.2). In his Die Psychopathologie des Alltagslebens (1901b), he expanded
this idea by claiming that not only dreams but also other unconscious formations, like symp-
toms, slips of the tongue, etc. can be read as rebuses. At the same time, this goes back to
Freud’s early neurological-based work Zur Auﬀassug der Aphasien (1891) in which he
identiﬁed two levels of linguistic processing as being crucial in the understanding of the un-
conscious processing of language. The semantic level refers to the word meaning which means
23This matches the ﬁndings of the much-noticed experiments of Libet who demonstrated a neural delay of ca.
500 milliseconds preceding conscious experience of any event. He drew from this observation the very same
conclusion that all mental events begin unconsciously (Libet et al., 1967; Libet, 1992, 1993).
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words are treated as having a referential function for concepts or objects. The perceptual level
refers to the word presentation which means words are treated as concrete entities based on
their phonemic, graphemic, motoric, and kinesthetic properties.24 The main advantage of
using a subliminal rebus stimulus is that it is a reliable and objective method not only to
study its recovery under certain circumstances, but also to track its primary and secondary
process inﬂuences by means of certain predictable transformations (conceptual, clang, rebus).
It is thus possible to determine the respective dominant mode of thinking and investigate the
primary process mechanisms of condensation and displacement. Indeed, after ﬂashing the tiny
rebus subliminally, a clang eﬀect was found in the subsequent ranking of words including the
rebus word, clang-related words, as well as unrelated words, and in the description of waking
images. Hence, a primary process transformation, as Freud identiﬁed in the formation of
dreams (see chapter 1.2.2) and Fisher in subliminally presented visual stimuli (see above),
also occurs for the names of those brieﬂy ﬂashed objects. This ﬁts the observation of Freud’s
that the mechanisms of condensation and displacement can be best seen when they handle
words and names: the names of these objects were treated as concrete phonemic patterns
losing their referential function and resulting in novel words totally unrelated to their original
meanings.
Likewise, using a penny rebus, consisting of the picture of a pen and a knee, primary process
clang and rebus eﬀects were shown within free associations after subliminal, but not after
supraliminal exposure (Shevrin and Luborsky, 1961). Thus, the rebus technique turned out
to be a helpful tool in investigating the conditions under which “the change from a concep-
tual to a sensorial ordering of thought takes place - the conditions, that is, under which
secondary-process thinking gives way to primary-process thinking” (Shevrin and Luborsky,
1961, p.486-487).25
In 1967, Shevrin and Fisher went one important step further in the investigation of the pri-
mary process and dreams by combining the method of subliminal stimulation with the newly
discovered sleep-dream cycle (see chapter 1.5). Thus, they were not only able to explore pri-
mary process transformations of a subliminal stimulus in dreams, but also to compare dreams
from REM-(rapid eye movement) sleep and non-REM-sleep by awakening the subjects from
the respective sleep stage. They ﬂashed the penny stimulus for 6 ms (milliseconds) imme-
24These two diﬀerent aspects of language ﬁnally resulted in the concept of primary and secondary process think-
ing. Hence, this dual process theory of language can be seen as the basis for Freud’s later conceptualization
of the two diﬀerent principles of mental functioning.
25The hypothesis inherent in the rebus ﬁndings just described, and in Freud’s Zur Auﬀassung der Aphasien
(1891), that is “a distinct role for the perceptual aspects of words in the unconscious” (Klein Villa et al.,
2006, p.118) was more recently tested by Klein Villa et al. (2006) (see also Bazan, 2007). Using a priming
paradigm with a subliminal or supraliminal palindrome word as prime and two target alternatives, they
provided evidence for Freud’s hypothesis that word meaning and word presentation are functionally distinct
when processed unconsciously. Recent preliminary data conﬁrm this ﬁrst ﬁnding (Bazan et al., 2010).
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diately before the subject’s retiring to bed. During the night, the subjects were awakened
from REM- and non-REM-sleep and asked to fulﬁll several tasks (give a dream report, have
four minutes of free association, and draw an image). It was hypothesized that REM-sleep,
in which most dreams occur and which are described as more bizarre (see chapter 1.5), is
characterized by a more primary process mode of thinking. This hypothesis was conﬁrmed
by more penny related words within the free associations after REM-sleep awakenings (re-
bus eﬀect). Non-REM-sleep awakenings, however, were followed by signiﬁcantly more pen
and knee associates (conceptual eﬀect; Shevrin and Fisher, 1967). This was a remarkable
ﬁnding since it suggests that REM- and non-REM-sleep can be distinguished on the basis of
their respective thought processes which parallel the Freudian concept of primary and sec-
ondary process thinking. Although there have been some (but only quite rare) attempts to
investigate the eﬀects of subliminal eﬀects on dreams beyond the above mentioned pioneering
studies of Po¨tzl, Fisher and Shevrin (Kaser, 1986; Leuschner and Hau, 1992; Leuschner, 1994;
Schredl, 1999; Leuschner et al., 2000), the Shevrin and Fisher study is still the only one to
investigate the primary and secondary processing of a waking subliminal stimulus in REM-
and non-REM-sleep. However, the results have never been replicated, although they bear
such central assumptions about dreams, unconscious processes, and primary and secondary
process thinking. To make up for this major omission, the study presented here aims to
replicate and extend this original study. By this, we hope to ﬁnd supportive evidence for
the original ﬁndings which clearly demonstrate a predominance of primary process thinking
during REM-sleep, while non-REM-sleep seems to be organized along secondary process lines.
Summarizing the vast amount of studies investigating primary process thinking by means
of subliminal stimulation, one can state that altered states of consciousness, such as dreams
(Fisher, 1954, 1956, 1957; Luborsky and Shevrin, 1956; Shevrin and Luborsky, 1958), hal-
lucinations (Po¨tzl, 1915; Fisher, 1959), and hypnosis (Shevrin and Stross, 1962; Stross and
Shevrin, 1965, 1968) are especially conducive to the emergence of subliminal eﬀects and pri-
mary process operations. Also certain kinds of responses facilitate the occurrence of the
phenomenon, such as free imagery (Allers and Teler, 1924; Luborsky and Shevrin, 1956;
Fisher, 1956; Fisher and Paul, 1959; Fiss et al., 1963), drawings (Giddan, 1967; Leuschner,
1994), free associations (Urbantschitsch, 1918; Shevrin and Luborsky, 1958; Haber and Erde-
lyi, 1967; Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968b; Stross and Shevrin, 1968; Leuschner and Hau, 1992), or
Rorschach responses (Silverman and Silverman, 1964).26 Generally, a supine position of the
subject in a darkened room seems to enhance the recovery of subliminal eﬀects in comparison
with a upright-light condition (Fisher and Paul, 1959). This ﬁts to the ﬁnding of Shevrin
26Next to the question of whether unconsciously registered elements do appear in subsequent dreams, fantasies,
and images, the method of subliminal perception was also successfully used to investigate the responses to
subliminal stimulation in relation to repression as a defense mechanism (e.g. Fritzler et al., 1970; Shevrin
et al., 1969, 1996; Shevrin, 2000; Shevrin et al., 2002).
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and Luborsky that signiﬁcantly more elements of a subliminally exposed stimulus appeared
in dreams and images than in intentional recall (Shevrin and Luborsky, 1958). Snodgrass
et al. (1993) similarly found evidence that subjects performed better when told to guess the
subliminally presented stimulus by just letting the words pop into their minds, instead of
trying hard to do so. All in all, as Dixon states, a “state of eﬀortless relaxation on the part of
the subject” (Dixon, 1971, p.111) seems to be the essential condition for a subliminal eﬀect
to appear. This might be due to the fact that “when certain ego functions controlling the
higher discriminative visual perceptive processes are interfered with (. . . ) the more primitive,
primary mode of visual perception manifests itself” (Fisher, 1960a, p.34) and, therefore, sub-
liminal eﬀects are facilitated. This is conﬁrmed by studies which found that subjects with a
high capacity for regression in the service of the ego (Kris, 1952), who are more able to adopt
a passive, non-critical, regressive, and receptive position, and who can temporarily refrain
from secondary process control, show stronger subliminal eﬀects (Eagle, 1959; Fisher, 1960a).
However, not all the studies dealing with primary process thinking used the method of sub-
liminal stimulation, nor did they necessarily focus on one of the conditions (sleep, hypnosis,
etc.), or methodologies (free associations, dreams, images, etc.) mentioned above. Extensive
research had been done on the relationship between primary process organization and creativ-
ity (e.g. Kris, 1952; Pine and Holt, 1960; Domino, 1976; Suler, 1980; Martindale and Dailey,
1996; Russ, 1988, 2001). These studies suggest that access to primary process thinking - and
therefore the capability of controlled regression, loose associations, free ﬂoating energy, and
novel combinations of images and ideas - is strongly connected with creativity.
Holt developed a scoring manual designed to score primary process markers in Rorschach
responses (Holt, 1956; Holt and Havel, 1960; Holt, 1977, 2002) which was also used to score
dream reports (Levin and Harrison, 1976), Thematic Apperception Test (TAT) stories (Eagle,
1964; Horowitz, 1965), psychotherapy transcripts (Bugas, 1986), and other free verbalizations
(Goldberger, 1961). Fromm (1969) even used it to score the paintings of the Dutch painter
Hieronymus Bosch. Similarly, Martindale and Dailey developed a computerized scoring sys-
tem (the Regressive Imagery Dictionary) to analyze the amount of primary process content
in any given text (Martindale, 1975, 1990). The validity of this scoring system has been
proved in several studies, conﬁrming the hypotheses that primary process contents are more
prominent in children (West et al., 1985), psychopathology (West and Martindale, 1988), and
altered states of consciousness induced either by drugs or medication (Martindale and Fischer,
1977; West et al., 1983) or by hypnosis (Comeau and Farthing, 1985, cited by Holt, 2009).
Furthermore, Auld et al. (1968) constructed a 7-point rating scale for the scoring of primary
process thinking in dreams.
Another set of evidence, supporting the central psychoanalytic assumption of the existence
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of primary and secondary process thinking as two distinct modes of mental functioning, was
provided by Brakel and colleagues (Brakel et al., 2000, 2002; Brakel and Shevrin, 2005) and
their so-called GeoCat-experiments (= geometrical categorization). In these ingenious stud-
ies, using neutral geometrical items as stimuli, they provided experimental evidence outside
the clinical practice and independent of the psychoanalytic environment for this particular
assumption. The notion of independent evidence is an important factor since it answers the
objection made by critics of psychoanalysis who call for the use of extraclinical methods in the
investigation of psychoanalytical constructs (e.g. Popper, 1963; Gru¨nbaum, 1984; see chapter
1.1).27 Their aim was to test the hypothesis that these two distinct thought systems have
two diﬀerent organizing and categorizing principles as one formal aspect in which primary
and secondary process thinking diﬀer from each other. While primary process organization is
supposed to focus on attributional similarity (= similarity of concrete and superﬁcial features,
special attributes, parts rather than wholes), secondary process thinking should favor catego-
rizations made on the basis of relational similarity (= similarity of relations between parts)
or conﬁgurational similarity (= similarity of the total conﬁguration resulting from the way
parts are related to each other). One can refer to several remarks leading to this hypothesis,
starting with Freud. In his writing U¨ber den Traum (1901a), he states:
Einer einzigen unter den logischen Relationen, der der A¨hnlichkeit, Gemeinsamkeit, U¨ber-
einstimmung, kommt der Mechanismus der Traumbildung im ho¨chsten Ausmaße zugute.
Die Traumarbeit bedient sich dieser Fa¨lle als Stu¨tzpunkte fu¨r die Traumverdichtung,
indem sie alles, was solche U¨bereinstimmung zeigt, zu einer neuen Einheit zusammen-
zieht.28(Freud, 1901a, p.63)
In his Formulierungen u¨ber die zwei Prinzipien des psychischen Geschehens (1911),
he describes the secondary process as thinking which “went beyond mere ideational presen-
tations and was directed to the relations between impressions of objects”.29 Accordingly,
Rapaport claims: “Where the primary process (. . . ) holds sway (. . . ) everything belongs
with everything that shares an attribute of it” (Rapaport, 1951, p.708). Bruner similarly de-
scribes that secondary process thinking “employs categorization or conceptualization and the
operations by which categories are established (. . . ) and related one to the other to form a
27In fact, this also partly applies to the subliminal experiments described above, which investigate the psy-
choanalytic unconscious, since the method of subliminal stimulation itself does not presuppose dynamic
unconscious processes. Chapter 1.4.2 describes another set of experiments, using neurophysiological meth-
ods to gain evidence for psychoanalytic core assumptions totally independently of the clinical situation.
28(Engl.: One of these logical relations - that of similarity, consonance, the possession of common attributes -
is very highly favored by the mechanisms of dream-formation. The dream work makes use of such cases as
a foundation for dream-condensation, by bringing together everything that shows an agreement of this kind
into a new unity.)
29(“welches sich u¨ber das bloße Vorstellen erhob und sich den Relationen der Objekteindru¨cke zuwendete”
(Freud, 1911, p.233))
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system”, while primary process categorization is “judged for its goodness as a story by criteria
that are of a diﬀerent kind” (Bruner, 1986, p.12.13).
The conceptual roots of the experiments and the stimuli used by Brakel et al. go back to
the work on categorization by the cognitive psychologist Medin (e.g. Smith and Medin, 1981;
Murphy and Medin, 1985; Medin et al., 1990). Using special geometric ﬁgures consisting of
squares, circles, triangles, arches, etc., subjects were asked to judge which of two choices was
more similar to a presented master ﬁgure - the relationally or the attributionally similar al-
ternative (see chapter 2.2.4.1 for an example). They found that the relationally similar choice
was signiﬁcantly more often judged as being more similar. Brakel et al. extended this ﬁnding
by taking attributional similarity judgments as an index for primary process thinking and
relational responses as markers for secondary process mentation. They tested the hypothesis
that unconscious similarity judgments - as opposed to the conscious ones shown by Medin
et al. - would result in more attributional similarity choices, since unconscious mentation
is supposed to be ruled by primary process thinking (Freud, 1900; see chapter 1.2.1). In-
deed, their hypothesis was conﬁrmed by showing that when the same stimuli were presented
outside awareness by subliminal exposure, categorization was mainly attributional (Brakel
et al., 2000). By this, additional important evidence was provided for (a) the existence of
unconscious processes which (b) are organized along primary process lines - as opposed to
the predominance of secondary process thinking in conscious mentation. Extending these
experiments, it could, furthermore, be demonstrated that an indirect similarity task (“Which
of the two choices do you prefer?”) also results in more attributional responses when items are
presented subliminally than a direct task does (“Which of the two choices is more similar?”)
(Brakel, 2004). Brakel et al. could likewise conﬁrm the hypothesis that the thinking of young
children is characterized by primary process thinking while secondary process thinking only
develops in the course of the life span (Freud, 1900, see chapter 1.2). While preschoolers
made signiﬁcantly more attributional similarity choices, this changed at the age of about
seven when a shift to more relationally based similarity judgments, as an index of secondary
process thinking, was observable. This predominance of relational responses then remains sta-
ble throughout life (Brakel et al., 2002). Furthermore, they demonstrated that people with
increased state anxiety, which is supposed to be related to unconscious conﬂict (Freud, 1926),
shift toward primary process thinking - as expressed in their predominance of attributional
responses (Brakel and Shevrin, 2005).
Summarizing, whenever psychoanalytic theory predicts a shift towards primary process think-
ing, Brakel and colleagues found a predominance of attributional similarity choices in their
GeoCat-experiments. Using their geometrical ﬁgures, they could conﬁrm three implications
of Freud’s theory of primary process thinking: (a) unconscious processes are ruled along pri-
mary process lines (Brakel et al., 2000) and in indirect tasks, where unconscious inﬂuences are
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larger, primary process thinking predominates (Brakel, 2004), (b) primary process thinking
is developmentally earlier (Brakel et al., 2002), and (c) anxiety states, often related to uncon-
scious conﬂicts, favor regression on primary process thinking (Brakel, 2004). These important
ﬁndings were supplemented by Bazan et al. (2007) who found, by means of the same geometri-
cal ﬁgures, that schizophrenic patients in an acute psychotic state tend to more attributional
choices as evidence for the predominance of primary process thinking in schizophrenia. Lack-
ing so far is the application of the GeoCat ﬁgures to the sleep-dream cycle. Since this would
complement the set of ﬁndings mentioned above, we want to examine in our study whether the
predominance of categorization by attribute is also detectable after REM-sleep awakenings,
where the primary process mode is supposed to be dominant. Correspondingly, one would
expect to get more relational similarity judgments after being awakened from non-REM-sleep,
which is supposed to be ruled by the secondary process.
1.3 The method of subliminal stimulation
The term subliminal derives from the Latin words sub (Engl.: under) and limen (Engl.:
threshold). Following a deﬁnition by Merikle “subliminal perception occurs whenever stimuli
presented below the threshold or limen for awareness are found to inﬂuence thoughts, feelings,
or actions” (Merikle, 2000, p.497). Intuitively the idea that perception occurs without any
awareness of perceiving, contradicts the common idea that perception implies consciousness.
For that reason, the question of whether stimuli might be perceived and acted upon without
the subject having any awareness of the stimulus has always been a question of interest and
it has produced a considerable amount of research, discussion, and controversy.
The experimental investigation of subliminal perception started more than 120 years ago with
Pierce and Jastrow (1884) and Sidis (1898). However, these early studies are only of histor-
ical interest and had little impact on the further development of the method of subliminal
stimulation. This changed with Po¨tzl who was the ﬁrst to explore the recovery of unconscious
registered elements in dreams and images (Po¨tzl, 1917; see chapter 1.2.3). For the subliminal
presentation of the stimulus, he used a tachistoscope (Greek for tachistos (Engl.: very rapid)
and skopein (Engl.: to view)). This apparatus allows a very brief presentation of a visual
stimulus down to one millisecond. It either works with a high-speed shutter and continuous
illumination, or with special lamps able to produce such short light ﬂashes (Benschop, 1998).
Despite their theoretical impact, Po¨tzl’s ﬁndings were mainly anecdotal and lacked systematic
control and methodological rigor. Nevertheless, the method of subliminal stimulation began
to arouse the interest of other researchers, starting in the early 1950s with Charles Fisher
(e.g. Fisher, 1954, 1956, 1957; Fisher and Paul, 1959; Fisher, 1960b; see chapter 1.2.3). Fol-
lowing Fisher, more and more likewise psychoanalytically oriented researchers adapted the
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subliminal method (e.g. Dixon, 1956, 1958a,b; Luborsky and Shevrin, 1956; Klein et al., 1958;
Klein, 1959; Eagle, 1959; Smith et al., 1959; Paul and Fisher, 1959; Shevrin and Luborsky,
1958, 1961; Shevrin and Stross, 1962; Shevrin and Fisher, 1967; Stross and Shevrin, 1968;
Shevrin et al., 1969; Pine and Holt, 1960; Spence, 1961; Spence and Holland, 1962; Fiss et al.,
1963; Giddan, 1967; Haber and Erdelyi, 1967; Silverman and Silverman, 1964; Silverman,
1983).30 They used this method for the investigation of unconscious processes (including the
preconscious and the dynamic unconscious) and studied states and concepts of psychoanalyt-
ical interest, such as conﬂict, aﬀect, repression, dreams, hallucinations, free association, and
primary process thinking (see chapter 1.2.3). The results of these experiments demonstrated
that despite the very brief stimulus presentation, highly accurate registration takes place, so
the subliminal presented stimulus is registered in an almost photographic way. Summarizing,
it is mainly due to this revolutionary method that one of the major assumptions of psycho-
analytic theory - the existence of unconscious psychological processes (see chapter 1.1) - is no
longer doubted. Hence, its importance for psychoanalysis cannot be overestimated.
However, the history of subliminal experiments has always been a history of strong criticism
and heated controversies, ranging from “slight unease to downright hostility” (Dixon, 1971,
p.223). Although Fisher and his successors introduced some substantial modiﬁcations to ac-
count for some of the methodological weaknesses of the Po¨tzl study (e.g. by using suitable
controls, complex scoring systems, blind judges, etc.), methodological limitations remained.
This was emphasized by the behaviorists Goldiamond (1958) and Eriksen (1959, 1960) who
criticized the methodology of these early psychoanalytically-based subliminal studies - espe-
cially with regard to inconsistent modes of stimulus presentation, diﬀerent exposure times,
and rarely mentioned luminance levels. Furthermore, it was never exhaustively determined
how much of the ﬂashed stimulus was actually consciously registered (see below).
As described in chapter 1.2.1, in the late 1970s subliminal research was largely taken over
by cognitive psychologists (Wickens, 1972; Marcel, 1975, 1983a,b; Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc,
1980; McCauley et al., 1980; Fowler et al., 1981; Balota, 1983) to study “preattentive, precon-
scious aspects of perception” (Shevrin et al., 1996, p.4) and preconscious cognition. Mainly by
means of priming experiments they could, for instance, demonstrate the inﬂuence of sublim-
inal primes on subsequent decision tasks. Most of these priming studies relied on backward
pattern masking which means the subliminal stimulus is masked by a second, immediately
following stimulus consisting of a random pattern of letters, numbers, or ﬁgures. This is a
substantial diﬀerence from the Po¨tzl-based experiments described above which used so-called
energy masking, in which the subliminal stimulus is followed by a blank slide of much brighter
intensity than the masked stimulus (Turvey, 1973).
However, objections against the subliminal method remained. Even though extensive research
30For a more extensive review see Dixon, 1971 and Dixon, 1981.
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in this ﬁeld demonstrated that people do in fact perceive stimuli and act on them without
being consciously aware of them, questions like “Are the subliminal eﬀects truly unconscious
or maybe due to some residual consciousness?” are still a matter of controversial discussion.
In addition, Kouider and Dehaene identify the following aspects:
Indeed, this topic has faced some of the most complex problems of experimental psy-
chology, not only technically (e.g. How to present stimuli that are invisible but still
processed?), but also methodologically (e.g. How to demonstrate an absence of conscious
perception?), theoretically (e.g. Should we trust introspective subjective measures or
rather rely on objective measures?) and epistemologically (e.g. Why do so many sublim-
inal perception experiments fail to be replicated?). Such diﬃculties, among others, are
the reasons why the topic of perception without awareness has taken so long to achieve
respectability. (Kouider and Dehaene, 2007, p.857)
1.3.1 Subjective and objective threshold approaches
All experiments trying to demonstrate unconscious perception go back to the so-called dissoci-
ation paradigm (Erdelyi, 1985, 1986) in which performance on two diﬀerent tasks is compared:
one (usually direct) to measure conscious perception, and one (usually indirect) to measure
unconscious perception. The dissociation paradigm holds that unconscious perception can
be demonstrated when the direct measure of conscious awareness yields null sensitivity (e.g.
the subject indicates no conscious awareness of the stimulus), while eﬀects on the indirect
measure can still be found (e.g. signiﬁcant eﬀects in a priming task demonstrate that the
stimulus was nevertheless perceived). The direct measure to index conscious perception usu-
ally relies on some sort of perceptual discrimination task (e.g. identiﬁcation or detection) in
which the subject is asked to discriminate between alternative stimuli, or to choose between
presence or absence of a certain stimulus. This forced-choice discrimination measure is based
on the signal detection theory (SDT; Green and Swets, 1966) which deﬁnes consciousness or
awareness as discrimination ability.
Early studies in subliminal research mainly relied on the subject’s self-reports of whether they
had been consciously aware of the ﬂashed stimulus or not. In the studies of Fisher, for in-
stance (see chapter 1.2.3), subliminality was established after the actual experiment following
a classical psychophysiological approach. Therefore, the stimulus was ﬁrst exposed for the de-
ﬁned duration of 10 ms (the duration used during the experiment) and the subject was asked
to report what he saw (mostly only a ﬂash of light). Stimulus duration was then increased
until the subject ﬁrst reported seeing something (the detection threshold), and then further
increased until he reported being able to identify the stimulus (the identiﬁcation threshold).
It was concluded, that there was no conscious awareness of the stimulus below the detection
threshold. But of course these self-reports were far from being consistent and objective, and
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have, therefore, been strongly criticized (e.g.Eriksen, 1960). In the often-cited Marcel studies
on semantic priming, for instance, subjects reported that they did not perceive the masked
stimuli at all (Marcel, 1980, 1983a,b). As demonstrated by Cheesman and Merikle (1984),
however, they were able to discriminate the masked stimuli better than chance (more than
50 % correct guesses), when forced to chose out of several alternatives which stimulus might
have been the one presented before. Following this observation, Cheesman and Merikle (1984,
1985) distinguished between two diﬀerent threshold measures: the subjective and the objective
threshold.
Studies based on the subjective threshold rely on the subjects’ self-reports about whether or
not they were consciously aware of the ﬂashed stimulus. Stimulus intensity is arranged such
that subjects report not being able to detect anything and not having any conscious experience
of the stimulus. However, when forced to choose out of several alternatives, their choices are
above chance, although they feel they are only guessing. This could be due to the subject’s
conservative response criterion for consciousness because, as Merikle (1984) points out, it
is diﬃcult to know which criterion the subject applies when reporting conscious experience.
Thus, “denials of awareness may reﬂect very low conﬁdence rather than a complete absence
of awareness” (Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006, p.4) and alternative weak conscious perception
explanations cannot entirely be ruled out (the so-called SDT criterion artifact critique).31
Following Eriksen’s critique (1959), Cheesman and Merikle summarize the controversial aspect
of the subjective threshold method:
Since the subjective approach simply deﬁnes awareness in terms of observers’ self-reports
of their conscious experiences, this approach transfers the responsibility for operationally
deﬁning awareness from the investigator to the observer, and any experimenter who uses
this approach is, in eﬀect, asking each observer to provide his or her own deﬁnition of
awareness. (Cheesman and Merikle, 1985, p.314)
Thus, self-reports about the presence or absence of conscious awareness can vary considerably
between subjects, depending on their individual criterion for accepting something as being
conscious.
In contrast, stimulus presentation at the objective threshold is arranged such that above chance
discrimination in a direct forced-choice discrimination task is ruled out. Thus, the criterion
artifact concern of the subjective threshold approaches is avoided. Since the subject does not
report any awareness of the stimulus plus is not able to discriminate between the presence or
absence of a stimulus, a complete absence of conscious perception is assumed. This measure
requires even weaker stimulus intensities as compared to the subjective threshold approach and
31As Dixon comments, people might “prefer to appear insensitive rather than hallucinated” (Dixon, 1971,
p.230).
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thus represents a more conservative estimate - and, presumably, the most stringent criterion
for subliminality. Cheesman and Merikle state:
[A]n objective approach based on forced choice decisions among stimulus states has the
obvious advantage of providing a method for assessing perceptual sensitivity independent
of an observer’s biases in a particular situation. Thus, the objective approach places the
responsibility for deﬁning awareness clearly with the experimenter, as the experimenter
has a method for distinguishing response patterns attributable to biased responding from
those due to true perceptual sensitivity. (Cheesman and Merikle, 1985, p.314)
As described above, this forced-choice discrimination method is based on the signal detection
theory. In this procedure, an equal number of stimulus and non-stimulus cards are ﬂashed in
random order and subjects have to state after each exposure whether they detected something
or nothing. Afterwards, d’ as measure of conscious perception (sensitivity to discriminate be-
tween stimulus and no-stimulus) is calculated by comparing the number of correct guesses
(hits) with the number of incorrect guesses (false alarms; see chapter 2.3.1 for more details).
In terms of the SDT, d’ at the objective threshold is at chance (d’ = 0; null sensitivity)
which means the subject cannot detect a diﬀerence between stimulus and no-stimulus. At the
subjective threshold, however, detection is above chance (d’ > 0). This means, some degree
of phenomenal awareness is still possible at the subjective but not at the objective threshold
which exhaustively excludes any conscious perception. This refers to a central requirement
of the dissociation paradigm that null sensitivity in the conscious perception measure, when
equated with awareness, provides an exhaustive index of all relevant conscious experience
(Reingold and Merikle, 1988). If this is not the case, putatively unconscious processes can
still be explained by some residual conscious inﬂuences. However, if the applied measure of
conscious awareness is at the same time an exhaustive measure of unconscious processes, then
establishing null sensitivity would eliminate all evidence for both conscious and unconscious
perceptual processes. Hence, exhaustiveness alone is not suﬃcient to provide convincing evi-
dence for unconscious perception. Instead, an exhaustive measure that exclusively measures
conscious perceptual information would be desirable. But, according to Merikle and Reingold
(1992), no such measure exists. Neither the method of the subjects’ introspective reports,
nor the behavioral measures indexing the subjects’ ability to discriminate between stimuli
yielded convincing ﬁndings, since one could always doubt whether the selected measure did
indeed guarantee a complete absence of all conscious (and only conscious) registration - or
rather implied “weak, residual conscious perception (. . . ) responsible for [the] putatively un-
conscious eﬀects” (Snodgrass, 2004, p.110). For this reason, sceptics like Holender (1986) and
Holender and Duscherer (2004) still doubt the inﬂuence of unconscious perceptual processes
on aﬀective and cognitive reactions.
1.3. The method of subliminal stimulation 24
1.3.2 Criticism
Indeed, as Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1985) have shown, none of the studies on subliminal
perception mentioned above, such as the cognitive priming experiments, could guarantee that
the presented stimuli were indeed undetectable, as can be measured by a forced-choice proce-
dure. They concluded that the stimulus presentation of these studies was at the subjective,
rather than at the objective threshold level32 and ascribed the positive ﬁndings of Marcel
and others to the fact that subjects have apparently been conscious of more than they re-
ported (which is in accord with Holender’s critique (1986)). Hence, following Cheesman and
Merikle, “any conclusions favoring unconscious word recognition based on the results of these
studies are completely unwarranted” (Cheesman and Merikle, 1985, p.315). In their opin-
ion, only the demonstration of perceptual processes occurring at the objective threshold, at
which the observer fails at discriminating between stimulus and no-stimulus condition, would
count as true evidence for perception without awareness. In their own experiments, however,
Cheesman and Merikle (1984, 1985) found no evidence for priming without awareness under
objective threshold conditions, and stated consequently that “no evidence for unconscious
priming will ever be found when precautions are taken to measure detection thresholds ac-
curately”. They further stated that “perception without awareness is a bogus phenomenon
since (. . . ) evidence supporting the phenomenon disappears when appropriate threshold pro-
cedures are used” (Cheesman and Merikle, 1985, p.333).33
Nevertheless, Cheesman and Merikle still accept perception without awareness as a real phe-
nomenon, as long as awareness is deﬁned in terms of a subjective threshold. However, “if the
objective detection threshold is assumed to be the appropriate deﬁnition of awareness, then
the only possible conclusion is that perception without awareness does not occur” (Cheesman
and Merikle, 1985, p.334). Dagenbach et al. (1989), as well as Kemp-Wheeler and Hill (1988),
however, found convincing evidence for unconscious perception at the objective threshold - as
did Groeger (1984), Kunst-Wilson and Zajonc (1980), Snodgrass et al. (1993), Van Selst and
Merikle (1993), Bernat et al. (2001a), Klein Villa et al. (2006), and Shevrin et al. (1992) in
their more recent investigations. Hence, whether the subjective or the objective threshold is
the better method to assess perception without awareness (see Merikle and Reingold, 1998;
Reingold and Merikle, 1990 for a summary of this controversy), as well as how to rule out
alternative weak conscious perception explanations, is still hotly debated.
This debate is accentuated by the fact that whether acceptable evidence for perception without
awareness is obtained, or not, apparently depends on the respective deﬁnition of awareness.
Similarly, Snodgrass points out that the subjective and the objective approach do not even
share the same underlying assumptions concerning the role of unconscious inﬂuences. In his
32This is also true for the stimuli of the studies ran by Fisher and his associates (see chapter 1.2.3).
33Snodgrass et al. (2004a), however, emphasized that this study was actually run under objective identiﬁcation
threshold, instead of objective detection threshold conditions (see below).
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excellent summary of this dilemma he states:
(. . . ) [R]ecalling the canonical subjective threshold eﬀect (i.e. direct discrimination re-
mains above chance even when awareness is denied), subjective models must postulate
(. . . ) that this elevated direct performance indeed reﬂects unconscious inﬂuences. If so,
utilizing objective methods, which require chance direct performance, should seriously
reduce or outright eliminate not only conscious but unconscious inﬂuences as well. With
this in mind, objective methods must apparently assume that direct discrimination tasks
somehow tap only conscious perceptual inﬂuences (. . . ). On the other hand, if reliable
objective threshold eﬀects are obtainable (e.g. on indirect tasks such as priming), this
would apparently conﬁrm that direct tasks are indeed insensitive to unconscious inﬂu-
ences. If so, this would in turn imply that subjective threshold eﬀects on direct tasks are
actually due to conscious inﬂuences, and hence, that subjective methods are invalid. In
short, it seems that subjective and objective methods are not just more or less stringent,
but actually imply mutually incompatible models - and hence, cannot be both valid.34
(Snodgrass, 2009, p.509)
Comparing subjective with objective threshold eﬀects reveals further substantial diﬀerences.
More speciﬁcally, inhibitory, as well as facilitative processes can be demonstrated at the ob-
jective threshold (see also chapter 4.5). This is, however, not true at the subjective threshold
where eﬀects are usually only facilitatory (e.g. Shevrin et al., 1996; Bernat et al., 2001b).
One could thus assume that subliminal eﬀects at the objective threshold occur at a deeper
unconscious level, as compared to the subjective threshold eﬀects.35
1.3.3 Responses to criticism
Responding to the diﬃculties of demonstrating true unconscious perceptual processes, Merikle
and colleagues suggest abandoning the question “Do unconscious perceptual processes exist?”
in favor of the question “How does unconscious perception diﬀer from conscious perception?”.
Since the former could not be answered unequivocally because alternative explanations of
the ﬁndings are always possible, the latter should provide evidence that perception without
awareness occurs. They cite various studies using this so-called process-dissociation method
to demonstrate qualitatively diﬀerent eﬀects of conscious and unconscious perception (see
34Snodgrass and Shevrin further propose that “objective threshold approaches index phenomenal awareness,
and that subjective threshold approaches index an additional form of consciousness - namely higher-order
reﬂective awareness. In this framework, objective threshold methods index phenomenally unconscious per-
ception, whereas subjective threshold methods index phenomenally conscious but reﬂectively unconscious
perception.” (Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006, p.32).
35This assumption gains further support by the ﬁndings of Shevrin et al. (1992, 1996) which demonstrated
subliminal activation of unconscious conﬂict at the objective detection threshold.
1.3. The method of subliminal stimulation 26
Merikle and Daneman, 1998 for review). They claim, “[n]ot only do these qualitative diﬀer-
ences show how conscious and unconscious perception diﬀer, but they also provide stronger
evidence for the existence of unconscious perception than was ever obtained in experiments de-
signed to demonstrate unconscious perception directly” (Merikle and Daneman, 1998, p.16).36
Furthermore, with regard to the subjective vs. objective threshold measures debate mentioned
above, they established their subjective threshold model (Cheesman and Merikle, 1984, 1986;
Reingold and Merikle, 1988, 1990; Merikle et al., 1995, 2001). They claim subjective threshold
eﬀects (stimulus conditions under which the subject claims not to perceive anything, but still
performs above chance in a forced-choice discrimination task) to be truly unconscious and,
consequently, deny objective threshold eﬀects.
This model was questioned by Snodgrass and his colleagues who propose the so-called objec-
tive threshold/strategic (non-monotonic) model (Snodgrass, 2002; Snodgrass et al., 2004a,b;
Bernat et al., 2001b), and hold that reliable unconscious perception at the objective thresh-
old does exist. They stress the importance of distinguishing between the objective detection
threshold (ODT; discrimination of the presence or absence of a stimulus), which is below
the objective identiﬁcation threshold (OIT; discrimination of one stimulus from another),
which is in turn below the subjective identiﬁcation threshold (SIT; correct identiﬁcation of the
stimulus) (Snodgrass, 2004). If one follows the conscious-perception-only model (Reingold
and Merikle, 1988, 1990; Holender and Duscherer, 2004) which functions on a hierarchical
strength/complexity continuum (the greater the stimulus intensity, the stronger/more com-
plex the eﬀects), the eﬀects should be strongest at the SIT, where more conscious information
is available, and weakest - respectively absent - at the ODT. However, unconscious eﬀects are
demonstrably strong and reliable under ODT conditions (Groeger, 1984; Shevrin et al., 1992;
Snodgrass et al., 1993; Van Selst and Merikle, 1993; Bernat et al., 2001a; Klein Villa et al.,
2006). At the longer OIT, however, those eﬀects are mostly absent (e.g. Dagenbach et al.,
1989; Cheesman and Merikle, 1984) but observable again under SIT circumstances. Since
ODT conditions require weaker stimulus intensity than OIT, this ﬁnding remarkably contra-
dicts the strength/complexity continuum. It suggest rather that conscious and unconscious
perceptual inﬂuences are functionally exclusive, which means conscious perceptual inﬂuences
override unconscious ones when both are present (Snodgrass, 2004; Snodgrass et al., 2004a).
Snodgrass et al. summarize:
At the ODT, conscious perception is completely absent, allowing higher level unconscious
perceptual inﬂuences to manifest freely. In the ODT-OIT region, these slightly stronger
36This interpretation, however, was criticized by Snodgrass et al. (e.g. 2004a). Instead of interpreting the
qualitative diﬀerences found in those studies as evidence for conscious and unconscious perceptual processes,
they could rather be seen as representing two diﬀerent aspects of conscious processes (conscious perception
and metacognitive decision processes).
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stimuli are consciously detectable although not yet identiﬁable. This lower level conscious
perception nonetheless overrides higher level [i.a. identiﬁcation-dependent] unconscious
perceptual inﬂuences, producing the negative portion of the curve. Beyond the OIT,
conscious perception is strong enough by itself to drive higher level eﬀects, and the curve
becomes positive. (Snodgrass et al., 2004a, p.862)
Thus, this non-monotonic relationship between the conscious and the unconscious percep-
tion indexes strongly speaks against alternative weak conscious perception explanations and
provides convincing evidence for true unconscious perception at the ODT (Snodgrass et al.,
2004b,a). Table 1.2 summarizes the assumptions and predictions of the model suggested by
Snodgrass et al. (2004a) with regard to the performance on direct (detection and identiﬁca-
tion) and indirect (e.g. semantic priming) tasks.
Performance Measures and Underlying Processes
Detection Identiﬁcation Indirect (e.g. semantic
priming)
Objective
Detection
Threshold
(ODT)
Chance performance:
no conscious detection
Chance performance:
no conscious
identiﬁcation
Above chance
performance:
unconscious semantic
activation
Objective
Identiﬁca-
tion
Threshold
(OIT)
Above chance
performance:
conscious detection
Chance performance:
no conscious
identiﬁcation
Chance performance:
conscious detection
overriding unconscious
semantic activation
Subjective
Identiﬁca-
tion
Threshold
(SIT)
Above chance
performance:
conscious detection
Above chance
performance:
conscious
identiﬁcation
Above chance
performance: driven
exclusively by
conscious perceptual
inputs
Supraliminal Above chance
performance:
conscious detection
Above chance
performance:
conscious
identiﬁcation
Above chance
performance: driven
exclusively by
conscious perceptual
inputs
Table 1.2: Assumptions of the objective threshold/strategic (non-monotonic) model by Snodgrass
et al. (2004a; adapted from Reingold (2004))
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Summarizing, the results of the subjective threshold models which increase monotonically
with stimulus intensity - as predicted by the conscious-perception-only model (see above) - are
much more in need to rule out possible conscious perception explanations. Furthermore, they
need to answer the critique, based on a SDT-perspective, that stimuli are in fact conscious but
below the subject’s criterion for consciousness (the criterion artifact; e.g. Macmillan, 1986).
Objective threshold approaches, however, and especially the ODT, represent the most strin-
gent criterion for subliminality and are assumed to exclude all conscious inﬂuences without
aﬀecting unconscious ones. However, since objective detection thresholds are quite diﬃcult
to obtain, the amount of studies at the ODT is relatively small.37 Nevertheless, for all the
reasons described above, we attach great importance in our own study to establish stimulus
conditions at the ODT to ensure that stimulus presentation in our experiment entirely rules
out conscious awareness (see chapter 3.1.1).
1.4 The electroencephalogram
In 1929, Berger developed the electroencephalogram (EEG) to record the brain’s electric ac-
tivity. The measurement of the electrical signals of the brain allows a person’s experiences
and behavior to be related to his or her brain activity. By this means, it becomes possible to
draw conclusions concerning the underlying mechanisms of information processing. One of the
advantages of the EEG is its high temporal sensitivity, since very fast information processing
within several milliseconds can be measured. Furthermore, it is a non-invasive method and
brain signals can be recorded from the scalp with very little eﬀort.
The EEG measures voltage diﬀerences between multiple electrodes which are attached to the
scalp. This voltage develops initially with a neurotransmitter which is released at the apical
dendrites of a cortical pyramidal cell. Depending on the respective neurotransmitter and
receptors, either an excitatory or an inhibitory post-synaptic potential results. The excita-
tory post-synaptic potential (EPSP) is characterized by a net negativity around the apical
dendrites outside the cell. The inhibitory post-synaptic potential (IPSP), however, is charac-
terized by a net positivity around the cell body which is due to the current ﬂow which leaves
the soma (Luck, 2005). By this, a small dipole is generated (negative pole at the apical den-
drite and positive pole at the soma). Summing up large numbers of these electric dipoles (>
10000), which result from the synchronized activity of many parallel pyramidal cells, leads to
an electric ﬁeld which is strong enough to be measured on the scalp. Thus, the recorded signal
is based on the temporal and spatial summation of excitatory and inhibitory post-potentials
37This is due to the mechanical constraints of computer screens which are mostly used in contemporary
subliminal research. The refresh rate of even a 140 Hz monitor allows no shorter presentation time than 7
ms (17 ms with normal monitors). Thus, one needs to rely on backward masking procedures to mask the
subliminal stimulus.
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of large assemblies of cortical pyramidal cells (Zschocke, 1995; Kirschstein, 2008).
The electrical activity of the EEG can be divided into spontaneous activity (e.g. alpha or sleep
rhythms), evoked potentials (EPs), and event-related potentials (ERPs). EPs are triggered by
internal or external stimulation. ERPs occur before, during, or after a sensoric, motoric, or
psychic event. In contrast to EPs, ERPs are also marked by cognitive processes. By averaging
numerous EPs or ERPs, the random EEG ﬂuctuations can be eliminated and the evoked or
event-related potential becomes visible. The ERP consist of diﬀerent positive and negative
components which represent diﬀerent sensory, motor, or cognitive processes (Luck, 2005).
The spontaneous EEG maps the basic activity of the brain - the continuously measurable
voltage ﬂuctuations, mostly independently of external stimulation. It consists of a composi-
tion of oscillations of various frequencies which prevail in dependence of the respective state
of consciousness and activity. The spontaneous EEG activity of a healthy person in relaxed
wakefulness with closed eyes, for instance, is strongly characterized by so-called alpha-waves
(8-13 Hz) which generally have higher voltages over occipital areas. As soon as the person fo-
cuses on some kind of external stimulus, however, these alpha-waves are blocked and replaced
by high frequency beta (15-30 Hz). All in all, ﬁve frequency bands can be distinguished which
are displayed in table 1.3.
Frequency (Hz)
gamma (γ) 28 - 48
beta (β) 15 - 30
alpha (α) 8 - 13
theta (θ) 4 - 7
delta (δ) 0.5 - 4
Table 1.3: EEG frequency bands
More and more researchers nowadays follow the approach of Basar and his co-workers who
claim that brain functions are represented by oscillatory activity in one (or more) of the
frequency bands described above (Basar, 2006). They analyze spontaneous, evoked, or in-
duced brain activity with regard to its frequency components. They consider the complex
integrative brain activity as the superposition of diﬀerent oscillatory components which are
generated in diﬀerent subsystems of the brain (Basar, 1980, 1990, 1998, 1999). Presumably,
only the interaction of these selectively distributed delta-, theta-, alpha-, beta-, and gamma-
oscillatory networks can account for the dynamic processes of the brain. Thus, oscillations
(neuronal rhythms as characteristic features of neural activity) are seen as possible commu-
nication mechanisms between cortical cell assemblies. Starting from the distributed selective
generators, diﬀerent brain regions begin to oscillate in synchrony within the respective fre-
quency of the generator and are thus able to communicate, to interact, and therefore, to
produce higher cognitive functions. Hence, according to this approach, the electrocortical
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signals are not only analyzed within the time domain, but also regarding their composition of
frequencies using frequency ﬁltering of the EEG signal. In a next step they can be correlated
with psychological variables to better understand the basis of processes like attention, mem-
ory, learning, etc. Numerous investigations have shown that delta-, theta-, alpha-, beta-, and
gamma-oscillations can be seen as functional correlates for sensory and cognitive processes
(see Basar et al., 1999a,b, 2001 for review). It must be emphasized, however, that it is not
possible to assign one speciﬁc function to one speciﬁc oscillatory activity. Each frequency
range has multiple functional correlates, and only the functionally interacting and superposi-
tion of several oscillatory components allows complex and integrative brain functioning. Or
as Basar et al. put it: “On one hand, spontaneous and event-related oscillations are correlated
with several brain functions; on the other hand, brain functions are related to a superposition
of oscillatory responses.” (Basar et al., 1999b, p.63)
In the following chapter, we will focus on the functional correlates of alpha and theta oscil-
latory activity since these frequencies might be of special importance in the investigation of
primary and secondary process thinking, as described below.
1.4.1 The role of alpha and theta
The functional role of alpha as the dominant frequency in the human EEG has undergone sig-
niﬁcant changes. Formerly, alpha synchronization was interpreted as a passive idling rhythm
(e.g. Adrian and Matthews, 1934; Pfurtscheller, 1992; see Pfurtscheller et al., 1996 for re-
view). This interpretation was based on the observation that spontaneous alpha oscillations
are most prominent in states of physical relaxation, like relaxed wakefulness with closed eyes
or sleep onset. They are blocked, however, when eyes are opened and under conditions of
mental eﬀort (see below). Today, alpha is no longer regarded as pure noise or an idling phe-
nomenon. On the contrary, the spontaneous alpha rhythm is supposed to “facilitate, overall,
association mechanisms in the brain”and to“serve as a communication signal “par excellence”
between diﬀerent structures” (Basar et al., 1999b, p.60). Alpha thus seems to represent an
important functional and universal code which facilitates sensory-cognitive communication.
Evoked alpha oscillations have been related to early sensory stimulus processing (Schu¨rmann
et al., 1997; Williamson et al., 1997; Basar, 1998). Furthermore, various functional correlates
have been found for event-related alpha oscillations. For example, alpha suppression has been
demonstrated in response to various perceptual, motor, and cognitive tasks (Klimesch et al.,
1990; Pfurtscheller and Klimesch, 1991; see Klimesch, 1999 for review). Interestingly, internal
tasks, such as visual imagination or mental arithmetic tasks, lead to an increase in alpha
frequency (Hadley, 1941; Klinger et al., 1973; Ray and Cole, 1985; Cooper et al., 2003, 2006).
This was interpreted as the inhibition of sensory input while attention is turned toward inter-
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nal processing. This alpha-inhibition hypothesis was taken further by Klimesch (Klimesch,
1996; Klimesch et al., 2007) and Pfurtscheller (2003) who proposed alpha synchronization
as an active inhibition mechanism of task irrelevant processes and cortical areas. Hence, a
suppression of alpha activity (alpha desynchonization) is regarded as reﬂecting a state of high
excitability and cortical activation (Steriade et al., 1990; Pfurtscheller and Klimesch, 1991),
whereas an increase in alpha activity (alpha synchronization) is assumed to be the functional
correlate of cortical inhibition (Klimesch et al., 2007).38 These ﬁndings suggest, “that alpha
activity is not a simple index of cortical idling, but that it is a measure of active processing
necessary for internally driven mental operations” (Cooper et al., 2003, p.66).
Furthermore, alpha power (deﬁned as the maximal amplitude in the alpha frequency band)
seems to be correlated with originality and creativity which has been related to primary
process thinking (see chapter 1.2.3). Fink and Neubauer (2006) recently demonstrated that
creative problem solving of a verbal creativity task is accompanied by lower levels of cortical
activation, as revealed by a marked increase in alpha power. As the authors point out, this
task-related synchronization of alpha activity “presumably reﬂecting a reduced state of active
information processing in the underlying neuronal networks (. . . ), stands in clear contrast to
the phenomenon of alpha desynchronization that is usually observed during performance of
conventional cognitive tasks” (Fink and Neubauer, 2006, p.51-52). Similarly, Martindale and
his co-workers demonstrated that creative subjects are less cortically aroused while perform-
ing a creativity task, as compared to less creative individuals (Martindale and Hines, 1975;
Martindale and Hasenfus, 1978; Martindale et al., 1984). They concluded that lower levels of
cortical arousal favor creative thinking and, hence, that primary process cognition is related
to low cortical activation as well.
Finally, alpha activity seems to be a distinctive feature of REM-sleep EEG (Roth et al.,
1999). However, only very few studies deal with its spectral features and topographic distri-
bution (e.g. Zeitlhofer et al., 1993; Cantero et al., 1999; Cantero and Atienza, 2000; Cantero
et al., 2000). Esposito et al. (2004) demonstrated that lower alpha power was associated with
increased recall of sleep mentation. With regard to the negative relationship between alpha
power and cortical activation (see above), they suggest that a decrease in alpha activity might
reﬂect cognitive elaboration taking place just before awakening.
Because of the apparent association between alpha activity and creativity and originality,
one could hypothesize that alpha is likewise related to primary process thinking. Hence, we
would expect to ﬁnd a positive correlation between alpha power during REM-sleep and the
rebus eﬀect as an index for primary process thinking and creativity. This very exploratory
38Palva and Palva (2007), however, claim that this inhibition hypothesis falls too short. They refer to an
increase in alpha oscillations during the maintenance of information during working memory tasks, and
suggest a more active role of alpha in working memory processes, which might be interpreted in terms of
attentional control processes (Herrmann and Knight, 2001).
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hypothesis is based on the suggestion of Klimesch that a “decrease in alpha during parts of
the REM-sleep can be interpreted in terms of an event-related suppression or desynchroniza-
tion of the kind that can be observed during an alert subject performing some type of task”
(Klimesch, 1999, p.180). Accordingly, an increase in alpha power during REM-sleep could
be interpreted in terms of an event-related synchronization. Therefore, an increase in alpha
power during REM-sleep could be related to an increase in creative primary process thinking
on the rebus level.
Activity in the theta frequency band is closely associated with higher level cognitive functions.
For instance, event-related theta oscillations have been related to cognitive processing (Basar
et al., 1999a; Sakowitz et al., 2000; Basar-Eroglu and Demiralp, 2001), information integra-
tion (Schmiedt et al., 2005), encoding of new information (e.g. Klimesch, 1996) - as well as
to anticipation, signal detection, and selective attention (Basar-Eroglu et al., 1992). While
long-term (semantic) memory tasks lead to a desynchronization in the alpha band (Klimesch,
1996), short-term (episodic) and working memory processes lead to a synchronization in the
theta band - as reﬂected in an increase in band power (Klimesch et al., 1994; Klimesch,
1996, 1999). Furthermore, theta power increases with increasing task demands (Basar et al.,
1999b). Basar (1999) summarizes that event-related theta oscillations are highly correlated
with mechanisms of associative learning and attention, as well as retrieval.
Spontaneous theta rhythms are rarely observed in the spontaneous EEG of a waking, alert
subject. However, they are prominent during sleep. As demonstrated by Armitage (1995),
REM-sleep shows more power in the theta frequency band than in any other frequency. The
same is true for non-REM-sleep stage 2.
As mentioned above, we assume alpha power to be related to a more primary process way
of mental functioning. Hence, we expect a positive correlation between alpha power, which
has been associated to creativity and originality, and the rebus eﬀect. On the other hand,
theta activity which has been related to higher cognitive performance might be associated to
a secondary process way of thinking, comprising reﬂective conscious thought. Although this
is a rather speculative hypothesis, we wish to explore whether theta power might indeed be
positively correlated with the conceptual eﬀect which implies mental functioning on a more
rational, logical level.
1.4.2 Brain correlates of unconscious perceptual processes and primary
process thinking
Next to their various other applications within scientiﬁc research, EEG measures were also
used to support the existence of unconscious processes and subliminal perception and - al-
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though very rarely - to investigate primary and secondary process thinking. Implementing
brain responses in the study of subliminal perception was meant to answer the objections
made by critics who called for objective evidence for the existence of unconscious processes
(see chapter 1.1). Using event-related potentials as non-psychological markers for unconscious
processes thus leads to the required independent support.
In the 1960s, being far ahead of their time, Shevrin and associates investigated the electrical
brain activity in relationship to subliminal perception and other psychological and especially
psychoanalytical relevant concepts like unconscious attention, primary- and secondary process
thinking, and repressiveness (for a summary of these experiments see Shevrin, 1973).
Shevrin and Fritzler (1968b) were the ﬁrst to study subliminal visual evoked potentials. They
collected average evoked responses (AERs) during the sub- and supraliminal presentation of
the penny-stimulus (see chapter 1.2.3) and a dummy control stimulus matched in size, shape
and colour but lacking the speciﬁc content of the penny rebus. After each block of stimu-
lus presentation, subjects were asked to give two minutes of free association. Interestingly,
Shevrin and Fritzler found that the B-C amplitude of the average evoked potential, which is
nowadays called the P200 (a positive going amplitude occurring about 200 ms poststimulus),
was signiﬁcantly greater for the rebus stimulus than for the dummy control in the subliminal
condition as well as in the supraliminal condition. Hence, the AER is able to discriminate
between a subliminally presented penny rebus stimulus and a dummy control - a ﬁnding which
was conﬁrmed by further studies of Shevrin and his co-workers (Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968a;
Shevrin et al., 1969, 1971). Furthermore, the P200 was signiﬁcantly correlated with the in-
cidence of conceptual free associations, while rebus and clang associations were correlated
with AER alpha. Thus, a high amplitude of the evoked response P200 is associated with a
secondary process subliminal eﬀect, while bursts of alpha occurring ca. 1.5 s poststimulus are
associated with a primary process subliminal eﬀect. It was assumed that the “high incidence
of alpha may be coordinate with a state which favors fantasy, loose thought connections, and
in general, thinking of an illogical rather than a logical type” (Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968b,
p.298). This is in great accordance with the more recent ﬁndings concerning the role of al-
pha and its relation to internal processes and creativity described in chapter 1.4.1. Hence,
increased alpha activity might be related to more creative, unrealistic associations, as in the
case of rebus and clang associates. For this reason we expect alpha power in our study to be
positively related to the rebus eﬀect as an index for primary process thinking.
These ﬁndings cannot be overestimated since they present evidence for brain correlates of
Freud’s theoretical constructs of primary and secondary process thinking. It needs to be em-
phasized that these studies were conducted at a time when the combination of psychoanalysis
and neurosciences was not at all as “en vogue”, as it is now. Nor was psychoanalysis as much
in need of presenting objective empirical evidence for its constructs as it is today (see chapter
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1.1). This underscores even more the importance and the farsightedness of these early studies.
Summarizing, Shevrin and his co-workers could demonstrate in a number of studies (e.g.
Shevrin and Fritzler, 1968b; Shevrin, 1973; Shevrin et al., 1992; Shevrin, 2001) that event-
related potentials are also measurable after the subliminal presentation of certain stimuli
and can thus be seen as markers for unconscious processes. It was further shown that these
“subliminal ERPs” have a similar component structure (although smaller in amplitude) to
conventional supraliminal ones (Bernat et al., 2001a). Finally, by means of subliminal ERPs,
it was possible to demonstrate that (a) a P300 component can be obtained by subliminal
stimuli in an oddball paradigm (Bernat et al., 2001b), (b) aversive conditioning can be es-
tablished without conscious awareness (Wong et al., 1997, 2004), and (c) aﬀective valence is
registered unconsciously (Bernat et al., 2001a).39
In addition to the investigation of descriptively unconscious processes by studying electro-
cortical eﬀects in relation to subliminal verbal eﬀects (as described above), Shevrin and his
associates also applied the method of event-related potentials combined with subliminal stim-
ulation to investigate the dynamic unconscious and related aspects like repression, defense,
unconscious conﬂict, aﬀect, and motivation (Fritzler et al., 1970; Shevrin et al., 1969, 1996;
Shevrin, 2000; Shevrin et al., 2002).
1.5 Sleep and dreams
The development of the electroencephalogram by Berger in 1929 (see chapter 1.4) marks the
starting point of modern sleep research. With the EEG it was not only possible to investigate
the electrophysiological brain activity during wakefulness, but also during sleep. Loomis et al.
(1937) were the ﬁrst to describe the characteristics of the human sleep EEG. The discovery of
rapid-eye-movement-sleep (REM-sleep), in 1953 by Aserinsky and Kleitman, marked another
important milestone in the history of sleep research. Following the current classiﬁcation de-
veloped by Rechtschaﬀen and Kales (1968), ﬁve diﬀerent sleep stages are distinguished on the
basis of their speciﬁc electrophysiological characteristics - four stages of so-called non-REM-
and one stage of REM-sleep (see table 1.4).40
39Quite a few more studies exist dealing with ERPs to subthreshold stimuli (e.g. Kiefer, 2002; Kiss and
Eimer, 2008). However, most of them can be criticized on methodological grounds, since either subliminal
conditions were not described in full detail (e.g. Brandeis and Lehmann, 1986; Naccache et al., 2005), or
were not suﬃcient enough to ensure true subliminality at the objective threshold (see chapter 1.3.1) (e.g.
Kostandov and Arzumanov, 1986; Devrim et al., 1997; Brazdil et al., 1998, 2001).
40These original rules for a standardized scoring of sleep stages have recently been worked over by the American
Academy of Sleep Medicine (Iber et al., 2007). According to these revised rules, the four stages of non-REM-
sleep are subsumed under only three stages. However, at the time the experiments of the study described
here were run, the original rules from 1968 were still applied.
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Sleep
stage
Frequency
[Hz]
Amplitude
[mV]
Type Characteristics
1
(non-
REM)
4-8 50-100 alpha,
theta
- transition from wake to sleep
- very light sleep
- slow eye movements
2
(non-
REM)
6-15 50-150 theta,
sleep
spindles,
K-complex
- some slow eye movements
- sleep spindles (short rhythmic
waveform clusters of 12-14 Hz)
- K-complexes (sharp negative wave
followed by slower positive compo-
nent)
3
(non-
REM)
2-4 100-150 delta,
theta
- slow wave sleep (SWS)
- little or no eye movements
- 20-50 % delta waves
4
(non-
REM)
0.2-2 200-200 delta,
theta
- slow wave sleep (SWS)
- little or no eye movements
- more than 50 % delta waves
5
(REM)
>12 5-50 beta, alpha
- dream sleep / paradoxical sleep
- rapid eye movements
- desynchronisation of the EEG (sim-
ilar to wakefulness)
- PGO-waves
Table 1.4: Characteristics of the diﬀerent sleep stages
During the night we pass these ﬁve stages in a cyclic pattern. One sleep cycle, which starts
with stage 1 non-REM-sleep, goes down all the way to stage 4 and then up again to ﬁnally
end in REM-sleep, lasts about 90 minutes. While slow wave sleep mainly occurs during the
ﬁrst part of the night, REM-sleep phases get longer in the course of the night (see ﬁgure 1.1).
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wake
REM
non-REM 1
non-REM 2
non-REM 3
non-REM 4
Figure 1.1: Schematic depiction of a healthy sleep architecture throughout an entire night
In contrast to the synchronized, large amplitude EEG during slow wave sleep, the electro-
physiological pattern during REM-sleep shows a desynchronized and highly activated brain.
Along with this increased activation and the occurrence of rapid eye movements, REM-sleep
is characterized by several neurophysiological parameters, such as enhanced heart beat, ac-
celerated breathing frequency, genital erection, and at the same time paralysis of all other
muscles. Struck by the remarkable paradox between a highly activated brain and a person
that is sound asleep, Aserinsky and Kleitman (1955) assumed that REM-sleep represents the
external manifestation of the subjective experience of dreaming. This assumption was sup-
ported by the observation that REM-sleep awakenings result in 70-95 % of the cases in a
dream report, while this is only true for 5-10 % of non-REM-sleep awakenings (e.g. Dement
and Kleitman, 1957; Wolpert and Trosman, 1958; Kales et al., 1967). Accordingly, REM-sleep
was believed to be the neurophysiological equivalent of dreaming and researchers hoped to
solve the mystery of dreaming by investigating the neural correlates of REM-sleep.
Jouvet (1962) was the ﬁrst who demonstrated in cat experiments that pontine brain stem
mechanisms control REM-sleep. Almost ten years later, Hobson and McCarley identiﬁed spe-
ciﬁc assemblies of neurons located in the pons and their respective neurotransmitters as being
responsible for switching on and oﬀ REM-sleep. This alternate interaction is described in their
model of reciprocal interaction (Hobson and McCarley, 1971; Hobson et al., 1975; Hobson and
McCarley, 1977). While cholinergic neurons in the formatio reticularis initiate REM-sleep,
aminergic neurons in the raphe´ nucleus and nucleus locus coeruleus, producing serotonine and
noradrenaline, inhibit the activity of the cholinergic REM-on neurons and switch oﬀ REM-
sleep again. Hence, Hobson and McCarley claim in their activation-synthesis-model (1977),
which has been developed further into the activation-input-mode model (AIM) (Hobson et al.,
2000), that dreams result from the eﬀort of the cortex to give meaning to this chaotic ac-
tivation arising from the brain stem. Accordingly, dreams are only an epiphenomenon of
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REM-sleep; they are meaningless, and especially lack any motivational or emotional driving
forces as was claimed by Freud.
Over time, more and more studies have proved that the amount of non-REM dreams was
apparently underestimated (e.g. Foulkes, 1962; see also review of Nielsen (1999) who found
an average REM dream report rate of 81.8 ± 8.7 % compared to an average non-REM dream
report rate of 42.5 ± 21.0 %). But even though Hobson et al. included this observation in
their AIM model (2000), the assumption of dreams being controlled by pontine brain stem
mechanisms reﬂected the scientiﬁc consensus for a long period of time. It was more than 20
years later when Solms proved it to be wrong and demonstrated that REM-sleep and dreams
are actually dissociable states which are controlled by diﬀerent brain mechanisms. In his ex-
tensive research with lesioned patients, he showed that damages in the brain stem, which lead
to a cessation of REM-sleep, do not necessarily aﬀect dreaming. On the other hand, lesions
in distinct forebrain structures, which completely spare the brain stem, cause a total loss of
dreaming while REM-sleep still occurs. He concluded that “forebrain structures are essential
for dreaming whereas brainstem structures are not” (Solms, 1995, p.54). Subsequently, Solms
identiﬁed a whole network of highly speciﬁc brain areas involved in the dream process (Solms,
1997, 2000; Kaplan-Solms and Solms, 2003). He demonstrated that dreaming is especially
controlled by dopaminergic forebrain mechanisms involving the ventral tegmental area com-
ponent of the dopaminergic mesolimbic reward circuits (Solms, 2000).41
As mentioned above, dreams apparently do not only appear during REM-, but also during
non-REM-sleep. However, there are qualitative and quantitative diﬀerences between REM-
and non-REM-sleep dreams. While REM-sleep dreams are mostly longer (e.g. Foulkes and
Rechtschaﬀen, 1964; Antrobus, 1983; Stickgold et al., 1994), more bizarre (e.g. Fiss et al.,
1966; Porte and Hobson, 1987; Zepelin, 1989), more vivid, visual, emotional, and less re-
lated to waking reality (e.g. Foulkes, 1962; Rechtschaﬀen et al., 1963; Cavallero et al., 1992),
non-REM-sleep mentation is usually shorter, less imaginative, bizarre and emotional, more
thought-like, and consists mostly of single thoughts or ideas often related to waking life (e.g.
Foulkes, 1962; Rechtschaﬀen et al., 1963).42 These remarkable diﬀerences in REM- and non-
REM-sleep mentation are probably due to the diﬀerences in the physiology of these two stages
which were demonstrated in the 1990s by a number of positron emission tomography (PET)
imaging studies. Non-REM-sleep is characterized by a relatively global cerebral deactivation
(decrease of energy metabolism throughout the basal forebrain, thalamus, pontine brain stem,
41These circuits belong to the so-called seeking system (Panksepp, 1998) because they are involved in goal-
seeking and appetitive driven behaviors. Therefore, this observation could be used to revive Freud’s theory
of dreams as wish fulﬁllment (see chapter 1.2.2).
42Despite these diﬀerences, there are some non-REM-sleep dreams which are very similar to REM-sleep dreams
in their intensity and sometimes even indistinguishable from REM dreams (Monroe et al., 1965). These are
mainly found at sleep onset (Foulkes and Vogel, 1965) or at the end of the night (Kondo et al., 1989).
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as well as orbitofrontal and anterior cingulate cortices), whereas activity in the visual and
auditory cortices remains preserved (Braun et al., 1997; Maquet et al., 1997; Hoﬂe et al.,
1997). This possibly reveals “the cortical substrate of dream-like imagery” during non-REM-
sleep (Hoﬂe et al., 1997, p.4803). In contrast, there is a widespread activation of brain areas
during REM-sleep (e.g. basal forebrain areas such as anterior hypothalamus, caudal orbital
cortex, and ventral regions of the striatum, all regions of the brainstem, as well as limbic
and paralimbic regions such as the amygdala, the hippocampal formation, parahippocampal
gyri, anterior insula, and the anterior cingulate cortices), which even exceeds the level of
activation prominent during wakefulness (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997; Nofzinger
et al., 1997). At the same time prefrontal (dorsolateral, orbital, and opercular) cortices are
dramatically deactivated (Maquet et al., 1996; Braun et al., 1997; Madsen et al., 1996). In-
terestingly, these cortices are normally responsible for the “highest order processing of neural
information, integrating sensory, cognitive and limbic information, organizing meaningful,
temporally sequenced behavioural responses and subserving working memory” (Braun et al.,
1997, p.1188). The deactivation of these areas might account for the bizarre, hallucinatory,
irrational, and disorientated, but highly emotional nature of REM-sleep imagery and cogni-
tion (Kahn et al., 1997).43 Concluding, following Nofzinger et al., their ﬁndings “of limbic and
paralimbic activation (. . . ) and increased metabolism during REM-sleep, as well as global, re-
gionally non-selective cortical deactivation and decreased metabolism during non-REM-sleep,
are generally supportive of the traditional notion that more story-like aﬀect-laden dreams
are more attributable to the REM-sleep, than non-REM-sleep behavioural state” (Nofzinger
et al., 1997, p.199).
Alongside these state-dependent activations of speciﬁc brain areas, the three states of con-
sciousness (wake, non-REM-sleep, REM-sleep) also diﬀer with respect to their neurochemical
inﬂuences. During wakefulness, the cortex is activated by brain stem ascending cholinergic
inﬂuences (Moruzzi and Magoun, 1949) - and at the same time inhibited by aminergic as-
cending neurons releasing dopamine, noradrenaline, serotonine, and histamine. This interplay
of activation and inhibition allows our rational and logical waking thinking. Both inﬂuences
decrease during non-REM-sleep. During REM-sleep, however, the cortex is widely activated
again (see above), but simultaneously strongly disinhibited since all aminergic neurons stop
ﬁring, except for the dopaminergic ones.44 This sustained release of dopamine in the absence
of serotonergic and noradrenergic inhibition is hypothesized to account for the bizarre and
illogical characteristics of REM-sleep mentation, which strikingly resemble the cognitive ac-
tivity of psychotic patients (Gottesmann, 2000).
43However, results are partly contradictory since Nofzinger et al., 1997 found an increase in cerebral blood
ﬂow in the prefrontal cortices during REM-sleep.
44This is in strong accordance with Solms’ observation that dreaming ceases completely when the dopaminergic
circuits are impaired (Solms, 2000).
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EEG studies showed that REM- and non-REM-sleep can also be distinguished on the basis
of gamma activity. This very fast frequency (30-50 Hz) is assumed to be correlated with cog-
nitive processing (see Basar-Eroglu et al., 1996 for review) and is prominent in wakefulness
and during REM-sleep.45 However, the occurrence of gamma oscillations is greatly reduced
during non-REM-sleep (Llina´s and Ribary, 1993; Steriade, 1997; Kahn et al., 1997). Together
with the sensorimotor blockade, this could contribute to the “emotional, hallucinatory, illogi-
cal, amnestic and disorientated cognition that typiﬁes REM-sleep dreaming” (Hobson et al.,
1998, p.242). Hence, gamma activity might be the neural substrate of the equally diverse,
but qualitatively diﬀerent cognitive processes during wakefulness and REM-sleep, while the
absence of this gamma activity during non-REM-sleep could explain the absence of these
kinds of cognitive processes.
Apart from their discrete underlying neurophysiological mechanisms and dominating neuro-
transmitters, diﬀerences in REM- and non-REM-sleep mentation show remarkable references
to what Freud described as the diﬀerences between primary and secondary process think-
ing (see chapter 1.2). The primarily bizarre, imaginative, illogical, and irrational nature of
most REM-sleep imagery with its manifold condensations, displacements, and transforma-
tions strongly corresponds to Freud’s primary process. Non-REM-sleep mentation, however,
which is more rational and reasonable, is closer to our waking thinking and what Freud named
the secondary process. This is in accord with observations even of non-psychoanalysts such
as Gottesman who points out that the “thought-like activity [of non-REM-sleep] somewhat
corresponds to Freud’s secondary process which sustains waking psychological controlled ac-
tivity”(Gottesmann, 2000, p.2). Even earlier, Rechtschaﬀen et al. stated that non-REM-sleep
mentation“has more of the secondary process characteristics (. . . ) than does REM-sleep men-
tation” (Rechtschaﬀen et al., 1963, p.546). Hence, dream content could possibly, instead of
being determined by a certain state (REM- vs. non-REM-sleep), be rather the result of a cer-
tain underlying process (primary vs. secondary process). But can REM- and non-REM-sleep
indeed be distinguished on the basis of the respectively prevailing kind of mental organization
paralleling the Freudian concept of primary and secondary process thinking? As described in
chapter 1.2.3, there has been one study which tried to answer this particular question (Shevrin
and Fisher, 1967). However, despite its encouraging results, there has been no further sup-
portive evidence so far. With our study we wish to replicate these important ﬁndings. Thus,
one of our main hypotheses is the assumption that the mental activity during REM-sleep -
in which more bizarre and imaginative dreams occur - has more characteristics of the pri-
mary process, while during non-REM-sleep - in which dreams are more thought-like - more
secondary process operations take place (see chapter 1.6).
45As opposed to during wakefulness, gamma activity during REM-sleep is marked by a lack of reset by sensory
input. This observation corresponds with the fact that attention during REM-sleep is turned away from
external sensory inputs toward internal inputs and memories (Llina´s and Ribary, 1993).
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1.6 Aims and scopes
With this study we hope to be able to make a contribution to the experimental validation of
the psychoanalytical construct of primary and secondary process thinking. Especially with
the ongoing rapid developments and manifold discoveries in the ﬁeld of brain research and
neuroscience, the more than centenarian psychoanalytic theories are being evermore criticized
as hypothetical and untenable. Psychoanalysis is challenged to present not only clinical, but
also experimental evidence for its hypotheses (see chapter 1.1). This project ties in with
this endeavor by trying to take a look at the Freudian theory from an experimental and
neurophysiological point of view.
Although there have been numerous studies dealing with primary and secondary process
thinking (see chapter 1.2.3), the question whether this theory can be transferred to the sleep-
dream-cycle has been largely ignored. This is even more remarkable since Freud explicitly
linked his famous theory of dream formation and dream work to the mechanisms of the
primary process (see chapter 1.2.2). Hence, we wish to make up for this failure, and apply
the Freudian concept of primary and secondary process thinking on the sleep-dream cycle.
We aim at demonstrating that REM- and non-REM-sleep can be distinguished on the basis
of their prevailing thought processes, paralleling primary and secondary process thinking. So
far, only one single study (Shevrin and Fisher, 1967) has attempted to test this hypothesis -
with success. Shevrin and Fisher were able to demonstrate that a visual stimulus presented
subliminally during wakefulness was processed in a more primary process way during REM-
sleep, while non-REM-sleep enhanced a more secondary process way of stimulus processing.
However, this striking ﬁnding has not been replicated ever since, although it touches on
so many important aspects relevant to psychoanalysis. With our study we want to make
up for this major omission and wish to investigate the following main hypothesis and the
accompanying sub-hypotheses:
• REM- and non-REM-sleep diﬀer with respect to their prevailing way of mental functioning.
These diﬀerences match the Freudian concept of primary and secondary process thinking.
While REM-sleep follows the rules of the primary process, non-REM-sleep mentation is
organized along more secondary process lines.
To investigate this hypothesis we follow three diﬀerent approaches. Firstly, we want to repli-
cate the original ﬁndings of Shevrin and Fisher (1967) by presenting a subliminal rebus stim-
ulus and investigate its primary and secondary processing during REM- and non-REM-sleep
(see chapter 3.3). We expect to ﬁnd the following:
 The subliminally presented rebus stimulus is processed diﬀerently during REM- and non-
REM-sleep. While REM-sleep mentation is marked by more primary process transforma-
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tions on the clang and rebus level, non-REM-sleep reveals more secondary process trans-
formations on the conceptual level.
Secondly, we want to extend these ﬁndings by using additionally stimuli (the so-called GeoCat-
stimuli of Brakel (2004)) which have proven useful in the investigation of primary and sec-
ondary process thinking (see chapter 3.4). Here we wish to demonstrate that:
 REM-sleep awakenings result in more attributional similarity judgments of the GeoCat
items as an index for primary process thinking, while more relational similarity judgments
as an index for secondary process thinking are given after awakenings from non-REM-sleep.
Lastly, we will look for neurophysiological correlates of these two modes of thinking as ad-
ditional independent evidence for primary and secondary process thinking. Since this is a
largely unexplored ﬁeld, our results will be mainly preliminary and exploratory. Nevertheless,
we want to analyze the neurophysiological data in more detail (see chapter 3.5) and try to
investigate the following hypothesis:
 Neurophysiological measures can be used as independent evidence for these diﬀerent modes
of mental functioning during REM- and non-REM-sleep. While increased alpha power
is expected to be associated with primary process eﬀects, we expect theta power to be
correlated with secondary process thinking.
2. Method
2.1 Subjects
The experimental group consisted of 20 university students (5 male, 15 female) who were
recruited by postings on the university campus. Subjects ranged in age from 20 to 35 (mean
age 23.6 ± 3.2 years) and met the following inclusion criteria:
• no diagnosed sleep disorder
• no history of neurological or psychiatric illness
• no current medication
• no drug abuse (see appendix A)
Except for one subject who was born in Poland but moved to Germany at the age of three,
and another subject who was born in Kazakhstan but had a German grandmother and moved
to Germany when she was seven years old, all subjects were German native speakers. All had
normal or corrected to normal visus and 14 to 19.5 years of education (16.2 ± 1.4 years).
Reported sleep eﬃciency (total sleep time / time in bed) ranged from 78-99 % (90.6 ± 6.6 %)
and average total sleep time from 6-10 hours (8 ± 1.3 hours). 90 % rated their sleep quality
as “good” (50 %) or “very good” (40 %). This was reﬂected in the mean total score of 3.8
(± 1.9) in the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse et al., 1989), which assesses the
subjective sleep quality of the preceding four weeks (the cut-oﬀ score for the PSQI is 5, a score
higher than 10 reveals severely disturbed sleep). With respect to dream recall frequency, 45
% indicated remembering their dreams “several times a week”, and 40 % chose “about once
a week”. The remaining 15 % remembered their dreams “twice or three times a month” (10
%), or “less than once in a month” (5 %). Participants received 70 e when they completed
the study.
42
2.2. Study design 43
2.2 Study design
2.2.1 Initial contact
Interested subjects were informed extensively in a ﬁrst informal meeting about the experi-
mental procedure, the measurement method, data protection, and data storage (see appendix
B).46 They were assured of having the right to quit the study at any point without giving any
reason. After they had rated their dream recall frequency on a seven-point scale (Schredl,
2002), they were asked to ﬁll in the Pittsburgh Sleep Quality Index (PSQI; Buysse et al.,
1989) to assess their individual sleeping habits and to measure the subjective sleep quality of
the previous four weeks. Those subjects who did not show impaired sleep quality and met
the inclusion criteria described above were included in the study. They gave written informed
consent (see appendix C) and were scheduled for the experiments. Each subject had to spend
four nights in the neurological sleep laboratory of the Klinikum Bremen-Ost (one baseline
night and three experimental nights) each with an interval of 5-7 days. They were asked to
keep a sleep log between sessions in which they wrote down when they went to sleep, when
they got up, how many times they woke up and if they had used any kind of drugs or alcohol.
2.2.2 Baseline night and data acquisition
All participants were ﬁrstly studied during a baseline night. By this, the subject could get
used to the environment of the lab and to sleeping with the electrodes. At the same time a
healthy sleep cycle could be assured and sleep disorders of any kind ruled out (i.e. obstruc-
tive sleep apnea syndrome, periodic limb movement disorder, somnambulism, REM-sleep
behavioral disorder, etc.). The subject arrived at the sleep lab in the evening, at around 9
PM. After changing for the night, electrodes and additional measuring devices were placed.
Polysomnographic recording included four scalp electrodes (C3, C4, O1, O2) with contralat-
eral mastoid references. EEG was measured monopolar with Ag-AgCl electrodes which were
attached with a conducting paste and ﬁxed on the scalp with collodion following the interna-
tional 10-20 electrode placement system (Jasper, 1958). The grounding electrode was placed
on the forehead. For the detection of REM-sleep, bipolar electrooculogram (EOG) from left
and right epicanthus lateralis was recorded to measure eye movements and bipolar submental
electromyography (EMG) to measure muscle tone. Figure 2.1 shows the usual polysomno-
graphic setup.
The following ﬁlter settings were used: EEG: sensitivity 7 muV/mm, low frequency ﬁlter
(LFF) 0.5 Hz, high frequency ﬁlter (HFF) 70 Hz; EOG: sensitivity 20 muV/mm, LFF 0.5
Hz, HFF 30 Hz, and EMG: sensitivity 10 muV/mm, LFF 10 Hz, HFF 70 Hz. Impedances
46The study protocol was designed according to the Helsinki Declaration (1964/2004), and approved by the
ethics commission of the University of Bremen on October 16th 2009.
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for all electrodes were kept below 5 kOmega. All electrophysiological data was digitized with
a sampling rate of 200 Hz. Visual scoring of wakefulness and sleep stages was done following
the standardized rules of Rechtschaﬀen and Kales (1968), using 30 s epochs for scoring. Data
was recorded using Excel-Tech (XLTEK) hard- and software.
ELECTROENCEPHALOGRAM (EEG)
ELECTROOCULOGRAM (EOG)
ELECTROMYOGRAM (EMG)
Figure 2.1: Polysomnographic setup (adapted from Borbe´ly, 1984)
To rule out sleep disorders, the following additional measurements were used during the
baseline night: anterior tibialis leg EMG, electrocardiogram (ECG), as well as measures of
airﬂow, respiratory eﬀort, and blood oxygen saturation. All nights were acoustically and
visually recorded with a microphone and a video camera. By this, subjects could get in
touch with the experimenter in the adjoining room during the whole night at any time. After
putting on the electrodes and measuring devices, the subject went straight to bed and was
awakened the next morning around 7 AM. After all cables had been removed, the testing was
over and the subject could go home.
2.2.3 Rebus and control night
For the ﬁrst and second experimental night (rebus and control night), participants again ar-
rived in the evening in the sleep lab. In all experimental nights, leg EMG and respiratory
measures could be eliminated since sleep disorders had already been ruled out during the base-
line night. Instead, the EEG electrodes Fpz, Fz, Cz, Pz, and Oz were added. After putting
on the electrodes, and immediately before the subject’s retiring to bed, the experimental
stimulus was presented.
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2.2.3.1 Rebus stimulus
Like Shevrin and Fisher (1967; see chapter 1.2.3), we also use a rebus stimulus for the investi-
gation of primary and secondary processes during sleep. Our rebus consists of the two pictured
objects Kamm (Engl.: comb) and Floß (Engl.: raft; see ﬁgure 2.2). The condensation of the
sounds of both objects leads to the rebus word kampﬂos (Engl.: without a struggle/ﬁght).
Figure 2.2: The kampﬂos rebus stimulus
This stimulus is able to evoke diﬀerent levels of associations and thus allows for tracing back
primary, as well as secondary process inﬂuences:
• Associations on the conceptual level: hair, head, water, wood, etc. (associations refer
to the pictured objects comb and raft)
• Associations on the clang level: Kammer (Engl.: broom closet), Kamin (Engl.: chim-
ney), hilﬂos (Engl.: helpless), etc. (associations imply the sounds of the pictured objects)
• Associations on the rebus level: victory, defense, enemy, ﬁght, etc. (associations refer
to the rebus word kampﬂos)47
As described in chapter 1.2.3, associations on the conceptual level imply the characteristics
of the secondary process. They are logical, rational, and conventional and refer clearly to
the pictured objects Kamm and Floß. However, associations on the clang, and especially
on the rebus level are characterized by more primary process operations. On the clang
level, objects are not longer treated as real objects but as phonetic structure. On the rebus
level, a condensation of these sounds occurs, resulting in a completely new word (kampﬂos).
Thus, only a primary process reading, which combines the word presentations of the stimuli
(condensation), results in associations on the rebus meaning. The main advantage of such a
rebus stimulus is that it allows one to investigate the conditions under which it undergoes
primary or secondary process transformations. This is possible by making concrete predictions
about several transformations (conceptual, clang and rebus) that can be identiﬁed precisely
47Freud referred to associations of this kind as being superﬁcial associations which are a characteristic of the
primary process (Freud, 1900; see chapter 1.2).
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and reliably.48
In the rebus night, this stimulus was presented subliminally before the subject’s retiring to
bed. To control for the experimental eﬀect of this stimulus, we also ran a control night in
which a blank slide was presented instead of the rebus stimulus. Thus, each subject was
his49 own control and a measure of base rate recovery could be provided (see Dixon, 1971).
The order of the rebus and the control night was randomized and counterbalanced. Both the
experimenter and the subject were blind to the respective condition.
2.2.3.2 Stimulus presentation
Rebus and control stimulus were presented by an electronical projection-tachistoscope EPT
5a which consists of two Kodak carousel-projectors (see ﬁgure 2.3) and an external control
box.
Figure 2.3: The two Kodak carousel-projectors of the tachistoscope
The projectors work with special xenon high-pressure lamps. The advantage of these lamps
is their very short rise and drop time of only 30 μs. In case of subliminal stimulation, where
presentation times are supposed to be extremely short to avoid conscious awareness of the
stimuli, this is a crucial factor. Presentation times of the EPT 5a tachistoscope can be varied
from 0.1 ms to 100 s in steps of 0.1 ms. Projector 1 (P1) is switched oﬀ and ﬂashes only
during the deﬁned presentation time (“light ﬂash”) to present the stimulus. Projector 2 (P2)
is switched on and gets dark (“dark ﬂash”) during this stimulus presentation. Because of this
uninterrupted cross-fading the light is continuously on and the subject does not realize when
the picture is being ﬂashed. In our experiment, stimulus presentation was characterized by
48Using pictures instead of words is preferable since words, being strongly overlearned, have strikingly low
recognition thresholds (see Shevrin, 1973).
49In order to improve readability, only the masculine form is used in the text. Nevertheless, all data apply to
the male and female participants.
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the following parameters:
• presentation time: 1 ms
• number of presentations: 5
• time between each of the 5 ﬂashes: 1 s
• luminance: 5 ﬂ (foot lamberts)
• size of projection screen: 100 x 66 cm
• size of the stimulus on the screen: the picture of the Kamm and the Floß covers a square
of the size 24 x 6 cm
• distance from subject to screen: 2.35 m50
Working with this duration and luminance has proven to assure working at the objective
detection threshold (ODT), described in chapter 1.3.3 (Shevrin et al., 1992; Van Selst and
Merikle, 1993; Bernat et al., 2001a,b; Klein Villa et al., 2006; Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006;
Snodgrass, 2009). Furthermore, Wong et al. (1994) demonstrated that the individual thresh-
olds of a group of subjects were on average at 2.35 ms, ranging from 2 to 4 ms. Hence, the
1 ms exposure time used in this study is indeed below most individual thresholds. In this
respect we diﬀer from the original study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967) who used presentation
times of 6 ms, and were thus most probably working at the subjective detection threshold
(see chapter 4.1 for a discussion of this point).
The subject was asked to sit down in front of the screen and look at the ﬁxation cross at
the center of the screen. He was told that he would soon be asked to respond to a stimulus
which was probably not seen but still present. This was done to avoid the subject feeling too
awkward by responding to something he did not see. By saying “Ready!” just before ﬂashing
the stimulus, the subject was warned and knew when to focus on the ﬁxation cross and not
to blink his eyes. Either the rebus stimulus or a blank control slide was ﬂashed, immediately
followed by the reappearance of the ﬁxation cross.51 Afterwards, the subject stated whether
he had seen anything. Then he was asked to describe the ﬁrst picture which came to mind
and to make a drawing of it while describing it a second time. After this, the subject was
asked to free associate for four minutes. Immediately afterwards, the subject went to bed and
the light was switched oﬀ.
50See chapter 3.1 for the results of the pretestings which were run to test the characteristics of the tachistoscope
and to assure subliminality.
51Since luminance levels for all the slides (rebus stimulus, blank slide, ﬁxation cross) were set at 5 ﬂ, this method
diﬀers from the energy masking method employed in earlier subliminal studies (see chapter 1.3). However,
it is in accord with more recent subliminal studies working at the ODT (e.g. Bernat et al., 2001a,b).
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2.2.3.3 Tasks
During the night, the subject was awakened several times. Our aim was to get three REM-
and three non-REM-sleep (stage 2) awakenings.52 We did not use the ﬁrst sleep cycle but
the second, third, and fourth since they are more stable and last longer. The ﬁrst awakening
was a non-REM awakening immediately following the ﬁrst sleep cycle, and the last one was a
REM awakening early in the morning. To assure a stable non-REM period, we waited for 15
minutes of uninterrupted stage 2 sleep before waking the subject up. Since especially the REM
periods of the earlier sleep cycles are shorter and less stable, the REM awakenings were all
ﬁve minutes into their respective periods of uninterrupted REM-sleep. Figure 2.4 exemplarily
shows the order of the nocturnal awakenings in the rebus night which also pertains for the
control night.
non-REM 1
REM 1
non-REM 2
REM 2
non-REM 3
REM 3
23:00 01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00
wake
REM
non-REM 1
non-REM 2
non-REM 3
non-REM 4
Figure 2.4: Order of the nocturnal awakenings in the rebus night
After waking the subject up by knocking on the door the experimenter entered the room and
sat down next to the subject’s bed. After each awakening the subject was asked to perform
the following tasks (verbal answers were tape recorded):
1. A verbal dream report and a drawing of it
Immediately upon awakening the experimenter asked “What was happening before I awak-
ened you?”53 and added “Please recall what was happening in as much detail and as
elaborately as possible. Allow enough time to avoid forgetting something”. Because the
52This is in accordance with the original study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967). Furthermore, almost all non-
REM-sleep dream reports described in the literature are obtained from stage 2 sleep, since stage 2 makes up
the major part of non-REM-sleep and is equally distributed throughout the night (see Antrobus, 1991).
53This formulation proved to result in more dream reports than the question“What were you dreaming before I
awakened you?” (Foulkes, 1962). Since non-REM-sleep mentation is often less dream- but more thought-like
(see chapter 1.5), it might, therefore, sometimes not be identiﬁed as a dream by the dreamer himself.
2.2. Study design 49
experimenter was blind to the respective condition (rebus or control), she could feel free
to ask the subject to clarify details of the dream in order to get as detailed a report as
possible. Afterwards, the subject was asked to make a drawing of what he had reported
and to describe it at the same time. This was meant to elicit a greater ampliﬁcation of the
dream content.
2. Four minutes of free associations
After this, the subject was asked to close his eyes and to say all the individual words that
came to mind for the following four minutes. The instruction was: “Please tell me all of the
individual words that come to your mind in the next few minutes. Let your mind roam as
far as it wants to - no matter how related or unrelated, no matter how silly or non-sensical
the words may seem. It is particularly important that you say all of the words that come
to your mind. You can do this best by making yourself as relaxed as possible so that the
words just come up by themselves. Just let it happen, and say the words as they come to
you. It would help if you would close your eyes - so please close them now and let them
remain closed until I tell you to open them. I will tell you when to start and when to stop
again.”
3. A description and drawing of the ﬁrst picture that came to mind
Finally, the subject was asked to describe the ﬁrst picture that came to mind, and to make
a drawing of it while describing it for a second time.
Besides the dream reports, free associations and images were used because former studies have
shown that both are useful in recovering subliminal material (e.g. Luborsky and Shevrin,
1956; Fisher, 1956; Fisher and Paul, 1959; Stross and Shevrin, 1968; Shevrin and Fritzler,
1968b; see chapter 1.2.3). Furthermore, as Holt points out, primary and secondary process
are hypothetical constructs which can hardly be observed directly. Hence, we must “content
ourselves with thought products, in some of which we can detect signs (. . . ) that have been
produced by primary and/or secondary processes” (Holt, 2002, p.461). In our opinion, the
dream report is clearly the end product of the underlying thought process, be it primary or
secondary process-like. With the methods of free associations and free imagery, however, we
hope to be closer to the process itself.
The next morning the subject was again awakened around 7 AM and released from the cables.
2.2.3.4 Detection experiment and debrieﬁng
To assure that the stimulus was indeed presented subliminally, we ran a forced-choice detec-
tion experiment (based on signal detection theory; see chapter 1.3.1) the morning after the
second experimental night. Therefore, we ﬂashed 32 cards with the rebus stimulus and 32
blank cards under the experimental conditions described in chapter 2.2.3.2, in a randomized
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order. By this, one of the basic criteria for establishing subliminality called for by Merikle
(1982), that is to obtain a suﬃcient number of threshold-determining responses, is fulﬁlled.
Participants were told that either a slide with a picture or a blank slide would be ﬂashed
ﬁve times for 1 ms in quick succession, and that there would be an equal number of trials of
each kind in random order. They were asked to state after each presentation whether they
had seen “something” or “nothing” and to keep their responses approximately equally divided
between these two choices. This answers another basic criteria for establishing subliminality,
that is to eliminate response bias. Only by answering “yes” and “no”, even in the absence of a
stimulus, is it possible to precisely determine the objective threshold. To meet the conditions
of the objective detection threshold (ODT), subjects must not be able to detect a diﬀerence
between the rebus and the blank. If they see “something” - even if they cannot identify it as a
comb or a raft - they are no longer at the ODT. Thus, if discrimination between stimulus and
no stimulus conditions is d’ = 0 (see chapter 1.3.1), detection is at chance and subliminality
is guaranteed.
After the detection experiment there was a debrieﬁng in which the rebus stimulus was pro-
jected on the screen and subjects were asked the following questions:
1. What is this?
2. What are your ﬁrst ﬁve associations to each of the pictures (Kamm and Floß)?
3. Do these items have any association to one of your dreams during the last two nights here
in the sleep lab?
4. Are there more ideas you have about these two items?
5. If this was a rebus, what would it mean?
6. What are your ﬁrst ﬁve associations to the rebus word (kampﬂos)?
7. Does this word have any association with one of your dreams during the last two nights
here in the sleep lab?
2.2.4 GeoCat night
In this last experimental night, the same electrodes as in the rebus and the control night
were used (see chapter 2.2.3). However, there was no subliminal stimulation and subjects
went straight to bed after all the cables had been ﬁxed. As in the rebus and control night,
we aimed at getting three REM- and three non-REM-sleep awakenings - starting with a
non-REM-sleep awakening after the ﬁrst sleep cycle and ending with a REM-sleep awakening
early in the morning. For the ﬁrst four awakenings (two REM and two non-REM awakenings)
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we used the classic GeoCat stimuli of Brakel (2004), while during the last two awakenings
(one REM and one non-REM awakening) the scalar GeoCat items of Brakel (unpublished
scale, described in Vanheule et al., (under review)) were administered. Figure 2.5 shows the
procedure and the awakenings of this experimental night.
classic GeoCat
classic GeoCat
classic GeoCat
classic GeoCat
scalar GeoCat
scalar GeoCat
23:00 01:00 03:00 05:00 07:00
wake
REM
non-REM 1
non-REM 2
non-REM 3
non-REM 4
Figure 2.5: Order of the nocturnal awakenings in the GeoCat night
2.2.4.1 GeoCat stimuli
The classic GeoCat stimuli comprise four lists, each with six items. Every item consists of
three geometric ﬁgures - a master ﬁgure at top center and two diﬀerent similarity choices
below: one relational similarity choice (diﬀerent features but identical spatial organization)
and one attributional similarity choice (identical features but diﬀerent spatial organization;
Brakel, 2004; see ﬁgure 2.6).54 The ﬁgures are counterbalanced for position and item bias.
This means an attributional choice in one item functions as relational choice in another item
with a diﬀerent master ﬁgure, and vice versa (list 1 and 2). Furthermore, the position of both
choices (left/right) was reversed (version A and B; Brakel, 2004; Brakel and Shevrin, 2005;
see appendix D for all four lists).
Besides the classic GeoCat stimuli, we also used the 24 scalar GeoCat items which comprise
the same geometric ﬁgures as the classic GeoCat items. One scalar GeoCat item consists
of two ﬁgures and instead of giving categorical similarity judgments, subjects were asked to
indicate on a scale ranging from 1 to 5 how similar these two ﬁgures were (see appendix E for
an example). The scalar GeoCat items were created by taking the 12 classic GeoCat master
54Good internal validity and internal consistency of these items was demonstrated by Vanheule et al., (under
review).
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Figure 2.6: Exemplary version of one classic GeoCat item consisting of a master ﬁgure on top and
two alternatives (relational left and attributional right) underneath (Brakel, 2004)
ﬁgures and putting them in paired opposition with the relational and the attributional alter-
natives of the corresponding classic GeoCat item. Hence, twelve items assess attributional
and twelve relational similarity judgment. Figure 2.7 shows an example of two attributionally
similar items.
Figure 2.7: Exemplary version of one scalar GeoCat item showing two attributionally similar items
2.2.4.2 Tasks
Immediately after the ﬁrst four awakenings (two non-REM- and two REM-sleep awakenings),
the subject was presented with a pen and paper version of one of the classic GeoCat lists.
The order of the diﬀerent lists was randomized. On each of the four sheets was a visual
analog scale on which the subject had to state his respective state of anxiety ranging from 1
(“calm”) to 10 (“very anxious”). The instruction below told the subject to make a spontaneous
choice about which of the two alternatives (attributional and relational) was more similar to
the respective master ﬁgure (see appendix D). The attributional choice - which is based on
part-for-whole categorization - is an index for primary process thinking, whereas relational
similarity judgments are thought to reﬂect more secondary process thinking.
After the last two awakenings (one non-REM- and one REM-sleep awakening), the subjects
were presented with the 24 items of scalar GeoCat. Instead of categorical similarity judgments,
subjects were asked to rate the similarity of all 12 pairs of attributionally similar items and
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12 pairs of relationally similar items on a visual analog scale ranging from 1 (“diﬀerent”) to 5
(“identical”). Each pair was presented on a separate sheet with the visual analog scale below
the items and the question “How similar are these two ﬁgures?” (see appendix E). The order
of the 24 items was randomized for each awakening and for each subject. The morning after
this last experimental night, subjects had to redo the four classic GeoCat lists and the 24
scalar GeoCat items in a fully awake condition. The order of the four classic lists and the 24
scalar items was again randomized.
2.2.4.3 Personality measures
Finally, subjects were asked to ﬁll in the following personality questionnaires: the State and
Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Laux et al., 1981) which consists of two scales to measure
state anxiety as a temporary emotional state, as well as trait anxiety as a relatively stable
personality feature. The NEO-Five-Factor-Inventory (NEO-FFI; Borkenau and Ostendorf,
1993) which is designed to measure ﬁve domains of personality: neuroticism, extraversion,
openness to experience, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Additionally, two scales to
measure social desirability were administered. Firstly, the German version of the Balanced
Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR; Paulhus, 1998) by Musch et al. (2002) which
consists of two scales measuring self-deceptive enhancement and impression management.
Secondly, the Social Desirability Scale (SDS-16) by Sto¨ber (1999) which mainly measures
impression management.
2.3 Data analysis
2.3.1 Stimulus detectability
As described in chapter 2.2.3.4, we presented 32 rebus (stimulus YES) and 32 blank (stimulus
NO) cards in the detection experiment in randomized order for 1 ms. After each presentation,
the subject had to state whether he saw “something” (response YES) or “nothing” (response
NO). Table 2.1 shows the resulting possibilities:
response YES response NO
stimulus YES hit miss
stimulus NO false alarm correct rejection
Table 2.1: Possible answer categories in the detection experiment
For the analysis of the detection experiment, d’ as an index for conscious perception (dis-
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crimination between stimulus and no stimulus condition; see chapter 1.3.1) is calculated.
Technically, d’ is deﬁned as the normalized distance between the means of the underlying
stimulus and no-stimulus distributions (Macmillan, 1986). Hence, the following formula is
applied (Macmillan and Creelman, 1991):
d’ = z(H) - z(F)
where “H” is the hit rate (proportion of YES trials to which subject responded YES) and
“F” the number of false alarms (proportion of NO trials to which subject responded YES).
As already mentioned, d’ at the objective detection threshold is supposed to be zero - more
speciﬁcally it is supposed to be not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero. Hence, the H0 hypothesis
that d’ = 0 is tested with a one-sample t-test. In case of a non-signiﬁcant result, the H0
hypothesis can be accepted and it is clearly demonstrated that detection is indeed at chance.
2.3.2 Rebus night
2.3.2.1 Free associations
For the scoring of the rebus and conceptual associates obtained from our experimental sub-
jects during the night, we need an objective reference. Therefore, we collected normative word
association data to the rebus word (kampﬂos) and its components (Kamm and Floß) from a
large group of people (reference group: N = 510). A catalogue was compiled which was then
used as a basic scoring measure (see appendix F). It was obtained from 403 women (79 %)
and 107 men (21 %) aged 18-35, like the experimental group. Mean age was 24 ± 3 years and
all of them were German native speakers. They were ﬁlling in an online questionnaire (see
appendix G) which was distributed via the internet. In this questionnaire they were asked to
give some personal information and ﬁve associates to a list of pictures (including a picture
of a comb and a raft) and words (including the rebus word and its component parts). By
these means, we obtained extensive lists of associates for the key words, on the basis of which
we could judge the appearance of stimulus-related words within the associates given by our
subjects after each awakening. Although we obtained ﬁve associations to both pictures and
words, we decided to take the ﬁrst given associates to the words (Kamm, Floß, and kampﬂos)
as reference, since this is more in accord with the original procedure applied by Shevrin and
Fisher (1967). This association catalogue was also used to score dream reports and image
descriptions. As Shevrin (1973) has shown, scoring on the basis of such association norms is
possible with a degree of reliability limited only by scoring error which is usually less than
3 %. Hence, this method allows a very objective and reliable scoring. In our case, this was
even more enhanced by the fact that the rater was blind to the respective condition (rebus
or control) and state (wake, non-REM, or REM). In the following, the scoring of the free
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associations is described in more detail to illustrate the basic procedure. This procedure is
largely adopted from the scoring rules of Shevrin and Stross (1964) which were also used in
the original study by Shevrin and Fisher (1967). The same rules are applied to the scoring
of dream reports and image descriptions but, for the sake of simplicity, the free association
scoring is described representatively.
After the transcription of the associations, which had been tape recorded during the experi-
mental sessions, the actual scoring begins. Each word is taken one at a time in the subject’s
production and looked for on the alphabetized list of the association catalogue. When a word
is found to match it is assigned to the respective category:
1. pure associate to Kamm
2. embedded associate unchanged in meaning to Kamm
3. embedded associate changed in meaning to Kamm
4. clang associate to Kamm
5. pure associate to Floß
6. embedded associate unchanged in meaning to Floß
7. embedded associate changed in meaning to Floß
8. clang associate to Floß
9. pure associate to kampﬂos
10. embedded associate unchanged in meaning to kampﬂos
11. embedded associate changed in meaning to kampﬂos
Pure associates are only exact associates as shown in the basic association catalogue, and
their grammatical variants (singular, plural, possessive forms of nouns, diﬀerent tenses of
verbs, participles, gerunds, imperative and superlative forms of adjectives, adverbs, etc.) -
e.g. frei (Engl.: free) and Freiheit (Engl.: freedom). Embedded associates unchanged in
meaning refer to those associates which occur in compound words without any signiﬁcant
change in meaning (e.g. Schiﬀ (Engl.: ship) and Schiﬀbruch (Engl.: shipwreck)). This rule
is applied both ways: to words in the association catalogue and words in the subject’s pro-
ductions. Embedded associates changed in meaning imply all associates which occur
in compound words but have undergone a signiﬁcant change in meaning (e.g. Baum (Engl.:
tree) and baumeln (Engl.: to dangle)). Hence, it is more the sound than the actual meaning
of the word that is involved in some other word. Finally, the clang category is scored when
the phonemes of the key rebus words appear as a clang within the subject’s verbalizations
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(e.g. Kammer (Engl.: chamber) or hilﬂos (Engl.: helpless)).55 It is the clang sound, not the
spelling that counts. Because of the low incidence of words containing kamm- and ﬂos-clangs
and our wish to get as full a measure of the clang response as possible (and since the three
consonants determine and diﬀerentiate the syllable suﬃciently), we decided to score k mm
and ﬂ s with whatever single sounded vowels or diphtongs appear between the anchoring
consonants as clangs (e.g. Kummer (Engl.: grief) or Keim (Engl.: seed)).56 Reliability for
the clang scoring is very high, since no judgments are involved in identifying these clang as-
sociates. In accord with the original study (Shevrin and Fisher, 1967) the clang eﬀect, which
implies the characteristics of the primary process, is measured independently of the rebus and
conceptual eﬀect (see below).
Each of these categories - depending on whether it is assigned to Kamm-, Floß-, or kampﬂos-
associates - describes either more primary process (PP) or secondary process (SP) thinking
(see table 2.2).
pure embedded
unchanged in
meaning
embedded
changed in
meaning
Kamm 1 (SP) 2 (SP) 3 (PP)
Floß 5 (SP) 6 (SP) 7 (PP)
kampﬂos 9 (PP) 10 (PP) 11 (PP)
Table 2.2: Possible scoring categories for Kamm-, Floß-, and kampﬂos-related words and their re-
spective relation to primary process (PP) or secondary process (SP) thinking
Associations on the conceptual level (pure and embedded unchanged in meaning as-
sociates to Kamm and Floß ; category 1, 2, 5, 6) reﬂect a secondary mental process which
depends entirely on the semantic/dictionary meaning of the word - not on its sound or any
change in meaning. Associations on the rebus level (pure and embedded unchanged in
meaning associates to kampﬂos; category 9, 10) reﬂect the primary mental process, which
has already occurred unconsciously when the words Kamm and Floß are treated as sounds
and combined to form a new word (kampﬂos). Furthermore, the embedded changed in
meaning categories (3, 7, 11), in which words are also treated as concrete phonemic patterns
(and not with respect to their referential function), indicate primary process thinking as well
and, therefore, also enter the calculations of the rebus eﬀect.
Hence, following our second hypothesis (see chapter 1.6), we expect to ﬁnd a stronger rebus
eﬀect as indicator for primary process thinking in associations (and dream reports and image
55Since clang associates to kampﬂos are highly unlikely (to our knowledge no word exists which contains the
sound kampﬂos), only the sounds kamm and ﬂos are scored.
56This procedure is also in accordance with the scoring rules of Shevrin and Stross (1964) which were used in
the original study by Shevrin and Fisher (1967).
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descriptions) following REM-sleep awakenings. After non-REM-sleep awakenings, however,
more secondary process-like answers and associations on the conceptual level are expected.
After all associations are assigned a number between 1 and 11 (or 0 in case of no matching
category), all secondary process associations (category 1, 2, 5, 6) and all primary process
related associations (category 3, 7, 9, 10, 11) are summed up within each awakening. These
scores are then corrected for the total number of words in that respective awakening and
for the total amount of awakenings in that respective sleep stage (non-REM or REM). To
depict the experimental eﬀect of the subliminal rebus stimulus, diﬀerence scores are calculated
by subtracting the respective sum scores of the control condition from those of the rebus
condition. Thus, each subject gets three diﬀerence scores (wake, non-REM, and REM). Out
of these scores a rank order is built. In order to compare the scores of these three states, a
Friedman two-way analysis is performed on the diﬀerence scores. Additionally, a Wilcoxon
signed rank test is applied to check the diﬀerences between two stages each.
2.3.2.2 Dream reports
Before scoring the dream reports with the procedure described above, the reports must be
prepared appropriately. According to the guidelines of Schredl and Erlacher (2003a), all parts
of the report not directly belonging to the dream (i.e. all remarks going beyond the actual
dream content) need to be removed. Introductory remarks (e.g. “I was dreaming that . . . ” or
“I only remember that . . . ”), as well as closing words (e.g. “. . . and then I woke up” or “That’s
all I remember!”) are deleted. The same is true for comments on the dream content (e.g. “I
once experienced a very similar situation.” or “That’s the friend I met the other day.”).
Along with the scoring on the conceptual-, rebus-, or clang-level, dream reports are also rated
according to their degree of bizarreness and their closeness to reality.57 One could assume
that an increased prevalence of primary process mentation is related to increased bizarreness.
Hence, we would expect a positive correlation between dream bizarreness and the rebus eﬀect.
Bizarreness is measured with the bizarreness scale of Schredl and Erlacher (2003b). Events,
characters, objects, feelings, or actions are scored as bizarre when they are highly improbable
or impossible, and match one of the following categories:
1. Incongruity
• something inconsistent with waking life (e.g. a talking dog)
• discrepancy from physical laws (e.g. traveling in time)
• mismatching features (e.g. experiencing something sad, but feeling happy)
57We wish to thank Franc Paul for the bizarreness and reality scoring of all dream reports.
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2. Discontinuity
• changes of features: elements suddenly appear, disappear, or change shape (e.g. a
friend changes into an animal)
• impossible or very improbably alterations in familiar settings (e.g. a sphinx in the
living room)
3. Uncertainty
• undetermined elements, explicitly vagueness (e.g. an unknown, undeﬁned object)
Mean numbers of bizarre elements per dream are calculated. Diﬀerences between stages are
tested using Wilcoxon test for related samples. For a correlation between dream bizarreness
and the rebus eﬀect, diﬀerence bizarreness scores are built by subtracting the bizarreness score
of the control condition from the one of the rebus condition. Spearman rank order correlation
is applied to check for correlations between the experimental eﬀect and dream bizarreness.
A 4-point scale (1 = realistic to 4 = several bizarre associations) is applied to judge the close-
ness to reality of the dream content. To obtain individual dream content measures, medians
across each subject’s reported dreams per stage and condition are calculated. Wilcoxon signed
rank test is used to test diﬀerences in closeness to reality between stages. Again, Spearman’s
correlation is applied to check for correlations between the rebus eﬀect and closeness to reality.
2.3.2.3 Images
As with the free associations and dreams reports, image descriptions after non-REM- and
REM-sleep awakenings were scored following the rules described in chapter 2.3.2.1. Addi-
tionally, picture drawings were checked for any resemblances to the subliminally presented
pictures of the Kamm and the Floß.
2.3.3 GeoCat night
For the evaluation of the classic GeoCat data, attributional and relational answers on each
list (maximum two from non-REM-sleep awakenings, two from REM-sleep awakenings, and
four from the fully awake condition) are counted. A continuous score is devised for each list
(relational minus attributional choices; see Brakel and Shevrin, 2005). This score ranges from
6 (all relational), through 0 (relational equal to attributional) to -6 (all attributional). In
the next step, average scores are calculated for each subject. Therefore, scores of the non-
REM, REM, and wake lists are summed up and divided by the number of awakenings (for
the non-REM and REM lists), respective by four (for the wake lists). For a statistical test
of mean diﬀerences between stages (non-REM, REM, wake), a 1-factor ANOVA for repeated
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measures on the factor stage is run. Post-hoc analysis is carried out by applying t-test for
related samples. As described in chapter 2.2.4.2, subjects are asked to rate their state of
anxiety on every classic GeoCat lists. Mean anxiety scores are calculated for every sleep stage
and for the waking state.
To build up a score reﬂecting the strength of similarity judgment for each of the scalar GeoCat
items, it is measured how many centimeters and millimeters subjects marked the line (range
1-5 cm) below the respective scalar item. Total scores for both attributional and relational
judgments are obtained by calculating the mean scale score for the 12 attributionally and the
12 relationally similar items for every subject and every stage (non-REM, REM, wake). The
resulting score ranging from 1 (diﬀerent) to 5 (identical) reﬂects how similar the items were
judged to be. Repeated measurement ANOVA with the factor item (2 levels: attributional
and relational) and the factor stage (3 levels: non-REM, REM, wake) is calculated. For
the post-hoc evaluation of diﬀerences between items and stages, a t-test for related samples
is applied. To be able to correlate the attributional scalar similarity score with the rebus
eﬀect (both are hypothesized to measure primary process thinking), we need to subtract the
scalar non-REM score from the scalar REM score. This is necessary to get a controlled
scalar measure which can thus be correlated with the already controlled rebus eﬀect (rebus
night minus control night). Spearman rank order correlation is applied to check for these
correlations between the controlled scalar measure and the rebus eﬀect.
2.3.4 EEG data
Electrophysiological data sets from the rebus and the control night are analyzed in more de-
tail to investigate a possible relationship between alpha and theta power and primary and
secondary process thinking, as well as dream bizarreness (see chapter 1.4.2 and 1.6).
After recording all night sleep EEG data using Excel-Tech (XLTEK) hard- and software (see
chapter 2.2.2), sequences of interest (ﬁve minutes of non-REM-sleep stage 2 and ﬁve min-
utes of REM-sleep before the respective awakenings) are cut out and converted from XLTEK
format to European Data format (EDF). Data is then imported into Matlab (Mathworks,
version 7.0) software package for further analysis. Each of the ﬁve minutes sequences of con-
tinuous data is visually inspected for artifact-free 20 sec epochs (i.e. without movement-, eye-
or muscle-artefacts).58 These epochs are subdivided into the single frequency bands by using
digital ﬁltering. Therefore, the non-relevant components are put back to zero and the ﬁltered
signal results after an inverse Fourier transformation. Thus, the respective oscillations curves
58Ten epochs of two seconds of EEG or 20 seconds of continuously EEG have proven to satisfy both stationarity
and stability for power analysis. Furthermore, this time span is short enough to prevent statistical parameters
from changing during the epoch (Cohen, 1977; Mo¨cks and Gasser, 1984; Corsi-Cabrera et al., 2000, 2006).
2.3. Data analysis 60
in the delta-, theta-, alpha-, beta-, and gamma-frequency can be obtained. In our further
analyses, we will focus on the theta (4-7 Hz) and alpha (8-13 Hz) band. Alpha and theta
spectral power (deﬁned as maximal amplitudes in the alpha/theta frequency band) for all
nine electrode positions is calculated. To diminish the number of factors included in statis-
tical analyses, and to enhance statistical power, we subsumed the nine electrode positions
under the following three areas: frontal (= fpz+ fz), central (= c3+ c4+ cz), and occipital
(= o3+o4+oz). Probably due to the sleeping position, the pz electrode displayed strong dis-
turbances in most subjects and was therefore excluded from further analyses. Finally, average
power values are derived for all awakenings (non-REM and REM) in the respective condition
(rebus and control). These power scores are correlated with the rebus and conceptual sublimi-
nal eﬀect and dream bizarreness using Pearson correlation coeﬃcient for normally distributed
data or Spearman rank order correlation test for non-normally distributed variables.
2.3.5 Statistical analyses
Statistical analyses are run using SPSS (Statistical Package for Social Science) for Windows
(version 11.5). Non-parametric one-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test is used to check for nor-
mality of continuous variables. In case of normal distribution, parametric statistical analyses
are justiﬁed. General linear model (GLM) repeated measures analyses of variance (ANOVA)
are performed to check for mean diﬀerences of more than two variables and to investigate
statistical main and interaction eﬀects. Mauchly test for sphericitiy is used to test violation
of sphericitiy. In case of a signiﬁcant Mauchly test, Greenhouse Geiser corrected scores are
used for further analysis. Post-hoc comparisons between two variables are run using t-tests
for related samples. Here, Levene-test is used to check homogeneity of variances. Correlations
between two or more normally distributed interval scaled variables are run using Pearson cor-
relation coeﬃcient.
In case of a non-Gaussian distribution of the data, or ordinal scaled variables, non-parametric
tests are applied. Friedman rank analysis of variance is performed as a non-parametric equiv-
alent to the repeated measure ANOVA mentioned above. Wilcoxon signed rank test is used
for the non-parametric comparison of two related samples. Spearman rank order correlation
is applied in case of at least one ordinal scaled variable or non-normally distributed data.
Diﬀerences are considered signiﬁcant at p < 0.05. Two-tailed tests are used if not stated
otherwise.
3. Results
3.1 Pretestings
3.1.1 Establishing subliminality
Clearly, one of the major requirements of this study is the guarantee of true subliminal-
ity. Therefore, it is indisputable to test in advance that the experimental conditions meet
the conditions of the objective detection threshold (ODT) - the most stringent criterion for
subliminality (see chapter 1.3.3). Thus, it is necessary to demonstrate that:
• the deﬁned presentation time of the tachistoscope is indeed exactly 1 ms,
• the required luminance is indeed 5 ﬂ,
• stimulus presentation under these conditions is indeed subliminal as can be demonstrated
by a forced-choice detection experiment with a number of subjects prior to the actual
experiments.
3.1.1.1 Presentation time and luminance
To make sure that the declared presentation time of the tachistoscope is exactly 1 ms and
that the light intensity is constant during this time interval, some pretestings were necessary.
We tested the characteristics of the xenon lamps with a photo cell connected to a digital
oscilloscope. The photo cell converts the light intensity of the xenon lamps into voltages
that can be measured very accurately with the digital oscilloscope. The screen shots of the
oscilloscope can then be transferred to a PC.
In the ﬁrst experiment we measured the temporal behavior of the light ﬂashes of projector 1
(P1). In ﬁgure 3.1(a) the average light intensity of 25 ﬂashes is plotted over time. After 0.005
ms, the average ﬂash has already reached its maximum value. The switch-oﬀ time of the
xenon lamp is slightly longer but the complete signal has already diminished after about 0.05
ms after switching oﬀ the pulse. 96.2 ± 0.4 % of the integrated signal lies within the desired
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time interval (thick line in ﬁgure 3.1(a)), and thus proves that an ideal pulse (1 ms light ﬂash
with constant intensity) is indeed achievable with those xenon lamps. The overshoots of the
signal at switching on and oﬀ is probably caused by the non-ideal response of the photo cell,
due to the fast switching. The negative intensities at switching-oﬀ prove that it cannot be an
eﬀect of the xenon lamp itself (negative light intensities are not possible and must, therefore,
be an artifact of the measuring device). Thus, the real temporal behavior of the xenon lamps
probably resembles the ideal pulse even better than represented in the ﬁgure.
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Figure 3.1: (a) Average intensity of 25 light ﬂashes of P1; (b) average intensity of 25 dark ﬂashes
of P2; (c) uninterrupted cross-fading of P1 and P2 (thin lines represent the measured
signals, thick lines represent the ideal pulses)
In the same way as for the light ﬂash, the temporal behavior of the “dark ﬂash” of projector
2 (P2) was measured. The drop and rise times are not as good as for the light ﬂash of P1.
However, since P2 is only used to “mask” the light ﬂash of P1 (to ensure an uninterrupted
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cross-fading) and no stimulus is presented, the rise and drop times are less critical. In ﬁgure
3.1(b), the average of 25 dark ﬂashes are plotted over time. Although the rise and drop times
are longer than for the light ﬂash, still 92.7 ± 1.1 % of the integrated signal of the dark pulse
lies within the desired time interval (thick line in ﬁgure 3.1(b)).
In ﬁgure 3.1(c), the uninterrupted cross-fading is analyzed by measuring the light intensity of
the complete stimulus presentation (average of 25 light ﬂashes together with 25 dark ﬂashes).
The ﬁgure shows that the light intensity remains constant over time, except for short time
intervals at the beginning and the end of the stimulus presentation. However, these overshoots
are due to measuring artifacts of the photo cell, as described above. These results prove that
the tachistoscope used in this experiment meets the required criteria, and is well suitable for
the use of subliminal stimulation.
As described in chapter 2.2.3.2, studies working at the ODT mainly rely on presentation times
of 1 ms and luminance of 5 ﬂ. Luminance is deﬁned as the brightness reﬂected from the screen,
not the brightness of the projector itself (the so-called ansi-lumen). Hence, the ansi-lumen,
the size of the stimulus, and the gain-factor of the screen constitute the actual luminance.
By using a lux meter and varying the distance between the screen and the projectors, it was
found that a distance of 2.35 m was necessary to achieve the required luminance of 5 ﬂ.
3.1.1.2 Stimulus detectability
Presentation time and luminance are the crucial factors in determining subliminality. How-
ever, further characteristics like size and contrast of the drawings, the distance between the
subject and the screen, etc. also play an important role. Size, contrast, and distance, as
well as some characteristics of the pictures themselves had to be modiﬁed several times (see
chapter 3.1.2) and a number of pretestings were necessary to determine the ideal conditions.
To assure that the conditions applied in this study actually meet the criterions of the ODT so
that the stimulus is not perceived consciously, we ran a detection experiment with a sample
of eight people beforehand.59 Applying the formula of Macmillan and Creelman (1991), we
received a mean d’ of -0.12 ± 0.31 (-0.48 min, 0.40 max). To test the H0 hypothesis that d’
= 0, we ran a one-sample t-test which showed a non-signiﬁcant result (T(7) = -1.068; p =
0.321). Thus, we could assume that the conditions of our experiment and the nature of the
pictures indeed assure subliminality. This detection experiment was run again with each of
the experimental subjects as described in chapter 2.2.3.4 and 3.3.4.
59The procedure of the detection experiment is identical to the one described in chapter 2.2.3.4.
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3.1.2 Suitability of the rebus stimulus
The challenges in developing a German rebus stimulus were manifold because it has to fulﬁll
several requirements: ﬁrstly, the two pictured objects resulting in the rebus word have to be
easily illustratable; secondly, they need to be inconclusively identiﬁable; thirdly, these two
objects should not be associated with each other; and lastly, the resulting rebus word must
not have any contentual connection to the two pictured objects.
The ﬁrst requirement was fulﬁlled since both objects, the comb and the raft, can be pictured
without problems. However, for the reading on the rebus level, an unambiguous identiﬁcation
of these pictured objects is indispensable (second requirement). To ensure the unambiguity
of the objects, we presented the picture of the comb and the raft to several people (N = 74),
and asked them to identify the objects. While the comb was identiﬁed very easily (100 %),
it turned out that this was not the case for the raft which was only identiﬁed correctly by 55
% of the people. The remaining 45 % identiﬁed the picture of the raft as sausages, airbed,
heater, or panpipes. Therefore, a number of modiﬁcations were necessary to increase the
unambiguity of the picture. In a second testing, both the comb and the raft were identiﬁed
correctly by 100 % of the sample (N = 54).60 Hence, we could be fairly sure that the pictured
objects would be identiﬁed correctly - even under subliminal conditions.
By analyzing the associations in the basic association catalogue given by the reference group
(see chapter 2.3.2.1), it was possible to check that Kamm and Floß are not associated with
each other (third requirement; see appendix F for the association lists). The forth requirement
can be answered in the same way by checking the associates given by the reference group to
kampﬂos (see appendix F) for the occurrence of the word Kamm or Floß. As expected, neither
Kamm, nor Floß appears as an associate to kampﬂos. Hence, one could conclude that our
rebus fulﬁlls all the requirements mentioned above.
3.2 Baseline night
Since the experimental procedure involved six awakenings (see chapter 2.2), it is very im-
portant that all participants have a normal sleep architecture. Hence, a healthy sleep of our
subjects is another basic requirement. As can be seen in table 3.1, which displays the major
sleep parameters of the baseline night, the average total sleep time (TST) was 7 h 27 min ±
58 min. All subjects fell asleep quite quickly (mean sleep onset after 9.9 ± 4.2 min) and dis-
played good sleep eﬃciency (90.9 ± 5.7 %; a sleep eﬃciency above 85 % describes a “healthy”
sleep). Although three subjects showed increased periodic limb movements (PLMs) during
the night and displayed a PLM index above the cut oﬀ point of 5, their sleep architecture was
60See appendix H for the original and the modiﬁed versions of the comb and the raft picture.
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unaﬀected in every case. Thus, these subjects could still be included in the study. One male
subject exhibited an apnea/hypopnea index of 5. Exceeding the cut oﬀ point of 5 would hint
at an underlying obstructive sleep apnea syndrome (OSA). However, the subject showed no
arousals or oxygen desaturations accompanying the hypopneas and, therefore, the criteria for
an obstructive sleep apnea syndrome were not fulﬁlled (American Sleep Disorder Association,
1990). Overall mean oxygen saturation was very good (97.4 ± 1.8 %), as can be expected in
young healthy subjects. Table 3.1 displays all sleep parameters of the baseline night. Sum-
marizing these parameters, all subjects showed a healthy sleep cycle during the baseline night
and could therefore be included in the study and scheduled for the three experimental nights.
Time in bed (TIB) 492.7 ± 46.0 min
(total time from “light oﬀ” in the evening until “light
on” in the morning)
Sleep period time (SPT) 478.6 ± 46.2 min
(time interval from sleep onset until the last occurrence
of a sleep stage before awakening)
Total sleep time (TST) 447.0 ± 58.2 min
(addition of all sleep stages without stage “wake”)
Sleep eﬃciency 90.9 ± 5.7 %
(percentage proportion between all sleep stages
without stage “wake” to TIB)
Sleep latency S1 9.9 ± 4.2 min
(time interval from “light oﬀ” until ﬁrst epoch stage 1;
sleep onset)
Periodic leg movement (PLM) index 4.1 ± 10.9
(number of PLMs per hour)
Number of awakenings 15.6 ± 4.6
Time awake after falling asleep 30.1 ± 24.6 min
(total time within SPT spending awake)
Apnea/hypopnea index (AHI) 0.4 ± 1.2
(number of apneas/hypopneas per hour)
Oxygen saturation 97.4 ± 1.8 %
Table 3.1: Sleep parameters of the baseline night (mean ± standard deviation)
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3.3 Rebus and control night
With the results of the rebus and the control night, we hope to ﬁnd supporting evidence for
the ﬁndings of the Shevrin and Fisher study (1967), and hence, for our main hypothesis that
REM-sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, while non-REM-sleep is character-
ized by more secondary process mentation. Therefore, we expect to ﬁnd a stronger rebus
eﬀect after REM-sleep awakenings, and a stronger conceptual eﬀect after awakenings from
non-REM-sleep (see hypothesis 2 in chapter 1.6). Our aim was to gain three non-REM-(stage
2) and three REM-sleep awakenings every night (see chapter 2.2.3.3), which means 240 awak-
enings in total for the rebus and control night (120 non-REM and 120 REM awakenings).
However, due to the unpredictable individual sleep behaviors, and the sometimes quite long
time intervals needed to fall back asleep again, we “only” managed to get 226 awakenings in
total - 115 non-REM-sleep awakenings and 111 awakenings from REM-sleep. Table 3.2 dis-
plays the amount of non-REM- and REM-sleep awakenings in the rebus and the control night.
rebus night control night total
non-REM 58 57 115
REM 57 54 111
total 115 111 226
Table 3.2: Number of non-REM and REM awakenings in the rebus and control night
3.3.1 Free associations
After each of the 226 awakenings, subjects gave four minutes of free associations. Taking
rebus and control night and all non-REM- and REM-sleep awakenings together, we obtained
1555 associations in the waking state, 3187 after awakenings from non-REM-sleep and 3195
after REM-sleep awakenings - which results in 7937 scorable associations in total. Figure 3.2
displays the total amount of wake, non-REM, and REM associations in the rebus and the
control night. The number of associations does not vary a lot within stages between rebus
and control night. Although there is a slight predominance of associations given in the rebus
night, this diﬀerence is statistically not signiﬁcant.
However, the varying number of non-REM-sleep and REM-sleep awakenings (see above) must
be taken into account to make the sleep stages comparable to each other and to the presleep
waking state. Furthermore, it is important to note that the amount of words given during the
four minutes of free association varies a lot between subjects. Table 3.3 shows the average
number of associations for wake, non-REM-, and REM-sleep (corrected for the number of
awakenings).
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Figure 3.2: Total number of wake, non-REM, and REM associations in the rebus and control night
rebus night control night
wake 41 ± 19 36 ± 24
non-REM 28 ± 18 27 ± 16
REM 30 ± 15 27 ± 16
Table 3.3: Average number of wake, non-REM, and REM associations per subject in the rebus and
control night (means ± standard deviation)
All associations are scored following the rules described in chapter 2.3.2.1 (the so-called nor-
mative scoring). The amount of Kamm- and Floß -related words (conceptual eﬀect as an
index for secondary process thinking) is higher in the presleep waking state and - as expected
- in non-REM-sleep, as compared to REM-sleep. Moreover, the amount of Kamm and Floß -
related associations is higher in the rebus night (when the subliminal rebus stimulus was
presented), as compared to the control night (when only a blank control stimulus was pre-
sented). In contrast, the diﬀerences between the amount of kampﬂos associates (rebus eﬀect
as an index for primary process thinking) across stages and conditions do not vary a lot (see
ﬁgure 3.3).
To depict the experimental eﬀect and to be able to compare the conceptual eﬀect (Kamm
and Floß) and the rebus eﬀect (kampﬂos) with each other, diﬀerence scores are built by
subtracting the scores of the control condition from those of the rebus condition. A positive
score (and a higher mean rank) indicates a stronger experimental eﬀect in the rebus than in
the control condition, while a negative score indicates the reverse (see table 3.4 and table 3.5).
To compare all three stages (wake, non-REM, REM) a Friedman two-way analysis of vari-
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Figure 3.3: Average number of Kamm & Floß and kampﬂos associations in both conditions (rebus
and control) and all stages (wake, non-REM, REM) (normative scoring)
subject wake rank non-REM rank REM rank
1 -3.12 2 4.17 3 -4.17 1
2 0.53 3 -2.91 1 -1.15 2
3 5.01 2 7.21 3 -1.29 1
4 -4.76 1 9.65 3 -0.97 2
5 1.86 3 -7.14 1 -3.43 2
6 1.25 3 -1.04 2 -3.08 1
7 8.33 2 9.38 3 0.00 1
8 8.50 3 5.09 2 2.09 1
9 4.04 2 6.15 3 -3.33 1
10 2.50 2 9.44 3 -4.59 1
11 0.00 2 2.39 3 -3.69 1
12 3.23 2 4.07 3 -0.52 1
13 1.10 3 -1.88 1 -1.49 2
14 7.01 3 -5.82 1 -5.74 2
16 6.98 3 -2.54 1 -0.34 2
17 5.00 3 4.53 2 -3.60 1
18 -4.31 1 1.32 2 3.84 3
19 16.00 3 0.00 1 7.99 2
20 6.28 2 15.13 3 -0.83 1
21 -2.31 3 -11.28 1 -4.37 2
mean rank 2.40 2.10 1.50
Table 3.4: Diﬀerences scores and ranks for the conceptual eﬀect (free associations; normative scoring)
in all stages (wake, non-REM, REM)
ance is performed on these diﬀerence scores. For the conceptual eﬀect the diﬀerence is
signiﬁcant (χ2 = 8.4; p = 0.015). The individual group comparisons based on the Wilcoxon
signed rank test for paired samples reveals, as hypothesized, a stronger conceptual eﬀect in
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subject wake rank non-REM rank REM rank
1 -4.19 1 19.40 3 19.25 2
2 -4.17 1 2.62 3 -0.50 2
3 -0.10 2 -0.49 1 0.05 3
4 2.86 3 -2.02 1 2.25 2
5 4.02 3 1.39 2 -0.35 1
6 -13.33 1 -0.64 2 -0.09 3
7 0.00 1.5 2.36 3 0.00 1.5
8 5.50 3 -0.31 2 -2.82 1
9 0.00 1 0.78 2 0.90 3
10 1.63 3 0.00 2 -0.95 1
11 4.17 3 -7.26 2 -15.46 1
12 -10.53 1 0.00 3 -4.63 2
13 -9.52 1 -8.29 2 -5.57 3
14 0.11 3 -1.52 1 -1.19 2
16 4.48 3 3.37 2 -3.89 1
17 2.50 3 -6.33 1 -1.61 2
18 0.00 2 0.00 2 0.00 2
19 -3.05 1 16.23 3 11.03 2
20 -5.56 1 0.00 3 -1.11 2
21 -4.17 1 -3.03 2 0.00 3
mean rank 1.93 2.10 1.98
Table 3.5: Diﬀerences scores and ranks for the rebus eﬀect (free associations; normative scoring) in
all stages (wake, non-REM, REM)
non-REM-sleep than in REM-sleep (p = 0.033). In the presleep waking stage, the eﬀect is
even stronger compared to REM-sleep (p = 0.002). The diﬀerence between wake and non-
REM-sleep is not signiﬁcant. With regard to the rebus eﬀect, the diﬀerences between stages
as revealed by the Friedman test are not signiﬁcant. Also, as can be seen in table 3.5, against
our hypothesis, a tendency for a stronger rebus eﬀect can be found in non-REM- rather than
REM-sleep (higher mean rank for non-REM than for REM). These results are pictured in
ﬁgure 3.4. While there is a clear predominance of the conceptual eﬀect in the presleep waking
state and in non-REM-sleep, the pattern is not as clear for the rebus eﬀect and scores remain
non-signiﬁcant.
What can account for the fact that we do ﬁnd the expected conceptual eﬀect in non-REM-
sleep, but no rebus eﬀect in REM-sleep? Presumably, one major reason is the rebus word
kampﬂos itself and its abstract and somehow paradox nature. It contains something (Kampf
(Engl.: ﬁght)) but at the same time negates it (kampflos (Engl.: without a ﬁght)). Further-
more, the words Kampf or kampﬂos might tap into something sensitive and/or emotional
and, therefore, have very diﬀerent unconscious eﬀects, as compared to the much more neu-
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Figure 3.4: Experimental conceptual and rebus subliminal eﬀect (free associations; normative scor-
ing) as function of stage (∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗ p < 0.01)
tral penny rebus word used in the original study (Shevrin and Fisher, 1967).61 In contrast to
penny, the kampﬂos rebus word can lead to very diﬀerent, subjective, and confused associative
activations, maybe even marked by a personal history. It also strongly depends on whether
one focuses on the Kampf -aspect and thus associates rather negative-toned words like “war”,
“blood”, or “enemy” - or whether one concentrates more on the positive part (without a ﬁght)
and thus gives associates like “peace”, “harmony”, or “friendship”. Hence, the kampﬂos stim-
ulus allows a very wide range of diﬀerent and very individual associations. This hypothesis is
conﬁrmed by the associates prevalent in the basic association catalogue (see chapter 2.3.2.1
and appendix F). While all 510 people of the reference group gave only 47 diﬀerent associates
to Kamm and 74 associates to Floß, the amount of diﬀerent kampﬂos associates is much larger
(114). Furthermore, a closer look at the associates themselves reveals that people associate
quite diﬀerent words, feelings, and ideas to kampﬂos as opposed to Kamm and Floß. More
speciﬁcally, while associates given to Kamm and Floß can be put in more or less one single
category (e.g. “personal hygiene” for Kamm and “summery adventure” for Floß), this is not
possible for the kampﬂos associates since they seem much more diverse (e.g. Friede (Engl.:
peace), erscho¨pft (Engl.: exhausted), Hund (Engl.: dog), klug (Engl.: clever), Rom (Engl.:
Rome)). Apparently there are no such prototypes of associations to kampﬂos, as there are
to Kamm or Floß. Hence, it would be important to know the very individual associations
of each subject to the word kampﬂos, and score all associations of that single subject again,
while taking the individual associates as reference for the kampﬂos scoring. In fact this was
possible, since we asked all subjects after the second experimental night in a debrieﬁng to
give ﬁve associations to the kampﬂos stimulus (see chapter 2.2.3.4). Thus, we were able to
61One could even assume whether the word Kampf touches thoughts, ideas, and associations buried deep inside
the collective German unconscious, and thus has an even more sensitive meaning.
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redo the kampﬂos scoring on the basis of the individual rebus associates.
Indeed, following the same rules as described in chapter 2.3.2.1, but using only the individual
debrieﬁng associations for the scoring on the kampﬂos level (the so-called individual scoring),
leads to a quite diﬀerent pattern (see ﬁgure 3.5). Although the total amount of kampﬂos-
related associations is much smaller, as compared to the normative scoring (since we only
have the ﬁve individual debrieﬁng associates as reference), there is a recognizable increase
in kampﬂos associates, as compared to Kamm and Floß associates during REM-sleep in the
rebus night. Hence, the individual nature of the rebus stimulus might indeed play a crucial
role.
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Figure 3.5: Average number of Kamm & Floß (normative scoring) and kampﬂos (individual scoring)
associations in both conditions (rebus and control) and all stages (wake, non-REM, REM)
To check for the experimental eﬀect, diﬀerence scores are built again as described above. As
expected, the rebus eﬀect becomes much stronger. Individual group comparisons based on
the Wilcoxon test for related samples reveal a signiﬁcantly stronger rebus eﬀect in REM-, as
compared to non-REM-sleep (p = 0.013). The diﬀerence between REM-sleep and the presleep
waking state is non-signiﬁcant. Figure 3.6 shows the clear predominance of the rebus eﬀect
in REM-sleep, as compared to the presleep waking state and non-REM-sleep.
Out of the total amount of 7937 associations, only 24 associates (0.3 %) were clang associates.
Because of this small amount, we abstained from scoring the clang associates as further
indication for primary process mentation.
3.3.2 Dream reports
After 162 of the total amount of 226 awakenings (115 non-REM- and 111 REM-sleep awak-
enings; see table 3.2 above), we were able to obtain dream reports - 62 from non-REM-sleep
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Figure 3.6: Experimental conceptual (normative scoring) and rebus (individual scoring) subliminal
eﬀect as function of stage (∗ p < 0.05 and ∗∗ p < 0.01)
stage 2 (54 % of all non-REM awakenings), and 100 from REM-sleep (90 % of all REM
awakenings). Half of the non-REM dream reports (31) and of the REM reports (50) were
obtained during the rebus night and the other half during the control night. This proportion
of non-REM and REM dreams is typical, and reﬂects the numbers described in the litera-
ture (e.g. Nielsen, 1999; see chapter 1.5). More importantly, these percentages resemble the
ones from the original study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967) who obtained 60 % non-REM-sleep
dream reports and 90 % REM-sleep dream reports. The length of the dream reports varies
considerably between stages and subjects. Consistent with the literature (see chapter 1.5),
REM-sleep dream reports are much longer as compared to non-REM reports (rebus condition:
p = 0.002; control condition: p = 0.049). Table 3.6 displays the average number of words for
non-REM and REM dream reports in the rebus and the control night.
rebus night control night
non-REM 24 ± 14 52 ± 101
REM 94 ± 75 89 ± 60
Table 3.6: Average number of words for non-REM and REM dream reports in the rebus and control
night (means ± standard deviation)
Following the procedure described above (see chapter 2.3.2.1), the normative scoring of the
dream reports yields no signiﬁcant diﬀerences. Neither the expected conceptual eﬀect (pre-
dominance of Kamm- and Floß -related words in non-REM dream reports), nor the rebus
eﬀect (higher incidence of kampﬂos associations in REM dream reports) can be observed. Al-
though the conceptual eﬀect is slightly higher during non-REM-sleep, this diﬀerence remains
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non-signiﬁcant. The same is true for the rebus eﬀect which is also - contrary to our hypothesis
- slightly stronger in non-REM- than in REM-sleep.
Rescoring the dream reports with the individual debrieﬁng associates to kampﬂos increases
the occurrence of kampﬂos-related words within REM-sleep dream reports (see ﬁgure 3.7).
But although we do ﬁnd the right tendency (stronger conceptual eﬀect in non-REM reports
and stronger rebus eﬀect in REM reports), these diﬀerences remain non-signiﬁcant (concep-
tual eﬀect: p = 0.477; rebus eﬀect: p = 0.123).
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Figure 3.7: Experimental conceptual (normative scoring) and rebus (individual scoring) eﬀect in
non-REM and REM dream reports
Again clangs were not scored since out of the total amount of words from all dream reports
(11598), only 16 (0.14 %) contained clang associations to Kamm or Floß.
Additionally to the scoring on the conceptual-, rebus-, and clang-level, dream reports were
scored with respect to their degree of bizarreness and their closeness to reality (see chapter
2.3.2.2). All in all, 11 (6.79 %) out of 162 dreams contained bizarre elements. This putatively
low incidence matches the observation that laboratory dreams usually comprise less bizarre
elements than everyday dreams (e.g. Cipolli et al., 1993). On the other hand, it has been
questioned whether dream bizarreness in general might be overestimated (see chapter 4.1.2).
Table 3.7 shows the mean number of bizarre elements in non-REM and REM dreams in the
rebus and control night. While REM dreams during the rebus night contain signiﬁcantly
more bizarre elements as compared to non-REM dreams (p = 0.041), this diﬀerence remains
non-signiﬁcant during the control night.
The same pattern is reﬂected in the closeness to reality of non-REM and REM dream reports
in the rebus and control night (see table 3.8). While non-REM dream reports in the rebus
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non-REM REM p1
rebus night 0 0.17 ± 0.33 0.041
control night 0.09 ± 0.27 0.08 ± 0.21 n.s.
Table 3.7: Number of bizarre elements per dream in the rebus and control night (means ± standard
deviation)
1Wilcoxon test for related samples
night are signiﬁcantly closer to reality than REM-sleep reports (1 = realistic; 4 = several
bizarre associations), this diﬀerence is non-signiﬁcant for the control night.
non-REM REM p1
rebus night 1.20 ± 0.30 1.81 ± 0.44 0.001
control night 1.42 ± 0.59 1.72 ± 0.50 n.s.
Table 3.8: Closeness to reality in non-REM and REM dreams in the rebus and control night (median
± variance)
1Wilcoxon test for related samples
The correlation between dream bizarreness, as well as closeness to reality and the rebus eﬀect
(individual scoring) is non-signiﬁcant. Hence, there seems to be no relationship between the
degree of bizarreness and the subliminal rebus eﬀect during REM-sleep.
3.3.3 Images
After 113 of the 226 awakenings (115 non-REM- and 111 REM-sleep awakenings; see table
3.2 above), subjects were able to describe an image coming to mind immediately after the
four minutes of free associations. 54 of these images were obtained after non-REM-sleep (47
% of all non-REM awakenings; 31 in the rebus night and 23 in the control night) and 59 after
awakenings from REM-sleep (53 % of all REM awakenings; 28 in the rebus night and 31 in
the control night). The length of image descriptions varies considerably between subjects.
Table 3.9 shows the average number of words for non-REM and REM image descriptions in
the rebus and the control night.
Neither the normative nor the individual scoring lead to any demonstrable conceptual or
rebus eﬀect. While the amount of Kamm- and Floß -related words in non-REM and REM
image descriptions for the normative scoring is identical, the individual scoring does lead to a
slight increase in kampﬂos associations within the REM descriptions - however, without any
signiﬁcant eﬀect (p = 0.180) (see ﬁgure 3.8).
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rebus night control night
non-REM 49 ± 50 38 ± 31
REM 48 ± 31 43 ± 44
Table 3.9: Average number of words for non-REM and REM image descriptions in the rebus and
control night (means ± standard deviation)
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Figure 3.8: Experimental conceptual (normative scoring) and rebus (individual scoring) eﬀect in
non-REM and REM image descriptions
Although the majority of clangs appeared, as one would expect, within images descriptions
obtained after REM awakenings in the rebus night, the total amount of clangs (14 out of 5201
words) was again too small to be scored.
3.3.4 Detection experiment
As described in chapter 2.2.3.4, we ran a detection experiment with each individual subject
(N = 20) the morning after the second experimental night. The so-called criterion c, which
reﬂects main response bias, is minimal (mean c = 0.02 ± 0.13). This indicates that subjects
indeed distributed their “yes” and “no” responses equally. Hit rates range from 0.34 to 0.66
and false alarms from 0.19 to 0.63. Table 3.10 displays the d’ of all subjects. Mean d’ is 0.07
± 0.37 (-0.56 min, 0.80 max). The non-signiﬁcant result of the one-sample t-test conﬁrms
our H0 hypothesis that d’ is at chance (T(19) = 0.847; p = 0.407). Hence, we can indeed as-
sume that stimuli were presented at the objective detection threshold (ODT) for every single
subject, and that there was no conscious awareness of the stimuli during the experiment.
Snodgrass et al. (1993) point out that the sample characteristics are regarded as more im-
portant as the individual performance levels. Hence, “[n]o evidence for conscious perception
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in the sample exists if the performance distribution is normal with a mean around chance”
- as is the case in our study. Relevant with respect to individual subject performance is the
question whether there are subjects within the sample whose performances depart so strong
from the sample performance that they count as outliers, and must be regarded as belonging
to another group - the group of conscious perceivers. As can be seen in ﬁgure 3.9, this is not
the case with our subjects.
Summarizing, detection in our sample is clearly at chance and any conscious perception can
be ruled out. This data of the individual detection experiments gives further evidence that
the subliminal method used in this study eﬀectively excludes any conscious awareness of the
rebus stimulus at the deﬁned exposure duration (1 ms) and luminance level (5 ﬂ).
subject d’
1 0.38
2 0.3
3 -0.15
4 -0.08
5 0.49
6 -0.41
7 -0.15
8 0.38
9 -0.08
10 0.8
subject d’
11 0.23
12 0.08
13 -0.56
14 0.08
16 0.72
17 -0.46
18 -0.15
19 0.3
20 -0.23
21 -0.08
Table 3.10: d’ of all subjects in the detection experiment
d’
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Figure 3.9: Boxplot of d’ s
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With regard to the personality measures applied after the last experimental night (see chapter
2.2.4.3), we found a signiﬁcant positive correlation between d’ and the Social Desirability Scale
by Sto¨ber (1999) (r = 0.584; p = 0.007) - as well as between d’ and the subscale self-deceptive
enhancement of the German version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding by
Musch et al. (2002) (r = 0.468; p = 0.038). Furthermore, we observed a negative relationship
between detection and state anxiety (r = -0.447; p = 0.048). There were no signiﬁcant
correlations with the subscales of the NEO-FFI.
3.3.5 Debrieﬁng
When the picture of the Kamm and the Floß was presented supraliminally the morning
after the second experimental night and after the detection experiment, all subjects expressed
surprise. None of them seemed to have expected a picture like this. Asked to name the
pictured objects all subjects identiﬁed the comb and the raft correctly.62 After giving the
ﬁrst ﬁve associations to both comb and raft, subjects were asked whether these two objects
had any connection to their dreams, their free associations or to the images they drew during
the last two nights in the sleep laboratory. Although all subjects seemed rather puzzled when
they were presented the stimulus, 14 out of 20 (70 %) reported a relation to their nocturnal
productions when asked explicitly. Out of these 14 subjects, 93 % reported a relation to Floß
but only 57 % to Kamm. While most referred to the higher incidence of Floß -related words
and topics within the dreams or the free associations (such as nature, wood, water, rain, river,
swimming), some subjects were able to give concrete examples. Subject No.4, for instance,
reported the following dream after the ﬁrst non-REM-sleep awakening in the rebus night:
Wir beide waren zusammen im Auto unterwegs, hier auf dem Gela¨nde und wir mussten
irgendwie zu einem anderen Raum (. . . ) und dann sind wir u¨ber die Straße hier gefahren
und es lagen viele A¨ste auf dem Weg und du bist viel zu schnell gefahren (. . . ) und wir
mussten immer um die A¨ste drum herum fahren, die so auf der Straße lagen und dann
mussten wir auf dem Rasen ein Stu¨ck lang fahren und dann wieder auf der Straße.63
Asked about a relationship between the presented objects and one of the dreams the subject
responded:
Dieser Traum der ersten Nacht, wo ich getra¨umt hab, dass wir hier beide durch den Park
62This was taken as further validation for the second requirement of the rebus stimulus, that is the pictures
making up the rebus need to be inconclusively identiﬁable (see chapter 3.1.2).
63(Engl.: We both were in the car on our way to another room here on the hospital grounds. (. . . ) We were
driving across the street and there were many branches lying in the way. You were driving far too fast (. . . )
and we had to go around the branches which were lying on the street and then we had to drive some part of
the way on the lawn and then on the street again.)
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mit dem Auto gefahren sind. (. . . ) Wenn ich jetzt diese Floß sehe, erinnert mich schon
der Traum daran, dass (. . . ) die Straße wirklich sehr kurvig war, was man ja irgendwie
ﬁnd ich mit dem Wasser verbinden kann und dann halt diese total parallel gelegenen
A¨ste, die auf der Straße lagen, also die sehr parallel in Absta¨nden zueinander lagen.64
Subject No.12 was able to relate several aspects from dream reports and free associations to
the pictured objects. Notably, all of them were recorded in the rebus night. His associations
to the supraliminally presented picture of the Kamm and the Floß go as follows:
Wenn ich jetzt das Floß sehe und an diesen einen Traum denke, wo ich von ganz weit
oben von so einer Plattform runter geschaut habe, dann hat beides so einen Touch von
Entfernung und Einsamkeit. (. . . ) Und wenn ich an das Fußballspiel denke (. . . ), da fa¨llt
mir ein, dass ich bei den Spielern oft gesehen habe, dass deren Haare oft so lang waren,
dass sie so ins Gesicht gefallen sind in so einzelnen Stra¨hnen. (. . . ) Und dann habe ich ja
ein paar mal diese Figuren gezeichnet (. . . ), die hatten ja so mehrere Schichten - wo glaub
ich beim dritten mal oder so “Der Schrei” rausgekommen ist. Das erinnert mich natu¨rlich
auch so ein bischen so an’s geka¨mmt sein. So mit den einzelnen Schichten, Stra¨hnen . . . .
Und dann hatte ich doch diese Sitzreihen gezeichnet. Das erinnert mich auch ein bisschen
so an die Form von dem Floß (. . . ), weil sie auch so geordnet waren.65
None of the subjects was able to identify the rebus level without broad hints. This is in ac-
cord with the ﬁndings of the early Shevrin studies and was interpreted to mean “that primary
process thinking is not easily accessible in the usual alert, conscious, waking state” (Shevrin,
1973, p.60), and that “having been responsive to the eﬀect was no help in achieving insight
into the relationships” (Shevrin and Luborsky, 1961, p.484). Only asking whether they had
any ideas about the pictured objects had no eﬀect. When explained, however, that these
objects would represent a rebus and invited to solve it, all of them were able to do so - but
mostly only after being given numerous hints (e.g. “What happens if you combine both ob-
jects?”; “Try merging the sounds of the two objects.”). After they had successfully solved the
rebus and had given ﬁve associations to the rebus word kampﬂos, they were asked whether
64(Engl.: This dream from the ﬁrst night when I was dreaming that we were both driving in a car through
the park. (. . . ) When I see this raft I have to think about the dream when (. . . ) the street was really curvy
which one could relate to the water. And then these totally parallel lying branches on the street, which were
lying in very parallel distances from each other.)
65(Engl.: When I see this raft and think about that dream where I was looking down from a very high platform,
then both have a touch of distance and loneliness. (. . . ) And when I think about that football match (. . . )
I remember that I often saw players whose hair was so long that it was falling in their face in single strands.
(. . . ) And then I was drawing these ﬁgures several times (. . . ) which had like multiple layers - one resulted
in “The Scream” I think. That also reminds me of being combed. With these single layers, strands . . . . And
then I once drew these rows of seats. That also reminds me a bit of the shape of the raft (. . . ) since they
were also ordered that way.)
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there was any relationship between this word and any of their dreams, free associations, or
images during the last two nights in the sleep laboratory. 42 % of the subjects saw a con-
nection. Subject No.6, for example, rated the positive and peaceful nature of her dreams
during the rebus and control night as being associated with the kampﬂos theme. Interest-
ingly, this subject was one of those who gave only positive and peaceful associations to the
word kampﬂos (e.g. friedvoll (Engl.: peaceful), scho¨n (Engl.: nice), ruhig (Engl.: calm),
besinnlich (Engl.: contemplative), and Klasse (Engl.: great)). The same was true for subject
No.7 who associated Harmonie (Engl.: harmony), friedlich (Engl.: peaceful), ruhig (Engl.:
calm), blauer Himmel (Engl.: blue sky), and kitschige Landschaft (Engl.: kitschy landscape)
with kampﬂos. He also described his dreams as being peaceful and as having included kitschy
landscapes and blue sky. Subject No.12 described above, who drew ﬁgures similar to the
famous painting “The Scream” by Edward Munch during the free imagination, associated the
somehow scary atmosphere of the picture and the feeling of despair with the word kampﬂos.
Finally, subject No.19 described a picture during the rebus night which was related to her
summer job, in which she built a Celtic village and “lived” in this village for several weeks as
part of a holiday project for children. Asked about connections between the kampﬂos stim-
ulus and her dreams or associations, she was reminded of the Celtics who were also ﬁghting,
and of her two male colleagues who also had played the part of Celtics, but who were very
defensive in their attitude and to whom she would immediately ascribe the attribute kampﬂos.
Summarizing, although none of the subjects showed any sign of recognition when the rebus
stimulus was presented supraliminally and none of them was able to identify the rebus level
without hints, some did indeed ﬁnd relationships between either the pictures of the Kamm
and the Floß, or the word kampﬂos, and their dreams, images, or associations. Hence, this
can be seen as a further indication that the subliminal stimulus was processed unconsciously.
3.4 GeoCat night
In the third experimental night classic and scalar GeoCat stimuli were applied to obtain sup-
porting evidence for our main hypothesis that REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the
primary process, while non-REM-sleep is organized along secondary process lines. According
to our third hypothesis (see chapter 1.6), we expect similarity judgments after awakenings
from REM-sleep to be mainly attributional (as an index for primary process thinking), while
awakenings from non-REM-sleep are supposed to lead to more relational similarity judgments
(as an index for secondary process thinking).
As in the rebus and the control night (see chapter 3.3), our aim was to obtain three non-
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REM-(stage 2) and three REM-sleep awakenings: the ﬁrst two non-REM and two REM
awakenings for the classic GeoCat items, and the last non-REM and REM awakening for the
scalar GeoCat items. Hence, six awakenings per subject, i.e. 120 awakenings in total (60 from
non-REM- and 60 from REM-sleep) would be the optimum. As table 3.11 shows, we were
able to get 110 awakenings - 56 from non-REM- and 54 from REM-sleep.
classic GeoCat scalar GeoCat total
non-REM 39 17 56
REM 38 16 54
total 77 33 110
Table 3.11: Number of non-REM- and REM-sleep awakenings in the GeoCat night
3.4.1 Classic GeoCat
Average continuous scores ranging from 6 (all relational) to -6 (all attributional) across sub-
jects show a clear predominance for relational choices for all stages (non-REM, REM, wake),
as indicated by the positive mean scores in table 3.12. As can be expected from these num-
bers, the repeated measure ANOVA on the factor stage (3 levels: non-REM, REM, wake)
revealed no diﬀerences within the similarity choices made after non-REM- and REM-sleep
awakenings or in the waking state. While 85 % of the subjects chose the relational over the
attributional alternative after awakenings from non-REM-sleep and in the fully awake con-
dition the morning after (as indicated by a positive number in table 3.12), this was also the
case for awakenings from REM-sleep. Hence, the expected relational dominance was found
for non-REM-sleep awakenings and the waking state but also, against our hypothesis, for
REM-sleep awakenings.
State of anxiety, however, did vary between stages as revealed by a signiﬁcant stage eﬀect
in the repeated measure ANOVA (F(1.496) = 7.832; p = 0.004). Post-hoc t-test for related
samples showed higher anxiety after non-REM awakenings than in the waking state (T(19)
= -2.990; p = 0.008). After awakenings from REM-sleep, anxiety was even more increased
as compared to the waking state (T(19) = -3.047; p = 0.007). The diﬀerence in anxiety
after REM- and non-REM-sleep awakenings was not signiﬁcant. Importantly, overall mean
anxiety scores on the scale ranging from 1 (“calm”) to 10 (“very anxious”) were rather low
(wake: 0.56 ± 0.94; non-REM: 1.12 ± 1.11; REM: 1.23 ± 1.12). There was no correlation
between the level of anxiety and the continuous scores of the classic GeoCat list. Hence, no
relationship between lower anxiety and more relational responses, or higher anxiety and more
attributional responses could be found.
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subject non-REM REM wake
1 6.0 4.0 5.5
2 6.0 6.0 5.0
3 6.0 6.0 6.0
4 4.0 2.0 -3.5
5 5.0 6.0 6.0
6 3.0 1.0 4.0
7 5.0 2.0 4.0
8 4.0 3.0 0.0
9 6.0 6.0 1.0
10 -1.0 2.0 1.5
11 4.0 4.0 4.0
12 1.0 0.0 0.5
13 5.0 6.0 5.5
14 -6.0 -6.0 -6.0
16 6.0 3.0 3.0
17 -4.0 -4.0 -6.0
18 2.0 6.0 4.5
19 6.0 4.0 5.0
20 5.0 6.0 6.0
21 4.0 6.0 6.0
mean 3.35 3.15 2.60
stddv 3.42 3.41 3.87
Table 3.12: Average continuous scores of the classic GeoCat items for all subjects and all stages
3.4.2 Scalar GeoCat
The total scores for the judgments of the attributionally and the relationally similar scalar
GeoCat items, ranging from 1 (diﬀerent) to 5 (identical; see chapter 2.3.3) for each stage (non-
REM, REM, wake), are depicted in table 3.13. Across stages, relationally similar items were
judged to be more similar than attributionally similar items (non-REM: n.s.; REM: T(16) =
-2.404; p = 0.030; wake: T(16) = -2.279; p = 0.037). At the same time, mean attributional
similarity scores do not diﬀer a lot between stages, neither do relational scores. Accordingly,
repeated measurement ANOVA shows no eﬀect on the factor stage (3 levels: non-REM, REM,
wake).
Interestingly, correlating the controlled attributional similarity scalar score (att REM minus
att non-REM; see chapter 2.3.3) with the rebus eﬀect within the free associations (individual
scoring), leads to an almost signiﬁcant positive correlation (r = 0.511; p = 0.062). Hence,
subjects who show a stronger rebus eﬀect judged attributional scalar GeoCat items as be-
ing more similar. Since this ﬁnding is in the hypothesized direction (stronger attributional
similarity scores correlate with a stronger rebus eﬀect), one could even justify a one-tailed
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test which would result in a signiﬁcant ﬁnding (r = 0.511; p = 0.031). Similarly, correlating
the controlled scalar score (att REM minus att non-REM) with the likewise controlled occur-
rence of rebus-related associations in the experimental night (amount of rebus associations
after REM minus amount of rebus associations after non-REM) leads to a signiﬁcant positive
correlation, using a one-tailed test (r = 0.487; p = 0.039). With regard to the relational
similarity judgments these correlations are non-signiﬁcant.
att rel att rel att rel
non- non- REM REM wake wake
REM REM
1 1.5 2.1 - - 0.7 3.3
2 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3 1.2 1.6
4 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.7 2.9 2.1
5 0.8 3.5 1.0 3.6 0.8 4.1
6 1.1 1.5 0.5 1.1 0.5 1.7
7 1.6 2.8 1.9 3.4 1.6 3.7
8 2.1 2.1 2.0 2.7 2.3 2.7
9 2.4 2.2 1.6 1.3 1.6 1.1
10 1.9 2.0 2.2 2.3 2.2 2.4
13 2.1 2.3 1.8 3.0 2.2 3.0
14 1.1 3.7 1.1 3.7 1.0 4.3
16 4.3 2.6 3.6 3.0 4.1 3.5
17 2.6 3.0 2.9 3.1 1.6 1.1
18 3.3 2.4 3.8 2.4 3.6 2.4
19 1.4 4.7 2.0 4.3 1.9 4.0
20 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.8 2.1
21 0.9 3.3 1.2 3.3 1.4 3.3
mean 1.9 2.5 1.8 2.6 1.9 2.7
stddv 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.0 1.0
Table 3.13: Total scores for relationally and attributionally similar scalar GeoCat items for all sub-
jects and all stages
3.5 EEG data
As described in chapter 2.3.4, average spectral power scores in the alpha and theta frequency
band for non-REM- and REM-sleep periods prior to the respective awakenings in both rebus
and control night are calculated. On the basis of these scores we want to investigate our
explorative hypothesis that primary process mentation is related to increased alpha power,
while secondary process thinking is associated with increased power in the theta frequency
band (see hypothesis number 4 in chapter 1.6).
Two separate ANOVA tests are carried out for both frequency bands (alpha and theta) with
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three variables per test: (1) condition (rebus, control), (2) stage (non-REM, REM), and (3)
electrode position (frontal, central, occipital). The 2×2×3 ANOVA for the alpha frequency
band reveals no signiﬁcant changes in spectral power for the main eﬀect of condition or
stage. However, there is a signiﬁcant eﬀect for electrode position (F(1.390) = 43.779, p <
0.001). Pairwise comparisons using t-test for related samples reveals signiﬁcantly higher alpha
power values for frontal electrodes as compared to central ones, and for occipital electrodes
as compared to central ones in both stages and conditions (p < 0.001). The 2×2×3 ANOVA
performed on the power scores for the theta band reveals no signiﬁcant main eﬀects for con-
dition but for stage (F(1) = 44.299, p < 0.001) and electrode position (F(1.228) = 57.697, p
< 0.001). Interaction eﬀects are found for stage×electrode (F(1.714) = 11.760, p < 0.001).
Post-hoc pairwise comparisons reveal signiﬁcantly higher theta power in non-REM-sleep as
compared to REM-sleep for all electrodes in both conditions (p < 0.005). Finally, higher theta
power is found for frontal electrodes as compared to central ones and for occipital electrodes,
as compared to central ones in both stages and conditions (p < 0.001).
To be able to correlate alpha power with the rebus eﬀect within the free associations (indi-
vidual scoring), as well as theta power with the conceptual eﬀect within the free associations
(normative scoring), diﬀerence scores for spectral power values are built by subtracting the
power scores from the control night from those of the rebus night. The resulting correlation
between these alpha power diﬀerence scores and the rebus eﬀect (individual scoring) during
REM-sleep is non-signiﬁcant. Pearson correlation coeﬃcient displays a positive correlation,
however, for theta power and the conceptual eﬀect (normative scoring) in non-REM-sleep
for the central electrodes (r = 0.655, p = 0.004). The same correlation for the rebus eﬀect
(individual scoring), on the other side, is non-signiﬁcant.
The correlation between the diﬀerence scores of dream bizarreness (rebus night minus control
night) and the diﬀerence scores for alpha power reveals a signiﬁcant negative correlation for
the frontal electrodes (r = -0.560, p = 0.019) during REM-sleep. Hence, increased alpha
power during REM-sleep is related to decreased dream bizarreness. The same correlation for
non-REM-sleep is non-signiﬁcant.
4. Discussion
4.1 Primary and secondary process eﬀects in the rebus night
The major aim of this study was to test the hypothesis that REM- and non-REM-sleep
diﬀer with respect to their prevailing ways of mental organization which parallel the Freudian
concept of primary and secondary process thinking (see chapter 1.6). Therefore, we ﬁrstly
aimed to replicate the study of Shevrin and Fisher (1967) which is the only study trying to
answer this question. We hoped to obtain converging evidence to support their ﬁndings that
REM-sleep is characterized by a more primary process way of thinking, while non-REM-sleep
follows the mechanisms of the secondary process. Therefore, we presented a subliminal rebus
stimulus prior to the subjects’ retiring to bed, and analyzed their responses given after REM-
and non-REM-sleep awakenings during the night. We obtained the following results:
1. A stronger conceptual eﬀect (normative scoring) within free associations obtained after
non-REM-sleep awakenings and a stronger rebus eﬀect (individual scoring) within free as-
sociations obtained after REM-sleep awakenings (see chapter 3.3.1).
2. A tendency for a stronger conceptual eﬀect (normative scoring) in dream reports from non-
REM-sleep and a tendency for a stronger rebus eﬀect (individual scoring) in dream reports
from REM-sleep which, however, remain non-signiﬁcant (see chapter 3.3.2).
3. No conceptual or rebus eﬀect within image descriptions obtained after non-REM- or REM-
sleep awakenings (see chapter 3.3.3).
In total, these ﬁndings match those of the original study by Shevrin and Fisher (1967) very
well. Similarly, they found a conceptual eﬀect within non-REM-sleep associations and a rebus
eﬀect within REM-sleep associations, but no eﬀects whatsoever in dream reports and images.
But to compare the results of these two studies reliably, it must be discussed beforehand in
which respects both studies are indeed similar or diﬀerent from each other. The simple fact
that this study was run with a German rebus, for instance, makes it no exact but rather a
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systematic replication. Although we tried to stay as close as possible to the original procedure,
we departed in some important aspects which will be discussed in the following:
• Instead of running only 10 subjects, we ran a larger sample of 20 subjects to increase
statistical power.
• In the original study, the subjects were nurses who worked during the night and were thus
able to sleep during the day. However, day-time sleep might diﬀer considerably from night-
time sleep. To ensure a normal sleep cycle and a stable sleep architecture, we therefore
decided to run our experiments during the night - having students as subjects.
• As compared to the penny rebus stimulus used in the Shevrin and Fisher study, our kampﬂos
rebus has some disadvantages. It is not a noun, and it is a rather abstract word. Because
of its ambiguous nature, it gives rise to very individual associations (see chapter 3.3.1).
Moreover, the prevalence of the word kampﬂos is presumably not as high as the prevalence
of the words Kamm and Floß. Although we were well aware of these problematic aspects
of the kampﬂos stimulus, the advantages still outweigh the disadvantages since this rebus
nevertheless fulﬁlls all the requirements of a suitable rebus stimulus (see chapter 3.1.2).
Furthermore, a lot of time was invested in searching for the ideal German rebus. Involved
in this search were several linguistic institutes of German universities, who were asked to
pass on our request to their students. Additionally, a broad public was addressed by an
online competition in which a prize was promised for the best rebus word (see appendix I).
After this long and extensive but fruitless search for an even more suitable German rebus,
we are convinced that there is no better alternative to the kampﬂos rebus.
• Because of the paradox nature of the kampﬂos stimulus which leads to very diﬀerent and
individual associations, as opposed to the far more unambiguous words Kamm and Floß, we
had to introduce an important change in the scoring procedure. Alongside the normative
scoring, which entirely follows the procedure of the Shevrin and Fisher study, we applied
a totally new scoring procedure - the so-called individual scoring. By this, we were able to
take the very individual kampﬂos associations given by the experimental subjects themselves
into account (see chapter 3.3.1).
• Instead of a presentation time of 6 ms as in the original study, we ﬂashed our rebus stimulus
only for the duration of 1 ms. By this means, and by assuring a luminance level of 5 ﬂ (see
chapter 3.1.1.1), we could be sure of working at the objective detection threshold (ODT),
which has proven to present the most stringent criterion for subliminality (see chapter 1.3.3).
In this respect, we presumably diﬀer on a very important point from the original study.
However, we cannot be entirely sure whether the stimulus presentation in the Shevrin and
Fisher study was at the subjective or objective threshold. Although the presentation time
(6 ms) and the method of assuring subliminality (psychophysiological method of ascending
4.1. Primary and secondary process eﬀects in the rebus night 86
limits) rather suggest that the stimulus was presented at the subjective threshold, it remains
unclear if this was in fact the case. The ﬁndings, on the other hand, which are very similar
to our own ﬁndings which were clearly obtained at the ODT, strongly suggest that Shevrin
and Fisher might have been working at the ODT as well.
4.1.1 Free associations
Although critics like Gru¨nbaum (1984; 2002), Wilcocks (1994), or Webster (1995) doubt the
retrieval capacity of free associations and claim that free associations are actually not free at
all but inﬂuenced by suggestions from the analyst and by his personal theories, this method is
still one of the most important techniques in psychoanalytical practice. Kris states: “For me,
the central point in psychoanalysis is the commitment to the free association method.” (Kris,
1966, p.7). By asking the patient explicitly to say everything coming to mind without re-
striction or hesitation, no matter how unrelated, painful, embarrassing, or silly it might seem,
access to the unconscious is presumed to be facilitated. We strongly believe that this method
can also be used to reveal unconscious processes in an empirical situation. Furthermore, as
has been shown in early studies, free associations are especially sensitive to subliminal eﬀects
(e.g. Luborsky and Shevrin, 1956; Shevrin and Luborsky, 1958; Stross and Shevrin, 1968; see
chapter 1.2.3). Correspondingly, the experimental eﬀect found in our study was carried by the
free associations, so its retrieval capacity of unconscious processes and subliminal eﬀects could
be clearly demonstrated. The fact that we were only able to demonstrate the rebus eﬀect by
using each subject’s individual associations to the rebus word kampﬂos (individual scoring)
gives converging evidence to the observation made by Fisher (1960b) and later Shevrin et al.
(1996) that the nature and the strength of the subliminal eﬀect depends on the subject’s
personal history and individual ideas and experiences.
But, besides the fact that free associations are apparently able to reveal unconscious processes,
how can we assume that the associations we obtained in the waking state actually revealed
processes which took place during the preceding sleep stage? Or more speciﬁcally, can we
catch a process (primary or secondary process) characteristic for a certain state of conscious-
ness (REM- or non-REM-sleep) in a totally diﬀerent state of consciousness (wakefulness)?
The answer is: Yes, we can! As numerous studies have shown, “the states of consciousness
prevailing in sleep have a certain momentum: although to outward appearances the subject
is awake as he gives his associations, they remain substantially inﬂuenced by the immediately
preceding sleep stage”(Shevrin, 1973, p.62). In other words, “cognitive and physiological com-
ponents of a sleep stage will “carry-over” and inﬂuence waking performance” (Nielsen, 2000,
p.858). This carry-over eﬀect of sleep mentation into the waking state was ﬁrst described by
Fiss et al. (1966) who used the thematic apperception test (TAT) to investigate the types of
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cognition that characterize REM- and non-REM-sleep. Indeed, their hypothesis that the dif-
ferentiating characteristics of a certain sleep stage would persist in the following waking state
could be conﬁrmed. TAT stories following REM-sleep awakenings were qualitatively diﬀerent,
and more “dream-like”, than stories following non-REM-sleep awakenings. Other studies have
supported this carry-over eﬀect (e.g. Lavie, 1974; Stones, 1977; Bertini et al., 1982; Lavie
and Tzichnisky, 1984; Spitzer et al., 1993). Hence, it could be concluded that “qualitatively
diﬀerent cognitive processes are active following and, by inference, just preceding awakenings
from REM- and non-REM-sleep” (Nielsen, 2000, p. 858). That makes our assumption that
the free associations obtained in the waking state reﬂect the mental process prevailing during
the preceding sleep stage justiﬁable.
4.1.2 Dream reports
As opposed to the free associations, the dream reports failed to show signiﬁcant eﬀects, al-
though the expected tendency could be observed (stronger conceptual eﬀect (normative scor-
ing) in the dream reports obtained after non-REM-sleep awakenings, and stronger rebus eﬀect
(individual scoring) in the dream reports obtained after REM-sleep awakenings). Although
it corresponds to the results of the Shevrin and Fisher study, this might be interpreted as a
rather surprising ﬁnding, since Freud explicitly assigned dreams a special function as vehicles
for the primary process (see chapter 1.2.2). Accordingly, he assumed that primary process
transformations can frequently be observed in dreams, an assumption which is in accord with
the early studies of Po¨tzl, Fisher and others, as described in chapter 1.2.2. Hence, one would
expect the primary process rebus eﬀect to be even stronger in the dream reports obtained
after REM-sleep awakenings than within the free associations. Strikingly, the opposite is true
- we found a rebus eﬀect in REM-sleep free associations, but not in REM-sleep dream reports.
However, these studies are not easily comparable. Firstly, there are important diﬀerences in
stimulus presentation - our study is the only study so far dealing with primary and secondary
processing of a subliminally presented stimulus in REM- and non-REM-sleep clearly working
at the ODT. Secondly, earlier studies relied more on visual transformations of the presented
stimulus reappearing in the dream report, while our study and the study of Shevrin and
Fisher (1967) mainly rely on verbal transformations.
Besides these practical and theoretical considerations, statistical problems might account for
the non-existent eﬀect. More speciﬁcally, signiﬁcance might not have been achieved because
of the fact that we have 10 % absence of scorable responses in REM-sleep, and 46 % absence
of scorable responses in non-REM-sleep which limits statistical analyses.
At this point, a more general note on dream research should be made since it is very often
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confronted with strong objections and criticisms. Hobson, for instance, who is one of the
most popular opponents to the idea of dreams being a meaningful and motivated phenomenon,
complains about the“methodological shortcomings and conceptual confusions”(Hobson et al.,
2000, p.801) in the ﬁeld of dream research. Among other things, he emphasizes the following
point:
The most profound problem in studying conscious states is the necessity of reliance on
verbal reports. This method is problematic because these accounts are just reports, not
the subject’s experience of the states themselves. (Hobson et al., 2000, p.802)
Next to the danger of reducing psychological states to narrative reports, Hobson’s comment
touches on an important issue already mentioned in chapter 2.2.3.3 - the diﬀerence between
process and product. We are interested in the investigation of a certain process (namely pri-
mary and secondary process). Since it is very diﬃcult to capture these processes in their pure
form, we often must content ourselves with products and try to draw conclusions about the
underlying processes. The dream which actually occurs in the very state we are interested
in (REM- or non-REM-sleep) as a visual, sensorial, and hallucinatory creation, often enough
escapes from being reported in verbal form - as everybody knows from his own experience.
Hence, the dream reports we obtain after REM- or non-REM-sleep awakenings are not fully
congruent with what we actually experienced during sleep. It is rather the end product of
what was happening during the respective stage. Presumably, it is diﬃcult to capture the
process of interest (primary or secondary process) within the product (the dream report),
which might have led to the non-signiﬁcant ﬁndings. By using the method of free associa-
tions, and assuming a certain carry-over eﬀect from the preceding sleep stage on wakefulness,
however, we hoped (and our results conﬁrm our hypotheses) to get closer to the process itself
(see chapter 4.1.1 above).
Although dream reports following REM-sleep awakenings in the experimental night contained
more bizarre elements, and were rated as being less closer to reality as compared to non-REM-
sleep dreams, the small total amount of bizarre elements still appears striking (see chapter
3.3.2). However, studies have shown that dream reports obtained in the sleep laboratory usu-
ally contain fewer bizarre elements as compared to everyday dreams (Cipolli et al., 1993). Fur-
thermore, Schredl and Erlacher (2003b) demonstrated that external judges ﬁnd signiﬁcantly
less bizarre elements than the dreamer himself. This leads to the question already discussed
above of how well in fact the dream report reﬂects the actual dream experience. Besides, it
can be questioned whether dream bizarreness is generally overestimated. As Leuschner (1999)
points out, dreams in general are not bizarre, sensational, and colourful, but rather gray and
ordinary. But since we remember a dream better the more bizarre it is (Cipolli et al., 1993),
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we tend to infer that most of our dreams are as bizarre and fanciful. Holt gives an excellent
summary of this issue, which is very much in accord with our ﬁndings:
We can be pretty sure that the most bizarre,“dreamlike”dreams occur in REM sleep (. . . ).
It is easy to lose sight of the fact, however, that the great majority of dream reports are
humdrum rather than fantastic, whether they came from awakenings in the laboratory
(. . . ), from diaries kept on morning arisings or from other sources. According to Domhoﬀ
(2001, p.19) they are “in large measure coherent and reasonable simulations of the real
world”. Thus, most dream reports have little that could be coded as manifestations of
the primary process. (Holt, 2009, p.76)
Presumably, the low incidence of bizarre elements accounts for the fact that we did not ﬁnd
a correlation between dream bizarreness and the rebus eﬀect.
4.1.3 Images
We also failed, as did Fisher and Shevrin in their original study, to demonstrate the expected
subliminal conceptual and rebus eﬀect within image descriptions. Although the rebus eﬀect
(individual scoring) is stronger in images obtained after REM-sleep awakenings and therefore
points in the expected direction, it clearly fails to be signiﬁcant. However, statistical analy-
ses for the scoring of image descriptions were even more impaired than they were for dream
reports, since we had 53 % absence of scorable responses in REM-sleep and 47 % absence of
scorable responses in non-REM-sleep. Furthermore, the task of drawing and describing the
ﬁrst picture that came to mind was the last of all the three tasks. Possibly, the subjects were
already too awake after the ﬁrst two tasks (dream report and four minutes of free associa-
tion), so the respective prevailing mental organization from the preceding sleep stage (REM-,
or non-REM-sleep) was no longer suﬃciently strong enough to also show the expected eﬀect in
the image drawings and descriptions. This touches on the question of how long the carry-over
eﬀect (see chapter 4.1.1) actually lasts. This question, however, has not been exhaustively
answered yet, and answers range between several minutes (e.g. Wilkinson and Stretton, 1971)
and 30 minutes (e.g. Sallinen et al., 1998).
Finally, as Shevrin and Fisher (1967) state in their original study, the absence of eﬀects within
the images could be due to the fact that images are primarily visual in nature, whereas the
measured eﬀects of this experiments are largely verbal. Hence, the verbal inﬂuences investi-
gated in this study might not be detectable in the images as a primarily visual experience.
Summarizing the ﬁndings of the rebus and control night, we were able to replicate the original
ﬁndings of Shevrin and Fisher (1967) using the German kampﬂos rebus stimulus. Further-
more, these ﬁndings were put on an even more stable ground, since our results were obtained
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under conditions working at the objective detection threshold (ODT) which cannot be con-
clusively inferred from the original study. Hence, conscious perception in our experiments
could be entirely ruled out, but subliminal eﬀects nevertheless persisted. As revealed by the
free associations, the same subliminal stimulus (a picture of a Kamm and a Floß) enters
sleep consciousness in two signiﬁcantly diﬀerent ways: it is processed on the basis of its con-
ceptual meaning (as an index of secondary process thinking) during non-REM-sleep, but on
the basis of its clang combination and, therefore, on the rebus level (as an index for primary
process thinking) during REM-sleep. In the course of the night, the prevailing transforma-
tions of the subliminally presented rebus stimulus change back and forth depending on the
respective psychophysiological sleep state. It can thus be assumed that “we are dealing across
the sleep-dream cycle with a continuum of unconscious inﬂuences rather than with qualita-
tive diﬀerences” (Shevrin and Eiser, 2005, p.8). Thus, our main hypothesis, that REM- and
non-REM-sleep diﬀer with regard to their mental organization which parallels the Freudian
concept of primary and secondary process thinking, could be conﬁrmed. The subliminally
presented stimulus is indeed processed during sleep. Furthermore, its rebus level can be read
unconsciously and appears in the free associations obtained after REM-sleep awakenings,
where the primary process mode of functioning is supposed to be dominant. Our ﬁndings are
especially remarkable since main eﬀects at the ODT are very rarely found (Snodgrass et al.,
1993; Klein Villa et al., 2006; see also chapter 4.5 below).
4.2 Subliminal versus supraliminal stimulus exposure
Since we were able to demonstrate the expected eﬀects using a subliminal rebus stimulus, the
following question needs to be answered: “Why does the stimulus need to be presented sub-
liminally to get the expected eﬀects?”. Or more precisely: “Would we ﬁnd the same eﬀects if
the rebus stimulus would have been presented supraliminally, or at least for a longer duration
than 1 ms?”
Fisher (1960b) was able to demonstrate that supraliminally presented stimuli are in fact incor-
porated into subsequent dreams as well. However, they reappear in a conceptual, secondary
process way, whereas primary process transformations are only observable after subliminal
exposure (see chapter 1.2.3). Similarly, Shevrin and Luborsky (1958, 1961) and Shevrin and
Fritzler (1968a) found that primary process clang and rebus eﬀects within free associations
could be obtained after the subliminal presentation of the penny rebus, but not after supral-
iminal exposure. Accordingly, Dixon claimed that “not only do unperceived elements in a
tachistoscopic display register and produce subsequent eﬀects, but that these may diﬀer con-
siderably from those produced by the same stimulus if presented above the conscious thresh-
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old” (Dixon, 1971, p.124). Apparently, an unconscious re-working of the respective stimulus -
as in case of subliminal stimulation - is necessary to result in primary process transformations.
Correct identiﬁcation, on the other hand, might “serve to protect perception against primary
process transformations” (Shevrin and Luborsky, 1961, p.487).
However, as stressed in chapter 1.3.1, it is important to distinguish between subliminal stud-
ies working at the subjective threshold and those working at the objective threshold. As
Snodgrass and Shevrin (2006) point out, there is a positive relationship between subjective
threshold eﬀects and stimulus detection. Hence, the eﬀects obtained in experiments work-
ing at the subjective threshold are greater the more the subject approaches the recognition
threshold (e.g. Haase et al., 1999). At the objective detection threshold (ODT), however,
eﬀects are negatively correlated with stimulus intensity. Thus, unconscious eﬀects at the ODT
become even stronger when conscious perception is completely absent as reﬂected in d’ (as
measure for conscious perception) at or below zero (e.g. Bernat et al., 2001b; Klein Villa
et al., 2006). These ﬁndings correspond with the hypothesis of Snodgrass and his co-workers
that conscious perception overrides unconscious perceptual inﬂuences when both are present
(see chapter 1.3.3), as in the case of subjective thresholds. Hence, as soon as any conscious
perception becomes available, the correlation between the subliminal eﬀect and stimulus de-
tectability is no longer negative (as it is at the ODT), but becomes positive. As described in
chapter 1.3.3, this negative relationship at the ODT provides very strong evidence against the
hypothesis that weak residual conscious perception might account for the subliminal eﬀect.
Klein Villa et al. correspondingly found that “even the smallest amount of conscious percep-
tion at the objective detection threshold will diminish subliminal eﬀects” (Klein Villa et al.,
2006, p.133). Hence, subliminal stimulus presentation at the objective detection threshold
reliably assures true unconscious perceptual processes.
One question remains: “Is the duration of stimulus exposure possibly irrelevant, since all
optical impressions leave after-images on the retina - no matter how short or long the actual
exposure was?” This is indeed a legitimate objection, but it misses the critical point. It is
true that all subliminal stimulation initiate some kind of physiological processes - not only
on the retina but within the whole central nervous system. According to Leuschner and Hau
(1992), dreams and subliminal eﬀects in general could thus be called “after-images”. However,
most importantly, the eﬀects measured with the method of subliminal stimulation are based
on mental processes. They arise simply from subjective experience. Or as Shevrin summa-
rizes: “[The] subliminal perception lasts only as long as the brief stimulus presentation, the
rest is memory and memory transformations involving processes of recognition and dynamic
unconscious inﬂuences.” (Shevrin, 2003, p.10).
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4.3 The role of transference
Another question which needs to be answered is: “Why should the subliminal rebus stimu-
lus, of all possible stimuli the subject registers consciously, preconsciously, and unconsciously
during the day, enter the mental processing during the night?” Or: “What makes the experi-
mental stimulus important enough to exert such a strong inﬂuence?”
Fisher, in his early subliminal studies emphasized one important aspect which, unfortunately,
has been largely neglected in most subliminal research thereafter: the role of transference
in the experimental situation (e.g. Fisher, 1954). Transference is deﬁned as “a repetition of
aspects of the experienced past - including one’s unconscious conﬂicts, unconscious (wishful)
fantasies, character traits, identiﬁcations, and various components of one’s original object
relations - in a new and often distorted version, with a new object (e.g. the psychoanalyst)”
(Shevrin et al., 1996, p.25). Introducing the psychoanalytic concept of transference into the
experimental situation, Fisher strongly diﬀers from most cognitive-behavioral experiments
which are designed and carried out as Shevrin puts it, “as if the subjects were tested in an
interpersonal vacuum” (Shevrin, 2000, p.54). Shevrin goes on:
The mind in most cognitive experiments (. . . ) is suspended for study in a sanitized ex-
perimental booth, sound-proofed, electronically-proofed, and person-proofed. The exper-
imental procedure is run oﬀ a computer to which the vacuum-suspended mind responds
on cue. Each mind is considered to be an exemplar of all minds, and the more completely
the experimental procedure is automated (rid of the experimenter’s presence) and rou-
tinized, the ﬁrmer the basis for generalizing from a few minds to all minds. (Shevrin,
2000, p.54)
Very diﬀerently, Fisher focused on the relationship between the subject and the experimenter.
Accordingly, he claimed that the subjects in the early Po¨tzl experiment might have interpreted
the instructions to record their dreams as an indirect command to dream about the presented
picture (Fisher, 1954). This claim is based on the psychoanalytic view of the experimental
situation “as one in which the relationship between the experimenter and the subjects leads
the latter to have a dream structured around several unconscious wishes activated by the total
experimental situation” (Dixon, 1971, p.112). Hence, all dreams obtained within subliminal
experiments are actually transference dreams. Similarly, Fisher was able to demonstrate in his
experiments that subjects who had a good positive transference to the experimenter showed
greater subliminal eﬀects (Fisher, 1960b). It seems to be the transference to the experimenter
which ascribes to the subliminally presented stimulus a special meaning and makes it stand
out against all the other stimuli encountered during the day. Since the relationship between
subject and experimenter seems to be a critical variable which inﬂuences the results obtained,
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Fisher explicitly attempted to establish a positive relationship and a good rapport with all
his subjects.
We do not have objective criteria to describe the quality of transference between subjects
and experimenter in our study. However, some inferential conclusions can be drawn from
the following observations: the study reported here asked a lot of the subjects. They were
willing to “sacriﬁce” their weekends to spend four nights in the sleep lab on four successive
weekends. They agreed to be awakened up to six times per night, accepting they would be
rather tired the following day. Despite these demanding requirements, all the subjects were
very cooperative which cannot be explained by the rather small fringe beneﬁt of 70 e alone.
None of the subjects quit the study, although they had been explicitly informed of being al-
lowed to do so (see chapter 2.2.1). In our opinion, this could plausibly be explained by a good
transference to the experimenter. Furthermore, the nature of the study caused quite intimate
situations. Subjects were sitting in their pyjamas for about one hour while the cables were
attached by the experimenter. They were “observed” in a very private and unprotected state:
during sleep. They were asked to give insight into very personal details: their dreams. Hence,
the subjects allowed the experimenter to enter a very private sphere. Because they did so,
we can assume that they fully trusted the experimenter - which again can be explained with
a positive transference.
The situation described above, in which the electrodes were attached, possibly supported the
development of a positive transference. This procedure, lasting about one hour, very often
evoked quite personal conversations on the part of the subjects. This could be due to the
setting, which has some resemblances to the classic psychoanalytic setting: the subject is
sitting on a chair facing the window. The experimenter is sitting behind the subject, attach-
ing all the cables and electrodes to the head of the subject. Hence, there is no eye contact,
which we assume invited subjects to speak more freely and unrestrictedly about whatever
came into their minds (even though this was not the instruction, of course, since this was not
yet part of the actual experimental situation). Furthermore, although the subjects and the
experimenter were quite close for a very long time, most of the time the subjects could not
really see the experimenter: either the experimenter was sitting behind the subject (while
placing and removing the electrodes), the subject was sitting in front of a screen (during
stimulus presentation and detection experiment), or the subject was either sleeping, or at
least in a very sleepy state. This made it even easier for the subject to project good and
positive fantasies onto the experimenter.
Next to a positive transference, high social desirability could also account for the fact that
subjects were so willing and cooperative. Indeed, subjects scored higher on both subscales of
the German version of the Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (Musch et al., 2002)
than compared to a reference sample of the same age (N = 220), described by Musch et al.
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(subscale self-deceptive enhancement : 41.3 ± 8.1 vs. 39.2 ± 8.4; subscale impression man-
agement : 37.7 ± 8.2 vs. 31.4 ± 9.2). Presumably, one needs to be highly social desirable to
be willing to participate in such a demanding study.
Of course, the point of countertransference (the conscious and unconscious wishes and fan-
tasies on the side of the experimenter) is as important as that of transference discussed above.
In our study, the experimenter had a very positive countertransference to all subjects. This
seems very natural, since she was the one who formulated the hypotheses, designed the ex-
perimental setup, ran the experiments and who has a strong personal and scientiﬁc interest
in the outcome of the study. Hence, there is a high risk of inﬂuencing the subjects and their
behavior (not necessarily consciously) in a suggestive way to obtain the desired results. To
diminish this danger, the experimenter was totally blind to the respective condition (rebus or
control) during the experiments, as well as during the scoring procedure and data analysis.
4.4 The nature of the investigated unconscious processes
In our study we applied the method of subliminal stimulation to investigate unconscious pro-
cesses during sleep, or more precisely to investigate how an unconsciously registered stimulus
is processed during REM- and non-REM-sleep. Although we have used the Freudian concept
of the unconscious as a frame of reference, it needs to be stated that we have not aimed
at investigating the dynamic unconscious (see chapter 1.2.1). In Das Unbewusste (1915)
Freud discusses the ambiguity of the word unconscious to the eﬀect that there is a descriptive,
a dynamic, and a systematic usage of the word. Here, we are not dealing with unconscious
conﬂict and defensive activity related to the dynamic unconscious. Instead, we have investi-
gated the formal shifts in thought organization from REM- to non-REM-sleep. Hence, our
eﬀects are not dynamically, but rather descriptively unconscious. However, the fact that there
is a rebus eﬀect in the free associations (applying the individual scoring rules) proves that
primary process transformations, which are related to dynamic unconscious phenomena, took
place. Similarly, Shevrin claims that all rebus studies investigate “a formal aspect of dy-
namic unconscious thought organization marked primarily by superﬁcial associations in the
form of phonetic transitions and combinations” (Shevrin et al., 1996, p.107). It follows, that
this study has investigated the descriptively unconscious by presenting a neutral, presumably
non-conﬂictual rebus stimulus out of conscious awareness and by demonstrating two diﬀerent
ways of processing principles prominent during sleep. At the same time, however, we have
studied an important aspect of the dynamic unconscious: primary process thinking. Thus,
aspects of both the descriptive and the dynamic unconscious are combined in this research.
It is important to note, however, that although we applied a rather non-conﬂictual stimu-
lus (the kampﬂos rebus), dynamically unconscious processes like repression and defense still
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might have been involved. This is because the Kampf -aspect in the kampﬂos rebus might
indeed trigger something conﬂictual in some subjects, which then becomes subject to repres-
sion and enters the repressed unconscious. In this case, however, we would expect not the
emergence but rather the inhibition of kampﬂos-related associations in the rebus night - and
hence, some kind of a reverse rebus eﬀect (more kampﬂos associations in the control than in
the rebus night). Since this was not true, we can assume that acts of repression or inhibition,
related to the subliminally presented kampﬂos rebus, did not occur in this study.
4.5 Stimulus detectability
As described in chapter 3.1.1 and 3.3.4, our experimental setup was explicitly designed to
assure stimulus presentation at the objective detection threshold (ODT). Subliminality for all
experimental subjects was determined by a detection experiment in which d’ as an index for
conscious perception was clearly at chance (see chapter 3.3.4). Our ﬁnding, that the subliminal
stimulus nevertheless reappeared (after primary or secondary process transformations) within
the free associations obtained after nocturnal awakenings, answers the claim of Macmillan who
states:
Above-chance recognition (i.e. identiﬁcation) performance (or other evidence of acti-
vation) when detection d’ = 0 would be, for almost everyone, persuasive evidence for
unconscious perception. (Macmillan, 1986, p.39)
This claim corresponds to the signal detection theory described in chapter 1.3.1 which calls
for two diﬀerent tasks: one to measure conscious perception, and one to measure unconscious
perception. The ﬁrst task is usually a direct one (here: detection as the most sensitive con-
scious perception index; Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006; Snodgrass et al., 2009), while the latter
is mostly an indirect task (here: free associations, dream reports, image description). In case
of true unconscious perception, the direct measure of conscious awareness is supposed to yield
null sensitivity (here: d’ = 0). Meanwhile, eﬀects on the indirect measure are still observ-
able (here: a signiﬁcant conceptual eﬀect (normative scoring) and a signiﬁcant rebus eﬀect
(individual scoring) within the free associations). Hence, unconscious processes are present
whenever an indirect measure is more sensitive than a similar direct measure to the same per-
ceptual discrimination (Merikle and Reingold, 1992). This means the subject cannot detect
the presence of a certain stimulus in a forced-choice task, but this same stimulus nevertheless
inﬂuences the subject’s behavior - exactly what happened in our study.
As depicted in table 3.10 in chapter 3.3.4 we did not only ﬁnd positive but also negative
d’ s in our subjects. More precisely, half of the subjects had d’ s slightly above zero (max:
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0.80), while the other half had d’ s slightly below zero (min: -0.56). But how can detection be
negative? Indeed, Greenwald et al. (1995) declared the ﬁndings of negative d’ s to be rather
nonsensical and due to measurement error alone. However, as Snodgrass and Shevrin point
out, “this is likely because it is often implicitly assumed that detection is exclusively sensitive
to conscious perceptual inﬂuences” (Snodgrass and Shevrin, 2006, p.68). It becomes more
plausible if below-chance detection is regarded as reﬂecting inhibitory (subjects give more
wrong than right answers in the detection experiment), rather than facilitatory processes.
Similarly, Erdelyi states that “inhibition is a key to subchance perception” (Erdelyi, 2004,
p.85). Hence, as long as d’ is still not signiﬁcantly diﬀerent from zero, a positive d’ does
not imply “better detection”but rather “more facilitation”. Accordingly, a negative d’ implies
“more inhibition” rather then“worse detection”. This hypothesis is supported by the fact that
we found a signiﬁcant negative correlation between d’ and trait anxiety (see chapter 3.3.4).
This means, inhibition of stimulus detection is related to higher anxiety. On the other hand,
the signiﬁcantly positive correlation between d’ and social desirability implies that detection
might be facilitated the more social desirable the subject is.
Personality measures are often implemented in subliminal experiments working at the ODT.
As pointed out by Snodgrass et al. (1993), main eﬀects at the ODT are very rarely found.
Hence, personality factors are introduced to look for interaction eﬀects with stimulus de-
tectability (e.g. Klein Villa, 2006). As described above, stimulus detection in our experiment
was negatively correlated with trait anxiety, and positively correlated with social desirability.
We did not ﬁnd interaction eﬀects between the subliminal conceptual and rebus eﬀect and
detectability or personality factors - but more importantly, we found remarkably strong main
eﬀects for both the conceptual eﬀect (normative scoring) and the rebus eﬀect (individual
scoring) within the free associations (see chapter 3.3.1).
Summarizing, we were indeed able to demonstrate the processing of a certain stimulus (the
kampﬂos rebus stimulus) which has been registered totally outside of awareness. Although
there are several studies dealing with subliminal stimulation and dreaming (see chapter 1.2.3),
this study is, to our knowledge, the only one clearly working at the ODT and thus ruling out
any conscious awareness reliably. Furthermore, next to the original study of Shevrin and
Fisher (1967), it is the only one investigating primary and secondary process thinking during
sleep by using a subliminal rebus stimulus. The common belief holds that consciousness is
required for complex and demanding mental processes. On the contrary, we could demonstrate
that highly complex and creative processes (namely the solving of the rebus picture) can occur
entirely unconsciously. Moreover, in a wake and conscious state, subjects were not able to
solve the rebus level of the presented picture (see chapter 3.3.5).
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4.6 Primary and secondary process eﬀects in the GeoCat night
By applying the classic and the scalar GeoCat stimuli in the third and last experimental
night, we hoped to ﬁnd converging evidence which would support our main hypotheses and
the ﬁndings from the rebus study: that REM- and non-REM-sleep can be distinguished on the
basis of their prevailing mental organization, namely primary and secondary process thinking.
However, the results failed to show the expected results (see chapter 3.4). Although we found,
as expected, a predominance of relational similarity judgments in the classic GeoCat items
after awakenings from non-REM-sleep, we also found the same predominance of relational
similarity judgments after awakenings from REM-sleep. Hence, the hypothesized supremacy
of attributional similarity judgments after REM-sleep awakenings could not be demonstrated.
With regard to the scalar GeoCat items, we found a similar pattern: as expected, relationally
similar items were judged to be more similar than attributionally similar items after non-REM-
sleep awakenings - but also, against our hypothesis, after REM-sleep awakenings. Thus, we
failed again to demonstrate the hypothesized attributional eﬀect after REM-sleep awakenings.
One could assume that diﬀerences in the nature of the tasks within the rebus night and the
GeoCat night contributed to the diﬀerences within the results (expected eﬀect in the free
associations of the rebus night, but not in the classic or scalar items of the GeoCat night).
While both classic and scalar GeoCat items call for a structured cognitive task (which is
presumably going to wake people up), free associations do not ask the subject to focus on
something particular - but to let the mind roam without cognitive demands. As described in
chapter 1.2.3, previous research has shown that the GeoCat items are particularly suitable for
the investigation of primary process thinking under diﬀerent conditions during wakefulness.
However, the cognitively more demanding GeoCat tasks might not be suitable for the inves-
tigation of diﬀerences in primary and secondary process thinking during sleep, since subjects
are too much aroused by these tasks and the “carry-over” sleepiness eﬀect, described in chap-
ter 4.1.1, disappears too quickly.
The question of whether the order of the nocturnal awakenings might account for the fact
that we did not ﬁnd the expected diﬀerences within REM- and non-REM-sleep could also be
discussed. As in the rebus and the control night, we aimed to get six awakenings in total -
three REM-sleep awakenings and three non-REM-sleep stage 2 awakenings. As in the other
two experimental nights, the ﬁrst awakening always was an awakening from non-REM-sleep
and the last one a REM-sleep awakening. Presumably, the relational dominated answer pat-
tern from the very ﬁrst (non-REM-sleep) awakening continued to exert its inﬂuence on the
following (REM- and non-REM-sleep) awakenings when subjects were confronted with the
same items again (although in a diﬀerent formation as for the classic GeoCat items, or in a
diﬀerent order as for the scalar GeoCat items). The “carry-over” eﬀect from the preceding
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sleep stage onto mentation of the immediately following waking state does not seem to be
strong enough to overcome the answer pattern known from the very ﬁrst (non-REM-sleep)
awakening. Thus, responses remain strongly relational when items are repeated after being
ﬁrst seen following a non-REM-sleep awakening.
Vanheule et al. (under review) were able to demonstrate a similar order eﬀect within subjects
who ﬁlled in both the classic and the scalar GeoCat items: participants who ﬁlled in classic
GeoCat ﬁrst have a higher scalar GeoCat relational similarity score, as compared to partici-
pants who ﬁrst ﬁlled in scalar GeoCat. They explained this ﬁnding in terms of familiarization.
The relational score on the scalar GeoCat items is assumed to require more reﬂective con-
scious thought (as an index for secondary process thinking). Hence, “it would seem that when
an item that is comparable to an item one was ﬁrst familiarized with in the [classic] GeoCat
appears again in the [scalar] GeoCat, it is thought of as more similar” (Vanheule et al., (under
review), p.9). This is not the case, however, for the attributional similarity judgments which
are supposed to be less reﬂective (as an index for primary process thinking).
Although the expected diﬀerences in similarity judgments after REM- and non-REM-sleep
awakenings could not be demonstrated, we found a positive correlation between the scalar
GeoCat attributional similarity score and the rebus eﬀect within the free associations (in-
dividual scoring; see chapter 3.4.2). Thus, the stronger the rebus eﬀect, the more similar
attributionally similar scalar GeoCat items were judged to be. This can be interpreted that
both, the rebus eﬀect and the attributional similarity scalar score, reﬂect a similar way of
mental functioning, namely that of primary process thinking. This corresponds with the
ﬁndings of Bazan et al. (personal communication). In their so-called PhonoCat priming ex-
periments, they presented a subliminal prime (e.g. the word door). Afterwards subjects had
to choose the word they preferred out of two alternatives: one alternative was the phonolog-
ical palindrome of the prime (e.g. road) and the other alternative was a word without any
speciﬁc relationship with the prime word (e.g. lung). While the phonological palindrome
is supposed to show a strong attributionally similarity to the prime word and therefore to
reﬂect primary process thinking, this is not the case for the non-related word. Interestingly,
Bazan et al. were able to demonstrate a signiﬁcant positive correlation between the GeoCat
attributional similarity score and the PhonoCat attributional similarity choices (p = 0.003).
Hence, the rebus eﬀect, as well as geometrical and phonological attributional similarity scores,
seem to reﬂect primary process thinking - each tapping this way of mental functioning in a
very diﬀerent manner.
Finally, we found a negative correlation between the scalar GeoCat attributional similarity
score and age for non-REM-sleep (r = -0.540; p = 0.025) and wakefulness (r = -0.581; p =
0.014). The ﬁnding for REM-sleep just failed to be signiﬁcant (r = -0.470; p = 0.066). Hence,
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the younger the subjects, the more similar the attributional similar items are judged to be.
There was no correlation between the relational similarity score and age. Vanheule et al.
(under review), on the contrary, found a positive correlation between relational scalar scores
and age, but no correlation between attributional scalar scores and age. This seemingly
contradictory ﬁnding of Vanheule and his co-workers is actually rather complementary. It
supports the hypothesis that secondary process thinking (as indicated by higher relational
scalar scores) predominates the older the subject is. Our results, on the other hand, support
the associated hypothesis that primary process thinking (as indexed by a higher attributional
scalar score) predominates the younger the subject is (see also Brakel et al., 2002).
4.7 Electrophysiological correlates of primary and secondary
process thinking
As described in chapter 1.6, our last and rather explorative hypothesis was that neurophysi-
ological measures could be used as independent evidence for primary and secondary process
thinking during REM- and non-REM-sleep.
The literature about diﬀerences in alpha and theta power between REM- and non-REM-sleep
yields mixed results. Benca et al. (1999) and Hadjiyannakis et al. (1997), for instance, were
able to demonstrate that alpha power is lower during REM-sleep than during any other sleep
stage. Our ﬁnding, on the other hand, that there is no diﬀerence in alpha spectral power
between REM- and non-REM-sleep, is in accord with the ﬁndings of Armitage (1995) and
Dumermuth et al. (1983) who also failed to ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in alpha power across
sleep stages. With regard to theta power, we found signiﬁcantly higher theta power during
non-REM-sleep as compared to REM-sleep. Again, this is in accordance with the ﬁndings
of Armitage (1995) who described an increase in theta power during non-REM-sleep as com-
pared to REM-sleep. On the contrary, Williamson et al. (1997) found that theta band power
increases progressively from non-REM-sleep stage 4 and 3 through stage 2, REM-sleep and
wakefulness.
In our very preliminary results regarding the relationship between alpha and theta activity
and primary and secondary process thinking, we found no correlation between the alpha power
eﬀect and the rebus eﬀect (as an index for primary process thinking). In view of the fact that
the early studies of Shevrin and his co-workers strongly suggest a relation between power in
the alpha frequency band and primary process thinking (see chapter 1.4.2), this seems sur-
prising. However, the ﬁndings of Shevrin and associates were mainly based on event-related
potentials measured during wakefulness. Hence, one could assume that these results cannot
be readily applied to the sleeping state. The positive correlation between the theta power
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eﬀect and the conceptual eﬀect found within the free associations (as an index for secondary
process thinking), however, was indeed signiﬁcant for the central electrodes (see chapter 3.5).
Thus, increased central activity in the theta frequency band seems to be associated with a
stronger conceptual eﬀect and thus with secondary process thinking on a more logical and
rational level. Since activity in the theta band had been related to higher cognitive function
(see chapter 1.4.1), this correlation supports the idea of secondary process thinking being
the more mature mode of mental functioning reﬂecting ordered and goal-directed thought-
processes (see chapter 1.2). The ﬁnding that the correlation between theta power and the
rebus eﬀect (individual scoring) is non-signiﬁcant further supports this assumption.
Finally, we found a negative correlation between the alpha power eﬀect and the dream
bizarreness eﬀect in the frontal electrodes during REM-sleep. Increased alpha power thus
seems to be related to decreased dream bizarreness and vice versa. This ﬁnding is in accord
with the hypothesis of alpha serving an inhibitory function (see chapter 1.4.1): when alpha
power and therefore its inhibitory inﬂuence is increased, dreams are less bizarre. If the mani-
fest dream content is highly bizarre, however, there is less evidence of inhibition (lower alpha
power). This correlation was not found for non-REM-sleep dreams which is very likely due
to the very small amount of bizarre elements observable during non-REM dreams.
Our interpretation of the negative correlation between alpha power and dream bizarreness
as supporting the alpha inhibition hypothesis is very much in accord with the very recent
ﬁndings of Shevrin et al. (under review). They were able to demonstrate for the ﬁrst time
that alpha event-related synchronization not only inhibits attentional processing of conscious,
neutral stimuli but also unconscious attention to subliminal phobic stimuli. Hence, this ﬁnd-
ing likewise supports the idea “that alpha synchronization serves a general inhibitory function
in brain processing” (Shevrin et al., (under review), p.12). Moreover, the apparent relation
between inhibition (as reﬂected in increased alpha power) and dream bizarreness could be
seen as evidence for the Freudian concept of dream censorship which functions to inhibit un-
acceptable contents. As our data suggests, there might indeed be some inhibitory mechanism
exerting its inﬂuence onto dream content. The existence of something like a dream censor has
been strongly rejected by the critics of psychoanalytic dream theory, ﬁrst of all by Hobson and
his associates (e.g. Hobson and McCarley, 1977; Hobson, 2000). Therefore, our observation
of a close association between alpha power as inhibiting mechanism and dream bizarreness is
crucial.
Summarizing, we could partly conﬁrm our hypothesis that alpha and theta power are related
to primary and secondary process thinking insofar as theta power seems indeed to be associ-
ated to secondary process thinking. Furthermore, we found a negative relation between alpha
power and dream bizarreness which supports the hypothesis of alpha serving an inhibitory
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function and the hypothesis of the existence of a dream censorship.
4.8 Limitations
As in any other study, there are some limitations one has to keep in mind:
• One general limitation concerns the sample size of the study presented here. Although
we studied twice as many subjects as in the original study, a sample size of N = 20 still
limits the degree to which the results can be generalized. This especially concerns statistical
analyses and leads to quite big standard variations. Furthermore, the proportion of male
to female subjects (5:15) does not allow gender speciﬁc statements.
• With respect to the rebus night, the special nature of the kampﬂos rebus stimulus implies
some problematic aspects as discussed in chapter 3.3 and chapter 4.1. By introducing a
new way of analysis (the so-called individual scoring), it was possible to make up for these
problems. Still, it would be advantageous to have a less ambiguous rebus stimulus.
• One clear limitation of the GeoCat night concerns the order of awakenings. One could as-
sume that the expected eﬀect (more attributional similarity choices after REM-sleep awak-
enings, and more relational similarity choices after non-REM-sleep awakenings) emerges if
the order of awakenings is changed so that the ﬁrst awakening is not always a non-REM-
sleep awakening, as it was in our study. As discussed in chapter 4.6, the fact that the very
ﬁrst awakening was always from non-REM-sleep might account for the fact that we found
a predominance of relational dominated answers not only after the following non-REM
awakenings, but also after the following awakenings from REM-sleep.
• Clearly, our results regarding the correlation between the electrophysiological data and
primary and secondary process thinking are very preliminary. Furthermore, the focus of
our study was a replication of the original rebus study, and an extension of it with the classic
and scalar GeoCat stimuli. Hence, we were more concerned with providing our subjects a
sleeping environment as pleasant as possible. Otherwise, it would certainly be advisable
to run the experiments in a sound- and electronically-proofed environment to gain as pure
and artifact-free electrophysiological data as possible.
5. Conclusion and outlook
The present study is an important step in providing experimental validation for a psychoan-
alytic construct. Our goal was to investigate whether REM- and non-REM-sleep diﬀer with
regard to their prevailing form of mental organization, and whether this diﬀerence parallels
the Freudian concept of primary and secondary process thinking. Our main hypothesis (see
chapter 1.6) was that REM-sleep mentation follows the rules of the primary process, while
non-REM-sleep mentation is characterized by secondary process thinking.
The ﬁndings from the rebus night conﬁrmed this hypothesis by showing a rebus eﬀect (as an
index for primary process thinking) within the free associations following REM-sleep awaken-
ings and a strong conceptual eﬀect (as an index for secondary process thinking) within the free
association obtained after non-REM-sleep awakenings. Hence, in diﬀerent psychophysiological
states (REM-sleep vs. non-REM-sleep), diﬀerent kinds of mental organization predominate
(primary vs. secondary process thinking). In other words, one could assume that the sublim-
inally presented stimulus is processed and stored in two diﬀerent memory banks. While one
of these memory banks is organized along primary process lines, the other one is organized on
the basis of secondary process thinking. The former is mainly drawn upon when the subject
enters REM-sleep, while the latter secondary process memory bank is mainly drawn upon
when the subject enters non-REM-sleep (see Shevrin, 1973). The ﬁndings from the GeoCat
night, however, did not reveal these diﬀerences. While a more secondary process answer pat-
tern could indeed be demonstrated after non-REM-sleep awakenings, the expected primary
process answer pattern following REM-sleep awakenings could not be observed. However, as
discussed in chapter 4.6, the nature of the GeoCat tasks, as well as the order of our awak-
enings, could account for this. Finally, our hypothesis that primary and secondary process
thinking are related to increased power within the alpha and theta frequency band could also
only be partially conﬁrmed. While increased theta power is indeed related to the conceptual
eﬀect as an index for secondary process thinking, the expected relationship between increased
alpha power and primary process thinking was not found.
Summarizing, our successful replication of the Shevrin and Fisher (1967) study demonstrates
that REM- and non-REM-sleep can indeed be distinguished on the basis of their prevailing
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thought processes, which match the Freudian primary and secondary process. Together with
the original study, the study presented here is - to our knowledge - the only one applying the
psychoanalytic concept of primary and secondary process thinking on the sleep-dream cycle.
By this, it provides empirical evidence for all three basic principles of psychoanalysis (see
chapter 1.1):
1. The existence of a psychological unconscious: The hypothesis that below-conscious psychic
material inﬂuences and manifests itself in various behaviors could be conﬁrmed by demon-
strating the inﬂuence of an unconsciously perceived rebus stimulus on the free associations
obtained after REM- and non-REM-sleep awakenings.
2. The role of free associations: The relevance of the psychoanalytic method of free associa-
tions to trace back unconscious material could be supported by demonstrating the recovery
of the subliminally presented rebus stimulus within free associations after REM- and non-
REM-sleep awakenings.
3. The existence of two diﬀerent modes of mental functioning: Our ﬁndings provide evidence
that not only do conscious and unconscious processes diﬀer with regard to their prevailing
mental organization, but so too does REM- and non-REM-sleep mentation. While REM-
sleep is characterized by primary process thinking, non-REM-sleep mentation follows the
rules of the secondary process.
Since the discovery of REM-sleep was still more than three decades away, Freud was not aware
of the diﬀerence between REM- and non-REM-sleep dreams (see chapter 1.5). From a con-
temporary point of view, however, one would conclude that Freud was referring to REM-sleep
dreams when he emphasized that dreams are strongly marked by primary process transfor-
mations and mechanisms (see chapter 1.2.2). Although we were not able to conﬁrm this
hypothesis - since we did not ﬁnd the expected rebus eﬀect as a marker for primary process
thinking within dream reports obtained after REM-sleep awakenings - our ﬁndings within the
free associations still conﬁrm the underlying idea: namely that REM-sleep is characterized
by more primary process mentation. To strengthen the ﬁndings from the rebus study, a third
study with the same experimental setup would be desirable. To overcome the problems we
had with our somewhat tricky kampﬂos stimulus, another replication with a less ambiguous
and less conﬂictual rebus might be helpful. At the same time, it would be interesting to
compare male and female subjects to see whether there are gender diﬀerences in the way a
subliminal stimulus is processed during sleep.
Further studies are needed to investigate our hypothesis that our failure to demonstrate the
expected eﬀect during the GeoCat night is due to the disadvantageous order of awakenings.
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Hence, future studies should randomize the order of awakenings so that half of the subjects
gets a REM-sleep awakening ﬁrst, while the other half gets a non-REM-sleep awakening ﬁrst.
In this way, it would be possible to study whether the order eﬀect (always having an awaken-
ing from non-REM-sleep ﬁrst) indeed accounts for the fact that we found stronger relational
similarity judgments after non-REM-sleep and after REM-sleep awakenings. To check our
hypothesis that GeoCat might not be suitable for investigating primary and secondary pro-
cess thinking during sleep, because its cognitive demands are going to wake people up too
much, future studies might wish to change the instruction. By asking “Which ﬁgure do you
like better?” or “Pick one ﬁgure following your ﬁrst intuition.”, one could diminish the cog-
nitive eﬀort and allow subjects to answer intuitively. This might more resemble the task of
giving free associations, which similarly does not require any cognitive eﬀort.
Since our results pointing at a relation between theta power and secondary process thinking
are very preliminary, future research needs to focus on this relationship. Furthermore, more
studies are needed to investigate the association between alpha power and primary process
thinking. Although we were not able to demonstrate a correlation, the studies of Shevrin
and his co-workers strongly suggest a link between increased power in the alpha frequency
band and a more primary process way of mental functioning (see chapter 1.4.2). It is of
great importance to replicate these early ﬁndings. However, it might be more important to
concentrate on the waking state, before also trying to apply the ﬁndings to the sleeping state.
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F. Scoring catalogue
Association (%)
1 HAARE 46.84
2 BU¨RSTE 17.45
3 KA¨MMEN 7.06
4 FRISUR 2.55
5 ZINKEN 2.55
6 FRISO¨R 2.35
7 BADEZIMMER 1.57
8 SCHERE 1.18
9 ZACKEN 1.18
10 HORN 0.78
11 ORDNUNG 0.78
12 MAMA 0.59
13 MUSIK 0.59
14 PLASTIK 0.59
15 GLATT 0.39
16 GLATZE 0.39
17 HOLZ 0.39
18 HOSENTASCHE 0.39
19 LANG 0.39
20 MANN 0.39
21 ZIEPEN 0.39
22 ALTMODISCH 0.20
23 AUFSTEHEN 0.20
24 BART 0.20
Association (%)
25 BLASEN 0.20
26 DU¨NN 0.20
27 EITEL 0.20
28 FRAU 0.20
29 HAARPFLEGE 0.20
30 HORNKAMM 0.20
31 HU¨BSCH 0.20
32 INSTRUMENT 0.20
33 KATZE 0.20
34 KLETTEN 0.20
35 LA¨USE 0.20
36 LOCKEN 0.20
37 MA¨DCHEN 0.20
38 NUTZLOS 0.20
39 OPA 0.20
40 PAPA 0.20
41 PFLEGE 0.20
42 SCHNEEWITTCHEN 0.20
43 SCHO¨N 0.20
44 SHAMPOO 0.20
45 SPIEGEL 0.20
46 STIEL 0.20
47 TUSSI 0.20
Table F.1: Associations to Kamm (Engl.: comb)
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Association (%)
1 WASSER 31.96
2 HOLZ 13.33
3 FLUSS 9.02
4 MEER 4.51
5 ABENTEUER 3.53
6 SCHWIMMEN 2.94
7 HUCKLEBERRY FINN 1.96
8 INSEL 1.96
9 BAUMSTAMM 1.76
10 ROBINSON CRUSOE 1.76
11 RETTUNG 1.57
12 BAUM 1.37
13 EINSAM 1.37
14 FLIEHEN 0.98
15 SCHIFFBRUCH 0.98
16 TREIBEN 0.98
17 FAHREN 0.78
18 FLO¨SSER 0.78
19 SEE 0.78
20 BOOT 0.59
21 FREIHEIT 0.59
22 PADDEL 0.59
23 SPASS 0.59
24 STRAND 0.59
25 URLAUB 0.59
26 BALKEN 0.39
27 BAUEN 0.39
28 GEFAHR 0.39
29 MISSISSIPPI 0.39
30 NASS 0.39
31 PFADFINDER 0.39
32 STAMM 0.39
33 TOM SAWYER 0.39
34 U¨BERLEBEN 0.39
35 UNSICHER 0.39
36 WACKELIG 0.39
37 ABHAUEN 0.20
Association (%)
38 ALLEINE 0.20
39 AMAZONAS 0.20
40 ANGST 0.20
41 CAST AWAY 0.20
42 ENTENTU¨MPEL 0.20
43 ERREICHBAR 0.20
44 FILM 0.20
45 FLOSSFAHRT 0.20
46 FLUSSFAHRT 0.20
47 GERICAULT 0.20
48 INDIANER 0.20
49 KANU 0.20
50 KINDHEIT 0.20
51 LANGSAM 0.20
52 NATUR 0.20
53 NOAH 0.20
54 ODYSSEUS 0.20
55 PIRATEN 0.20
56 RAFTING 0.20
57 RAST 0.20
58 REISEN 0.20
59 RHEIN 0.20
60 RUDERN 0.20
61 SALZIG 0.20
62 SCHIFF 0.20
63 SCHLAUCHBOOT 0.20
64 SEENOT 0.20
65 SPIELEN 0.20
66 STABIL 0.20
67 STEG 0.20
68 STURM 0.20
69 U¨BERQUEREN 0.20
70 U¨BERSCHWEMMUNG 0.20
71 UFER 0.20
72 UNBEQUEM 0.20
73 WEIT WEG 0.20
74 WILDWASSER 0.20
Table F.2: Associations to Floß (Engl.: raft)
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Association (%)
1 AUFGEBEN 21.76
2 SCHWACH 10.2
3 FRIEDE 9.22
4 ERGEBEN 8.24
5 FEIGE 5.29
6 NIEDERLAGE 3.33
7 MUTLOS 3.14
8 SIEG 2.55
9 VERLIEREN 2.55
10 EINFACH 0.98
11 ERSCHO¨PFT 0.98
12 KAMPF 0.98
13 MU¨DE 0.98
14 WEHRLOS 0.98
15 GHANDI 0.78
16 RESIGNIERT 0.78
17 ANGST 0.59
18 BOXEN 0.59
19 ENTMUTIGT 0.59
20 FRIEDFERTIG 0.59
21 KAPITULATION 0.59
22 KLUG 0.59
23 KRAFTLOS 0.59
24 KRIEG 0.59
25 PASSIV 0.59
26 RUHIG 0.59
27 UNTERLEGEN 0.59
28 ARENA 0.39
29 GEWINNEN 0.39
30 GUT 0.39
31 HUND 0.39
32 MUTIG 0.39
33 NEIN 0.39
34 NIEMALS 0.39
35 REDEN 0.39
36 TRA¨GE 0.39
37 UNMOTIVIERT 0.39
38 VERLETZT 0.39
Association (%)
39 AMEISE 0.20
40 ANSEHEN 0.20
41 AUSGELAUGT 0.20
42 AUSGELIEFERT 0.20
43 BODEN 0.20
44 BUDDHISTEN 0.20
45 CHANCE 0.20
46 CHRISTUS 0.20
47 DEPRESSIV 0.20
48 DUELL 0.20
49 DUMM 0.20
50 EHRGEIZ 0.20
51 EINWILLIGEND 0.20
52 ELEFANT 0.20
53 ENTTA¨USCHT 0.20
54 ERLEDIGT 0.20
55 ERLEGEN 0.20
56 ERNIEDRIGUNG 0.20
57 FAUL 0.20
58 FREUNDLICH 0.20
59 FRIEDVOLL 0.20
60 GEGENWEHR 0.20
61 GEWALTLOS 0.20
62 GEWALTTA¨TIG 0.20
63 GLU¨CK 0.20
64 HILFE 0.20
65 HILFLOS 0.20
66 HOFFNUNG 0.20
67 IDIOTEN 0.20
68 KAMPFHUND 0.20
69 KAMPFKUNST 0.20
70 KLEIN 0.20
71 KONKURRENZ 0.20
72 KUNG FU 0.20
73 LASCH 0.20
74 LOOSER 0.20
75 LUSTLOS 0.20
76 MU¨HELOS 0.20
Association (%)
77 NACHDENKEN 0.20
78 NACHGIEBIG 0.20
79 NIEDERGESCHLAGEN 0.20
80 OHNE GEGENWEHR 0.20
81 OHNE KRAFT 0.20
82 OHNESIEGESWILLEN 0.20
83 RITTER 0.20
84 ROM 0.20
85 SCHADE 0.20
86 SCHLACHT 0.20
87 SCHLAFF 0.20
88 SCHLAU 0.20
89 SCHLECHT 0.20
90 SCHMA¨CHTIG 0.20
91 SCHWERT 0.20
92 SCHWIERIG 0.20
93 SIEGLOS 0.20
94 SIEGREICH 0.20
95 SOLDAT 0.20
96 STERBEN 0.20
97 TERRIER 0.20
98 TOT 0.20
99 TRAURIG 0.20
100 U¨BERRASCHEN 0.20
101 UNBEHOLFEN 0.20
102 UNENTSCHIEDEN 0.20
103 UNERFAHREN 0.20
104 UNGEHEUER 0.20
105 UNREBELLISCH 0.20
106 UNTERWU¨RFIG 0.20
107 VERLIEBT 0.20
108 VERSTAND 0.20
109 WEHRHAFT 0.20
110 WEICHEI 0.20
111 WETTKAMPF 0.20
112 WILLE 0.20
113 WORT 0.20
114 WORTGEWANNT 0.20
Table F.3: Associations to kampﬂos (Engl.: without a ﬁght)
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H. Original and modiﬁed versions of
the rebus pictures
Figure H.1: original version of the comb
Figure H.2: modiﬁed version of the comb with more clearly visible teeth to make it easier to identify
as a comb, and less strong contrast to make it more suitable for the tachistoscopic
presentation
152
Appendix H. Original and modiﬁed versions of the rebus pictures 153
Figure H.3: original version of the raft
Figure H.4: ﬁrst modiﬁed version of the raft without the ﬂag to avoid distraction
Figure H.5: second modiﬁed version of the raft with mirrored contrasts to make it less identiﬁable
during the tachistoscopic presentation
Appendix H. Original and modiﬁed versions of the rebus pictures 154
Figure H.6: third modiﬁed version of the raft with even less contrasts
Figure H.7: forth modiﬁed version of the raft with clearer annual rings, ropes, and waves to make it
easier to identify as a raft
Figure H.8: ﬁnal version of the comb and the raft, matched in size and contrast
I. Online rebus competition
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